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Computer security policies often are stated informally in terms of conﬁdential-
ity, integrity, and availability of information and resources; these policies can be
qualitative or quantitative. To formally quantify conﬁdentiality and integrity, a
new model of quantitative information ﬂow is proposed in which information
ﬂow is quantiﬁed as the change in the accuracy of an observer’s beliefs. This
new model resolves anomalies present in previous quantitative information-
ﬂow models, which are based on change in uncertainty. And the new model is
sufﬁciently general that it can be instantiated to measure either accuracy or un-
certainty. To formalize security policies in general, a generalization of the theory
of trace properties (originally developed for program veriﬁcation) is proposed.
Security policies are modeled as hyperproperties, which are sets of trace prop-
erties. Although important security policies, such as secure information ﬂow,
cannot be expressed as trace properties, they can be expressed as hyperproper-
ties. Safety and liveness are generalized from trace properties to hyperproper-
ties, and every hyperproperty is shown to be the intersection of a safety hyper-
property and a liveness hyperproperty. Veriﬁcation, reﬁnement, and topology
of hyperproperties are also addressed. Hyperproperties for system representa-
tions beyond trace sets are investigated.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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xiCHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Computer security policies express what computer systems may and may not
do. For example, a security policy might stipulate that a system may not allow
a user to read information that belongs to other users, or that a system may
process transactions only if they are recorded in an audit log, or that a system
may not delay too long in making a resource accessible to a user.1
This dissertation addresses mathematical foundations for security policies,
in two ways. First, metrics are developed for quantifying how much secret
information a computer system can leak, and for quantifying the amount of
trusted information within a computer system that becomes contaminated. Sec-
ond, ataxonomyisproposedforformal, mathematicalexpressionandclassiﬁca-
tion of security policies. These contributions are best understood in the context
of a select history of computer security policies.
1.1 Historical Background
Security policies have long been formulated in terms of a tripartite taxonomy:
conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability. Henceforth, this is called the CIA tax-
onomy. There is no agreement on how to deﬁne each element of this taxonomy—
as evidenced by table 1.1, which summarizes the evolution of the CIA taxonomy
in academic literature, standards, and textbooks.2 Perhaps the most widely ac-
1Security policies might also express what human users of computer systems may or may
not do—for example, that users may not remove machines from a building. This dissertation
focuses on computers, not humans; Sterne [111] discusses the relationship between these two
kinds of policies.
2Nor is there agreement on what abstract noun to associate with the elements of this tax-
onomy. Various authors use the terms “aspects” [16,47], “categories of protection” [31], “char-
acteristics” [97], “goals” [26,97], “needs” [72], “properties” [58], “qualities” [97], and “require-
ments” [92].
1Table 1.1: Deﬁnitions of the CIA taxonomy. Conﬁdentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability are abbreviated C., I., and A.
Source Year Term Deﬁnition
Voydock and Kent [121] 1983 N/A Security violations can be divided into... unauthorized re-
lease of information, unauthorized modiﬁcation of informa-
tion, or unauthorized denial of resource use.
Clark and Wilson [26] 1987 N/A System should prevent unauthorized disclosure or theft of
information, ...unauthorized modiﬁcation of information,
and...denial of service.
ISO 7498-2 [58] 1989 C. Information is not made available or disclosed to unautho-
rized individuals, entities, or processes.
I. Data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized
manner.
A. Being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized
entity.
ITSEC [30] 1991 C. Prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information.
I. Prevention of unauthorized modiﬁcation of information.
A. Prevention of unauthorized withholding of information or re-
sources.
NRC [92] 1991 C. Controlling who gets to read information.
I. Assuring that information and programs are changed only in
a speciﬁed and authorized manner.
A. Assuring that authorized users have continued access to in-
formation and resources.
Pﬂeeger [97] 1997 C. The assets of a computing system are accessible only by au-
thorized parties. The type of access is read-type access.
I. Assets can be modiﬁed only by authorized parties or only in
authorized ways.
A. Assets are accessible to authorized parties.
Gollmann [47] 1999 C., I., A. Same as ITSEC.
Lampson [72] 2000 Secrecy Controlling who gets to read information.
I. Controlling how information changes or resources are used.
A. Providing prompt access to information and resources.
Bishop [16] 2003 C. Concealment of information or resources.
I. Trustworthiness of data or resources...usually phrased in
terms of preventing improper or unauthorized change.
A. The ability to use the information or resource desired.
Common Criteria [31] 2006 C. Protection of assets from unauthorized disclosure.
I. Protection of assets from unauthorized modiﬁcation.
A. Protection of assets from loss of use.
2cepted, current deﬁnitions (if only because of adoption by North American and
European governments) are those given by the Common Criteria [31, x1.4], an
international standard for evaluation of computer system security:
 Conﬁdentiality is the protection of assets from unauthorized disclosure.
 Integrity is the protection of assets from unauthorized modiﬁcation.
 Availability is the protection of assets from loss of use.
The term “assets” is essentially undeﬁned by the Common Criteria. From the
other deﬁnitions in table 1.1, we surmise that assets include information and
system resources.
These deﬁnitions of the CIA taxonomy raise the question of how to distin-
guish between unauthorized and authorized actions. Authorization policies have
been developed to answer this question. In the vocabulary of authorization
policies, a subject generalizes the notion of a user to include programs running
on behalf of users. Likewise, object generalizes “information” and “resource,”
and right is used instead of “action.” Every subject can also be treated as an
object, so that subjects can have rights to other subjects. Authorization policies
can be categorized as follows:
 Access-control policies regulate actions directly by specifying for each sub-
ject and object exactly what rights the subject has to the object. File-system
permissions (e.g., in Unix or Microsoft Windows) embody a familiar ex-
ample of an access-control policy, in which users may (or may not) read,
write, and execute ﬁles. Access-control policies originated in the devel-
opment of multiprogrammed systems for the purpose of preventing one
user’s program from harming another user’s program or data [74].3
3Lampson [74] gives the canonical formalization of access-control policies as matrices in
which rows represent subjects, columns represent objects, and entries are rights.
3 Information-ﬂow policies regulate actions indirectly by specifying, for each
subject and object, whether information is allowed to ﬂow between them.
This speciﬁcation is used to determine what actions are allowed. Mul-
tilevel security, formalized by Bell and LaPadula [13] and by Feiertag et
al. [43], is a familiar example of an information-ﬂow policy that is used
to govern conﬁdentiality: Each subject is associated with a security level
comprising a hierarchical clearance (e.g., Top Secret, Secret, or Unclassiﬁed)
and a non-hierarchical category set (e.g., fAtomic, NATOg). Information is
permitted to ﬂow from a subject S1 to subject S2 only if the clearance of
S1 is less than or equal to the clearance of S2 and the category set of S1
is a subset of the category set of S2.4 Noninterference, deﬁned by Goguen
and Meseguer [46], is another, important example of an information-ﬂow
policy. It stipulates commands executed on behalf of users holding high
clearances have no effect on system behavior observed by users holding
low clearances. This policy, or a variant of it, is enforced by many pro-
gramming language-based mechanisms [104].
When used to govern conﬁdentiality of information, access-control poli-
cies regulate the release of information in a system, whereas information-
ﬂow policies regulate both the release and propagation of information. Thus
information-ﬂowpoliciesarestrongerthanaccess-controlpolicies. Forexample,
an information-ﬂow policy might require that the information in ﬁle f.txt does
not become known to any user other than alice. A Unix access-control policy
on ﬁle f.txt might approximate the information-ﬂow policy by stipulating that
4The ﬁrst mathematical formalization of security-level comparison seems to be a result of
Weissman [124]; a more general formalization in terms of lattices was given by Denning [36].
Differences between the Bell–LaPadula and Feiertag et al. models of multilevel security are dis-
cussed by Taylor [114]. Multilevel security, in addition to being an information-ﬂow policy, is
an example of a mandatory access control (MAC) policy. In contrast are discretionary access control
(DAC) policies—for example, Unix ﬁle-system permissions.
4only alice can execute a read operation on f.txt. But a Trojan horse5 running
with the permissions of alice would be allowed, according to the access-control
policy, to copy f.txt to some public ﬁle from which anyone may read. The con-
tents of f.txt would no longer be secret, violating the information-ﬂow policy.
Malicious programs such as a Trojan horse might exploit channels, or com-
municationpaths, otherthantheﬁlesystemtoviolateinformation-ﬂowpolicies.
Lampson introduces the notion of a covert channel, which is a channel “not in-
tended for information transfer at all” [73]—for example, ﬁlesystem locks, sys-
tem load, power consumption, or execution time.6 The Department of Defense
later deﬁned a covert channel somewhat differently in its Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria—also known as the “Orange Book” because of its
cover—as “any communication channel that can be exploited by a process to
transfer information in a manner that violates the system’s security policy” [37].
The TCSEC categorizes covert channels into storage and timing channels. Stor-
age channels involve reading and writing of storage locations, whereas timing
channels involve using system resources to affect response time [37].7
Rather than forbid the existence of covert channels, the TCSEC speciﬁes
that systems should not contain covert channels of high bandwidth.8 Low-
bandwidth covert channels are allowed only because eliminating them is usu-
ally infeasible. And sometimes elimination is impossible: the proper function of
some systems requires that some information be leaked. One example of such
5A Trojan horse [7] is a program that offers seemingly beneﬁcial functionality, so that users
will run the program—even if the program is given to them as a gift and they do not know its
provenance or contents. But the program also contains malicious functionality of which users
are unaware.
6Lampson also introduces “storage” and “legitimate” channels. The distinctions between
these and covert channels—as Millen [89] observes—are somewhat elusive.
7Kemmerer [62] seems to be the source of TCSEC’s categorization.
8The TCSEC deﬁnes “high” as 100 bits per second, the rate at which teletype terminals ran
circa 1985. The “Light Pink Book” [91] offers a more nuanced analysis of what constitutes high
bandwidth.
5a system is a password checker, which allows or denies access to a system based
on passwords supplied by users. By design, a password checker must release
information about whether the passwords entered by users are correct.
Research into quantifying the bandwidth of covert channels began by em-
ploying information theory, the science of data transmission. Information the-
ory could already quantify communication channel bandwidth, so its use with
covert channels was natural. Denning’s seminal work [35] in this area uses en-
tropy, an information-theoretic metric for uncertainty, to calculate how much
secret information can be leaked by a program. Millen [88] proposes mutual in-
formation, which is deﬁned in terms of entropy, as a metric for information ﬂow.
These metrics make it possible to quantify information ﬂow.
Much more history of computer security policies could be surveyed, but
what we have covered sufﬁces to put this dissertation in context. The begin-
ning (a taxonomy of security policies) and the end (quantiﬁcation of informa-
tion ﬂow) of our background are the places where this dissertation makes its
contributions.
1.2 Contributions of this Dissertation
Quantiﬁcation of security. Quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow is more difﬁ-
cult than at ﬁrst it might seem. Consider a password checker PWC that sets
an authentication ﬂag a after checking a stored password p against a (guessed)
password g supplied by the user.
PWC : if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0
For simplicity, suppose that the password is either A, B, or C. Suppose also that
the user is actually an attacker attempting to discover the password, and he be-
6lieves the password is overwhelmingly likely to be A but has a minuscule and
equally likely chance to be either B or C. (This need not be an arbitrary assump-
tion on the attacker’s part; perhaps the attacker was told by a usually reliable
informant.) If the attacker experiments by executing PWC and guessing A, he
expects to observe that a equals 1 upon termination. Such a conﬁrmation of the
attacker’s belief would seem to convey some small amount of information. But
suppose the informant was wrong: the real password is C. Then the attacker
observes that a is equal to 0 and infers that A is not the password. Common
sense dictates that his new belief is that B and C each have a 50% chance of
being the password. The attacker’s belief has greatly changed—he is surprised
to discover the password is not A—so the outcome of this experiment conveys
more information than the previous outcome. Thus, the information conveyed
by executing PWC depends on what the attacker initially believed.
How much information ﬂows from p to a in each of the above experiments?
Answers to this question have traditionally been based on change in uncer-
tainty, typically quantiﬁed by entropy or mutual information: information ﬂow
is quantiﬁed by the reduction in uncertainty about secret data [19,24,35,49,76,
82,88]. Observe that, in the case where the password is C, the attacker initially
is quite certain (though wrong) about the value of the password and after the
experiment is rather uncertain about the value of the password; the change from
“quite certain” to “rather uncertain” is an increase in uncertainty. So according
to a metric based on reduction in uncertainty, no information ﬂow occurred,
which is anomalous and contradicts our intuition.
The problem with metrics based on uncertainty is twofold. First, they do
not take accuracy into account. Accuracy and uncertainty are orthogonal prop-
erties of the attacker’s belief—being certain does not make one correct—and as
7the password checking example illustrates, the amount of information ﬂow de-
pends on accuracy rather than on uncertainty. Second, uncertainty-based met-
rics are concerned with some unspeciﬁed agent’s uncertainty rather than an
attacker’s. The unspeciﬁed agent is able to observe a probability distribution
over secret input values but cannot observe the particular secret input used in
the program execution. If the attacker were the unspeciﬁed agent, there would
be no reason in general to assume that the probability distribution the attacker
uses is correct. Because the attacker’s probability distribution is therefore sub-
jective, it must be treated as a belief. Beliefs are thus an essential—though until
now uninvestigated—component of information ﬂow.
Chapter 2 presents a new way to quantify information ﬂow, based on these
insights about beliefs and accuracy. We9 give a formal model for experiments,
which describe the interaction between attackers and systems by specifying
how attackers update beliefs after observing system execution. This experi-
ment model can be used with any mathematical representation of beliefs that
supports three natural operations (product, update, and distance); as a concrete
representation, we use probability distributions. Accordingly, we model sys-
tems as probabilistic imperative programs. We show that the result of belief up-
date in the experiment model is equivalent to the attacker employing Bayesian
inference, a standard technique in applied statistics for making inferences.
Our formula for calculating information ﬂow is based on attacker beliefs be-
fore and after observing execution of a program. The formula is parameterized
on the belief distance function; we make the formula concrete by instantiating it
with relative entropy, which is an information-theoretic measure of the distance
between two distributions. The resulting metric for the amount of leakage of se-
9Joint work with Andrew C. Myers and Fred B. Schneider.
8cret information eliminates the anomaly described above, enabling quantiﬁca-
tion of information ﬂow for individual executions of programs when attackers
have subjective beliefs. We show that the metric correctly quantiﬁes “informa-
tion” as deﬁned by information theory.10 Moreover, we show that the metric
generalizes previously deﬁned uncertainty-based metrics.
Our metric also enables two kinds of analysis that were not previously pos-
sible. First, it is able to analyze misinformation, which is a negative information
ﬂow. We show that deterministic programs are incapable of producing misin-
formation. Second, our metric is able to analyze repeated interactions between
an attacker and a system. This ability enables compositional reasoning about
attacks—for example, about attackers who make a series of guesses in trying to
determine a password.
We extend our experiment model to handle insiders, whose goal is to help
the attacker learn secret information. Insiders are capable of inﬂuencing pro-
gram execution, and we model them by introducing nondeterministic choice
into programs. We show that if a program satisﬁes observational determin-
ism [85,102,130], a noninterference policy for nondeterministic programs, then
the quantity of information ﬂow is always zero.
Previous work on quantitative information ﬂow has considered only conﬁ-
dentiality, despite the fact that information theory itself is used to reason about
integrity. Chapter 3 addresses this gap by applying the results of chapter 2 to
integrity.11 This application enables quantiﬁcation of the amount of untrusted
information with which an attacker can taint trusted information; we name this
10Information quantiﬁes how surprising the occurrence of an event is. The information (or
self-information) conveyed by an event is the negative logarithm of the probability of the event.
An event that is certain (probability 1) thus conveys zero information, and as the probability
decreases, the amount of information conveyed increases.
11Concurrent with the work described in this dissertation, Newsome et al. [94] also began to
investigate quantitative information-ﬂow integrity.
9quantity contamination. Contamination is the information-ﬂow dual of leakage,
and it enjoys a similar interpretation based on information theory.
Moreover, our12 investigation of information-ﬂow integrity reveals another
connection with information theory. Recall that information theory can be used
to quantify the bandwidth, or channel capacity, of communication channels. We
model such channels with programs that take trusted inputs from a sender and
give trusted outputs to a receiver. The transmission of information to the receiver
might be decreased because a program introduces random noise into its output
that obscures the inputs, or because a program uses untrusted inputs (supplied
by an attacker) in a way that obscures the trusted inputs. In either case, in-
formation is suppressed. We show how to quantify suppression; in expectation,
this quantity is the same as the channel capacity. We analyze error-correcting
codes [4] with suppression.
Simultaneouslyquantifyingbothconﬁdentialityandintegrityisalsofruitful,
becauseprogramssometimessacriﬁceintegrityofinformationtoimproveconﬁ-
dentiality. For example, a statistical database that stores information about indi-
viduals might add randomly generated noise to a query response in an attempt
to protect the privacy of those individuals. The addition of noise suppresses
information yet reduces leakage, and our quantitative frameworks make this
relationship precise: the amount of suppression plus the amount of leakage is a
constant, for a given interaction between the database and a querier.
Formalization of security. The CIA taxonomy is an intuitive categorization of
security requirements. Unfortunately, it is not supported by formal, mathemat-
ical theory: There is no formalization that simultaneously characterizes con-
12Joint work with Fred B. Schneider.
10ﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability.13 Nor are conﬁdentiality, integrity, and
availability orthogonal—for example, the requirement that a principal be un-
able to read a value could be interpreted as conﬁdentiality or unavailability of
that value. And the CIA taxonomy provides little insight into how to enforce
security requirements, because there is no veriﬁcation methodology associated
with any of the taxonomy’s three categories.
This situation is similar to that of program veriﬁcation circa the 1970s. Many
speciﬁc properties of interest had been identiﬁed—for example, partial correct-
ness, termination, and total correctness, mutual exclusion, deadlock freedom,
starvation freedom, etc. But these properties were not all expressible in some
unifying formalism, they are not orthogonal, and there was no veriﬁcation
methodology that was complete for all properties.
These problems were addressed by the development of the theory of trace
properties. A trace is a sequence of execution states, and a property either holds
or does not hold (i.e., is a Boolean function) of an object. Thus a trace prop-
erty either holds or does not hold of an execution sequence. (The extension of
a property is the set of objects for which the property holds. The extension of
a property of individual traces—that is, a set of traces—sometimes is termed
“property,” too [5, 70]. But for clarity, “trace property” here denotes a set of
traces.) Every trace property is the intersection of a safety property and a live-
ness property:
 A safety property is a trace property that proscribes “bad things” and can
be proved using an invariance argument, and
13A formalism that comes close is that of Zheng and Myers [131], who deﬁne a particular
noninterference policy for conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability.
11 a liveness property is a trace property that prescribes “good things” and can
be proved using a well-foundedness argument.14
This categorization forms an intuitively appealing and orthogonal basis from
which all trace properties can be constructed. Moreover, safety and liveness
properties are afﬁliated with speciﬁc, relatively complete veriﬁcation methods.
It is therefore natural to ask whether the theory of properties could be used to
formalize security policies.
Unfortunately, important security policies cannot be expressed as properties
of individual execution traces of a system [2,44,86,103,115,117,129]. For ex-
ample, noninterference is not a property of individual traces, because whether
a trace is allowed by the policy depends on whether another trace (obtained
by deleting command executions by high users) is also allowed. For another
example, stipulating a bound on mean response time over all executions is an
availability policy that cannot be speciﬁed as a property of individual traces, be-
cause the acceptability of delays in a trace depends on the magnitude of delays
in all other traces. However, both example policies are properties of systems,
because a system (viewed as a whole, not as individual executions) either does
or does not satisfy each policy.
The fact that security policies, like trace properties, proscribe and prescribe
behaviors of systems suggested that a theory of security policies analogous to
the theory of trace properties might exist. This dissertation develops that the-
ory by formalizing security policies as properties of systems, or system properties.
If systems are modeled as sets of execution traces, as with trace properties [70],
14Lamport [68] gave the ﬁrst informal deﬁnitions of safety and liveness properties, appropri-
ating the names from Petri net theory, and he also gave the ﬁrst formal deﬁnition of safety [70].
Alpern and Schneider [5] gave the ﬁrst formal deﬁnition of liveness and the proof that all trace
properties are the intersection of safety and liveness properties; they later established the corre-
spondence of safety to invariance and of liveness to well-foundedness [6].
12then the extension of a system property is a set of sets of traces or, equivalently, a
set of trace properties.15 We16 named this type of set a hyperproperty [29]. Every
property of system behavior (for systems modeled as trace sets) can be speci-
ﬁed as a hyperproperty, by deﬁnition. Thus, hyperproperties can describe trace
properties and moreover can describe security policies, such as noninterference
and mean response time, that trace properties cannot.
Chapter 4 shows that results similar to those from the theory of trace prop-
erties carry forward to hyperproperties:
 Every hyperproperty is the intersection of a safety hyperproperty and a
liveness hyperproperty. (Henceforth, these terms are shortened to hyper-
safety and hyperliveness.) Hypersafety and hyperliveness thus form a basis
from which all hyperproperties can be constructed.
 Hyperproperties from a class that we introduce, called k-safety, can be ver-
iﬁed by using invariance arguments. Our veriﬁcation methodology gen-
eralizes prior work on using invariance arguments to verify information-
ﬂow policies [12,115].
However, we have not obtained complete veriﬁcation methods for hypersafety
or for hyperliveness.
The theory we develop also sheds light on the problematic status of reﬁne-
ment for security policies. Reﬁnement never invalidates a trace property but
can invalidate a hyperproperty: Consider a system  that nondeterministically
chooses to output 0, 1, or the value of a secret bit h. System  satisﬁes the
security policy “The possible output values are independent of the values of
secrets.” But one reﬁnement of  is the system that always outputs h, and this
15McLean [86] gave the ﬁrst formalization of security policies as properties of trace sets.
16Joint work with Fred B. Schneider.
13system does not satisfy the security policy. We characterize the entire set of
hyperproperties for which reﬁnement is valid; this set includes the safety hy-
perproperties.
Safety and liveness not only form a basis for trace properties and hyper-
properties, but they also have a surprisingly deep mathematical characteriza-
tion in terms of topology. In the Plotkin topology on trace properties, safety
and liveness are known to correspond to closed and dense sets, respectively [5].
We generalize this topological characterization to hyperproperties by showing
that hypersafety and hyperliveness also correspond to closed and dense sets in
a new topology, which turns out to be equivalent to the lower Vietoris construc-
tion applied to the Plotkin topology [109]. This correspondence could be used
to bring results from topology to bear on hyperproperties.
Chapter 5 applies the theory of hyperproperties to models of system execu-
tion other than trace sets. We show that relational systems, labeled transition
systems, state machines, and probabilistic systems all can be encoded as trace
sets and handled using hyperproperties.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
Chapter 2 presents the new mathematical model and metric for quantitative
information ﬂow, as applied to conﬁdentiality. Chapter 3 applies those ideas
to integrity. Chapter 4 turns to the problem of a mathematical taxonomy of
security policies and presents the results on hyperproperties. Chapter 5 extends
those ideas to system models beyond trace sets. Related work is covered within
each chapter. Chapter 6 concludes.
14CHAPTER 2
QUANTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Qualitative security properties, such as noninterference [46], typically either
prohibit any ﬂow of information from a high security level to a lower level,
or they allow any information to ﬂow provided it passes through some release
mechanism. For a program whose correctness requires ﬂow from high to low,
the former policy is too restrictive and the latter can lead to unbounded leakage
of information. Quantitative conﬁdentiality policies, such as “at most k bits leak
per execution of the program,” allow information ﬂows but at restricted rates.
Such policies are useful when analyzing programs whose nature requires that
some—but not too much—information be leaked, such as the password checker
from chapter 1.
Recall that the amount of secret information a program leaks has tradition-
ally been deﬁned using change in uncertainty, but that deﬁnition leads to an
anomaly when analyzing the password checker. We argued informally in chap-
ter 1 that accuracy of beliefs provides a better explanation of the password
checker. This chapter substantiates that argument with formal deﬁnitions and
examples.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Basic representations for beliefs and pro-
grams are stated in x2.1. A model of the interaction between attackers and sys-
tems, describing how attackers update beliefs by observing execution of pro-
grams, is given in x2.2. A new quantitative ﬂow metric, based on information
theory, is deﬁned in x2.3. The new metric characterizes the amount of informa-
tion ﬂow that results from change in the accuracy of an attacker’s belief. The
This chapter contains material from a previously published paper [28], which is c  2005
IEEE and reprinted with permission from Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Computer Security Founda-
tions Workshop.
15metric can also be instantiated to quantify change in uncertainty, and thus it
generalizes previous information-ﬂow metrics. The model and metric are for-
mulated for use with any programming model that can be given a denotational
semantics compatible with the representation of beliefs, as x2.4 illustrates with
a particular programming language (while-programs plus probabilistic choice).
The model is extended in x2.5 to programs in which nondeterministic choices
are resolved by insiders, who are allowed to observe secret values. Related
work is discussed in x2.6, and x2.7 concludes. Most proofs are delayed from the
main body to appendix 2.A.
2.1 Incorporating Beliefs
A belief is a statement an agent makes about the state of the world, accompanied
by some characterization of how certain the agent is about the truthfulness of
the statement. Our agents will reason about probabilistic programs, so we begin
by developing mathematical structures for representing programs and beliefs.
2.1.1 Distributions
A frequency distribution is a function  that maps a program state to a frequency,
which is a non-negative real number. A frequency distribution is essentially an
unnormalized probability distribution over program states; it is easier to deﬁne
a programming language semantics by using frequency distributions than by
using probability distributions [101]. Henceforth, we write “distribution” to
mean “frequency distribution.”
The set of all program states is State, and the set of all distributions is Dist.
The structure of State is mostly unimportant; it can be instantiated according to
16the needs of any particular language or system. For our examples, states map
variables to values, where Var and Val are both countable sets:
v 2 Var;
 2 State , Var ! Val;
 2 Dist , State ! R+:
We write a state as a list of mappings—for example, (g 7! A;a 7! 0) is a state in
which variable g has value A and a has value 0.
The mass kk in a distribution  is the sum of frequencies:1
kk , (
P
 : ()):
A probability distribution has mass 1, but a frequency distribution may have
any non-negative mass. A point mass is a probability distribution that maps a
single state to 1. It is denoted by placing a dot over that single state:
_  , 
0 :if 
0 =  then 1 else 0:
2.1.2 Programs
Execution of program S is described by a denotational semantics in which the
meaning [[S]] of S is a function of type State ! Dist. This semantics describes
the frequency of termination in a given state: if [[S]] = , then the frequency
that S terminates in 0 when begun in  is (0). This semantics can be lifted to
a function of type Dist ! Dist by the following deﬁnition:
[[S]] , (
P
 : ()  [[S]]):
1Formula (?x 2 D : R : P) is a quantiﬁcation in which ? is the quantiﬁer (such as 8 or ), x
is the variable that is bound in R and P, D is the domain of x, R is the range, and P is the body.
We omit D, R, and even x when they are clear from context; an omitted range means R  true.
17Thus, the meaning of S given a distribution on inputs is completely determined
by the meaning of S given a state as input. By deﬁning programs in terms of
howtheyoperateondistributions, weenableanalysisofprobabilisticprograms.
Our examples use while-programs extended with a probabilistic choice con-
struct. Let metavariables S, v, E, and B range over programs, variables, arith-
metic expressions, and Boolean expressions, respectively. Evaluation of expres-
sions is assumed side-effect free, but we do not otherwise prescribe their syntax
or semantics. The syntax of the language is as follows:
S ::= skip j v := E j S;S j if B then S else S
j while B do S j S p8 S
The operational semantics for the deterministic subset of this language is stan-
dard. Probabilistic choice S1 p8 S2 executes S1 with probability p or S2 with
probability 1   p, where 0  p  1. A denotational semantics for this language
is given in x2.4.
2.1.3 Labels and Projections
We need a way to identify secret data; conﬁdentiality labels serve this purpose.
For simplicity, assume there are only two labels: a label L that indicates low-
conﬁdentiality (public) data, and a label H that indicates high-conﬁdentiality
(secret) data. Assume that State is a product of two domains StateL and StateH,
which contain the low- and high-labeled data, respectively. A low state is an
element L 2 StateL; a high state is an element H 2 StateH. The projection
of state  2 State onto StateL is denoted   L; this is the part of  visible to
the attacker. Projection onto StateH, the part of  not visible to the attacker, is
denoted H.
18Each variable in a program is subscripted by a label to indicate the conﬁden-
tiality of the information stored in that variable; for example, xL is a variable
that contains low information. For convenience, let variable l be labeled L and
variable h be labeled H. VarL is the set of variables in a program that are labeled
L, so StateL = VarL ! Val. The low projection L of state  is
L , v 2 VarL :(v):
States  and 0 are low-equivalent, written  =L 0, if they have the same low
projection:
 =L 
0 , (L) = (
0L):
Distributions also have projections. Let  be a distribution and L a low state.
Then (L)(L) is the combined frequency of those states whose low projection
is L:
L , L 2 StateL :(
P
0 : (0L) = L : (0)):
High projection and high equivalence are deﬁned by replacing occurrences of L
with H in the deﬁnitions above.
2.1.4 Belief Representation
To be usable in our framework, a belief representation must support certain
natural operations. Let b and b0 be beliefs ranging over sets of possible worlds W
and W 0, respectively, where a possible world is some elementary outcome about
which beliefs can be held [52].
1. Belief product 
 combines b and b0 into a new belief b 
 b0 about possible
worlds W  W 0, where W and W 0 are disjoint.
192. Belief update bjU is the belief that results when b is updated to include new
information that the actual world is in a set U  W of possible worlds.
3. Belief distance D(b _ b0) is a real number r  0 that quantiﬁes differences
between b and b0.
Although the results in this chapter are, for the most part, independent of
any particular representation, the rest of this chapter uses distributions to rep-
resent beliefs. High states are the possible worlds for beliefs, and a belief is a
probability distribution over high states:
b 2 Belief , StateH ! R
+; s.t. kbk = 1:
Thus, beliefs correspond to probability measures. Probability measures are
well-studied as a belief representation [52], and they have several advantages
here: they are familiar, quantitative, support the operations required above, and
admit a programming language semantics (as shown in x2.4). There is also a
nice justiﬁcation for the numbers they produce: roughly, b() characterizes the
amount of money an attacker should be willing to bet that  is the actual state
of the system [52]. Other choices of belief representation could include belief
functions or sets of probability measures [52]. Although these alternatives are
more expressive than probability measures, it is more complicated to deﬁne the
required operations for them.
For belief product 
, we employ a distribution product 
 of two distribu-
tions 1 : A ! R+ and 2 : B ! R+, with A and B disjoint:
1 
 2 , (1;2) 2 A  B :1(1)  2(2):
It is easy to check that if b and b0 are beliefs, b 
 b0 is too.
For belief update j, we use distribution conditioning:
jU ,  :if  2 U then
()
(
P
0 2 U : (0))
else 0:
20For belief distance D we use relative entropy, an information-theoretic met-
ric [59] for the distance between distributions:
D(b _ b
0) , (
P
 : b0()  log
b0()
b() ):
The base of the logarithm in D can be chosen arbitrarily; we use base 2 and write
lg toindicatelog2, makingbitstheunitofmeasurementfordistance. Therelative
entropy of b to b0 is the expected inefﬁciency (that is, the number of additional
bits that must be sent) of an optimal code that is constructed by assuming an
inaccurate distribution over symbols b when the real distribution is b0 [32]. Like
an analytic metric, D(b _ b0) is always at least zero and D(b _ b0) equals zero
only when b = b0.2
Relative entropy has the property that if b0() > 0 and b() = 0, then
D(b _ b0) = 1. Intuitively, b0 is “inﬁnitely surprising” because it regards 
as possible whereas b regards  as impossible. To avoid this anomaly, beliefs
may be required to satisfy an admissibility restriction, which ensures that attack-
ers do not initially believe that certain states are impossible. For example, a
belief might be restricted such that it never differs by more than a factor of 
from a uniform distribution. This restriction could be useful with the password
checker (c.f. x1.2) if it is reasonable to assume that attackers believe that all pass-
words are nearly equally likely. Or, the attacker’s belief may be required to
be a maximum entropy distribution [32] with respect to attacker-speciﬁed con-
straints. This restriction could be useful with the password checker if attackers
believe that passwords are English words (which is a kind of constraint). Other
admissibility restrictions can be substituted for these when stronger assump-
tions can be made about attacker beliefs.
2Unlike an analytic metric, D does not satisfy symmetry or the triangle inequality. However,
it seems unreasonable to assume that either of these properties holds for beliefs, since it can be
easier to rule out a possibility from a belief than to add a new possibility, or vice-versa.
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Figure 2.1: Channels in conﬁdentiality experiment
2.2 Conﬁdentiality Experiments
We formalize as a conﬁdentiality experiment (or simply an experiment) how an
attacker, an agent that reasons about secret data, revises his beliefs from interac-
tion with program that is executed by a system. The attacker should not learn
about the high input to the program but is allowed to observe and inﬂuence
low inputs and outputs. Other agents (a system operator, other users of the
system with their own high data, an informant upon which the attacker relies,
etc.) might be involved when an attacker interacts with a system; however, it
sufﬁces to condense all of these to just the attacker and the system. The channels
between agents and the program are depicted in ﬁgure 2.1 and are described in
detail below.
We conservatively assume that the attacker knows the code of the program
with which he interacts. For simplicity, we assume that the program always
terminates and that it never modiﬁes the high state. Both restrictions can be
lifted without signiﬁcant changes, as shown in x2.2.4.
2.2.1 Conﬁdentiality Experiment Protocol
Formally, an experiment E is described by a tuple,
E = hS;bH;H;Li;
22An experiment E = hS;bH;H;Li is conducted as follows.
1. The attacker chooses a prebelief bH about the high state.
2. (a) The system picks a high state H.
(b) The attacker picks a low state L.
3. The attacker predicts the output distribution: 0
A = [[S]](_ L 
 bH).
4. The system executes program S, which produces a state 0 2 0 as output,
where 0 = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H). The attacker observes the low projection of the
output state: o = 0L.
5. The attacker infers a postbelief: b0
H = (0
Ajo)H.
Figure 2.2: Experiment protocol
where S is the program, bH is the attacker’s belief at the beginning of the experi-
ment, H is the high projection of the initial state, and L is the low projection of
theinitialstate. Theprotocolforexperiments, whichusessomenotationdeﬁned
below, is summarized in ﬁgure 2.2. Here is a justiﬁcation for the protocol.
An attacker’s prebelief bH, describing his belief at the beginning of the exper-
iment (step 1), may be chosen arbitrarily (subject to an admissibility restriction
as in x2.1.4) or may be informed by previous experiments. In a series of ex-
periments, the postbelief from one experiment typically becomes the prebelief
to the next. The attacker might even choose a prebelief bH that contradicts his
true subjective probability distribution for the state, and this gives our analysis
additional power by allowing the attacker to conduct experiments to answer
questions such as “What would happen if I were to believe bH?”
The system chooses H (step 2a), the high projection of the initial state, and
this part of the state might remain constant from one experiment to the next
or might vary. For example, Unix passwords do not usually change frequently,
but the output displayed on an RSA SecurID token changes each minute. We
conservatively assume that the attacker chooses all of L (step 2b), the low pro-
23jection of the initial state. This gives the attacker additional power in controlling
execution of the program, which he can use to attempt to maximize the amount
of information ﬂow. The attacker’s choice of L is thus likely to be inﬂuenced
by bH, but for generality, we do not require there be such a strategy.
Using the semantics of S along with prebelief bH as a distribution on high
input, the attacker conducts a “thought experiment” to generate a prediction of
the output distribution (step 3). We deﬁne prediction 0
A to correlate the output
state with the high input state:

0
A = [[S]](_ L 
 bH):
Program S is executed (step 4) only once in each experiment; multiple exe-
cutions are modeled by multiple experiments. The meaning of S given inputs
L and H is an output distribution 0:

0 = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H):
From 0 the attacker makes an observation, which is a low projection of an output
state. Probabilistic programs may yield many possible output states, but in a
single execution of the program, only one output state is actually produced.
This output state 0 is produced with frequency 0(0). We write 0 2 0 to denote
that0 isinthesupportof(i.e., haspositivefrequencyaccordingto)0. Inasingle
experiment, the attacker is allowed only a single observation. The observation
o resulting from 0 is 0L:
Finally, the attacker incorporates any new inferences that can be made from
observation o by conditioning prediction 0
A. The result is projected to H to
produce the attacker’s postbelief b0
H (step 5):
b
0
H = (
0
Ajo)H:
24Here, conditioning operator jo is deﬁned in terms of conditioning operator jU.
The new operator removes all mass in distribution  that is inconsistent with
observation o, then normalizes the result:
jo , jf0 j 0L = og
=  :if (L) = o then
()
(L)(o) else 0:
2.2.2 Password Checking as an Experiment
Our experiment model allows the informal reasoning in x1.2 to be made pre-
cise. For example, consider the password checker; adding conﬁdentiality labels
yields:
PWC : if pH = gL then aL := 1 else aL := 0
TheattackerbeginsanexperimentbychoosingprebeliefbH, perhapsasspec-
iﬁed in the column labeled bH of table 2.1. Next, the system chooses initial high
projection H, and the attacker chooses initial low projection L. In the ﬁrst ex-
periment in x1.2, the password was A, so the system chooses H = (p 7! A).
Similarly, the attacker chooses L = (g 7! A;a 7! 0). (The initial value of a is
actually irrelevant, since it is never used by the program and a is set along all
control paths.) Next, the system executes PWC. Output distribution 0 should
be the point mass at state 0 = (p 7! A;g 7! A;a 7! 1); the semantics in x2.4 will
validate this intuition. Since 0 is the only state that can be sampled from 0, the
attacker’s observation o1 is 0L = (g 7! A;a 7! 1).
Finally, the attacker infers a postbelief. He conducts a thought experiment,
predicting an output distribution 0
A = [[PWC]](_ L 
 bH), given in table 2.2. The
ellipsis in the ﬁnal row of the table indicates that all states not shown have fre-
quency 0. This distribution is intuitively correct: the attacker believes that he
has a 98% chance of being authenticated, whereas 1% of the time he will fail to
25Table 2.1: Beliefs about pH
pH bH b0
H1 b0
H2
A 0:98 1 0
B 0:01 0 0:5
C 0:01 0 0:5
Table 2.2: Distributions on PWC output
p g a 0
A 0
Ajo1 0
Ajo2
A A 0 0 0 0
A A 1 0:98 1 0
B A 0 0:01 0 0:5
B A 1 0 0 0
C A 0 0:01 0 0:5
C A 1 0 0 0
::: 0 0 0
be authenticated because the password is B, and another 1% because it is C. The
attacker conditions prediction 0
A on observation o1, obtaining 0
Ajo1, also shown
in table 2.2. Projecting to high yields the attacker’s postbelief, b0
H1, shown in
table 2.1. This postbelief is what the informal reasoning in x1.2 suggested: the
attacker is certain that the password is A.
The second experiment in x1.2 can also be formalized. In it, bH and L re-
main the same as before, but H becomes (p 7! C). Observation o2 is therefore
the point mass at (g 7! A;a 7! 0). Prediction 0
A remains unchanged, and con-
ditioned on o2 it becomes 0
Ajo2, shown in table 2.2. Projecting to high yields
postbelief b0
H2 from table 2.1. This postbelief again agrees with the informal rea-
soning: the attacker believes that there is a 50% chance each for the password to
be B or C.
262.2.3 Bayesian Belief Revision
The formula the attacker uses to infer a postbelief is an application of Bayesian
inference, which is a standard technique used in applied statistics for making
inferences when uncertainty is made explicit through probability models [45].
The attacker therefore reasons rationally, according to Halpern’s rationality ax-
ioms[52], thoughtheliteratureonhumanbehaviorshowsthatthisisnotalways
the same as human reasoning [60,64].
Let belief revision operator B yield the postbelief from an experiment E =
hS;bH; H;Li, given observation o:
B(E;o) , ([[S]](_ L 
 bH)jo)H:
We write b0
H 2 B(E) to denote that there exists some o for which b0
H = B(E;o).
Recall Bayes’ rule for updating a hypothesis Hyp with an observation obs:
Pr(Hypjobs) =
Pr(Hyp)Pr(obsjHyp)
(
P
Hyp
0 : Pr(Hyp
0)Pr(obsjHyp
0))
:
In our model, the attacker’s hypothesis is about the values of high states, so
the domain of hypotheses is State  H. Therefore Pr(Hyp), the probability the
attacker ascribes to a particular hypothesis, is modeled by bH(H). The prob-
ability Pr(obsjHyp) the attacker ascribes to an observation given the assumed
truth of a hypothesis is modeled by the program semantics: the probability of
observation o given an assumed high input H is ([[S]](_ L 
 _ H)L)(o).
Given experiment E = hS;bH;H;Li, instantiating Bayes’ rule on these
probabilities yields Bayesian inference BI(E;o), which is Pr(Hjo):
BI(E;o) =
bH(H)  ([[S]](_ L 
 _ H)L)(o)
(
P
0
H : bH(0
H)  ([[S]](_ L 
 _ 0
H)L)(o))
:
With this instantiation, we can show that the experiment protocol leads an at-
tacker to update his belief according to Bayesian inference:
27Theorem 2.1. B(E;o)(H) = BI(E;o):
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
2.2.4 Mutable High Inputs and Nontermination
Two simplifying assumptions about programs were invoked by x2.2.1: pro-
grams never modify high input, and they always terminate. We now dispense
with these technical issues.
Mutable high inputs. If program S were to modify the high state, the at-
tacker’s prediction 0
A would correlate high outputs with low outputs. How-
ever, to calculate a postbelief (in step 5), 0
A must correlate high inputs with low
outputs. So our experiment protocol requires the high input state be preserved
in 0
A.
Informally, we can do this by keeping a copy of the initial high inputs in the
program state. This copy is never modiﬁed by the program. Thus, the copy is
preserved in the ﬁnal output state, and the attacker can again establish a corre-
lation between high inputs and low outputs.
Formally, let the notation b0
H mean the same distribution as bH, except that
each state of its domain has a 0 as a superscript. So, if bH ascribes probability
p to state , then b0
H ascribes probability p to the state 0. We assume that S
cannotmodifystateswithasuperscript0. Inthecasethatstatesmapvariablesto
values, this could be achieved by deﬁning 0 to be the same state as , but with
the superscript 0 attached to variables; for example, if (v) = 1 then 0(v0) = 1.
Note that S cannot modify 0 if did not originally contain any variables with
superscripts.
28Using this notation, the belief revision operator is extended to B!, which al-
lows S to modify the high state in experiment E = hS;bH;H;Li:
B!(E;o) , (([[S]](_ L 
 bH 
 b0
H)jo))H0:
In this deﬁnition, the high input state is preserved by introducing the product
with b0
H, and the attacker’s postbelief about the input is recovered by restricting
to H0, the high input state with the superscript 0.
Nontermination. To eliminate the second assumption, note that program S
must terminate for an attacker to obtain a low state as an observation when
executing S. If the attacker has an oracle that decides nontermination,3 then
nontermination can be modeled in the standard denotational style with a state
? representing divergence, as follows.
Let State? , State [ f?g, and ?L , ?. Nontermination is now allowed as
an observation, leading to an extended belief revision operator B!?:
B!?(E;o) , (out?(S; _ L 
 bH 
 b0
H)jo)H0:
3An attacker that cannot detect nontermination is more difﬁcult to model. At some point
during the execution of the program, he can stop waiting for the program to terminate and
declare that he has observed nontermination. However, he might be incorrect in doing so—
leading to beliefs about nontermination and instruction timings. The interaction of these beliefs
with beliefs about high inputs would be complex; we do not address it here.
29Observation o is now produced from output distribution 0 = out?(S; _ L 
 _ H).
Function out?(S;) produces a distribution which yields the frequency that S
terminates, or fails to terminate, on input distribution :
out?(S;) ,  : State? :if  = ?
then kk   k[[S]]k
else ([[S]])():
If S does not terminate on some input states in , output distribution [[S]] will
contain less mass than ; otherwise, kk = k[[S]]k. Missing mass corresponds to
nontermination [83,101], so out? maps the missing mass to ?.
2.3 Quantiﬁcation of Information Flow
The informal analysis of PWC in x1.2 suggests that information ﬂow corre-
sponds to an improvement in the accuracy of an attacker’s belief. We now for-
malize that analysis by using change in accuracy, as measured by belief distance
D, to quantify information ﬂow.
2.3.1 Information Flow from an Outcome
Given an experiment E = hS;bH;H;Li, an outcome is a postbelief b0
H such that
b0
H 2 B(E), where B is the belief revision operator from x2.2.3. Recall from x2.1.4
that D(b _ b0) is the distance from belief b to belief b0. The accuracy of the
attacker’s prebelief bH in experiment E is D(bH _ _ H); the accuracy of outcome
b0
H, the attacker’s postbelief, is D(b0
H _ _ H).
30We deﬁne the amount of information ﬂow Q caused by outcome b0
H of ex-
periment E as the difference of those two quantities:
Q(E;b
0
H) , D(bH _ _ H)   D(b
0
H _ _ H):
Thus quantity of ﬂow Q is the improvement in the accuracy of the attacker’s be-
lief. This amount can positive or negative; we defer discussion of negative ﬂow
to x2.3.3. Since D is instantiated with relative entropy, the unit of measurement
for Q is (information-theoretic) bits.
With an additional deﬁnition from information theory, a more consequential
characterization of Q is possible. Let I(F) denote the information contained in
event F drawn from probability distribution :
I(F) ,  lgPr(F):
Information is sometimes called “surprise” because I quantiﬁes how surprising
an event is; for example, when an event that has probability 1 occurs, no infor-
mation (0 bits) is conveyed because the occurrence is completely unsurprising.
For an attacker, the outcome of an experiment involves two unknowns:
the initial high state H and the probabilistic choices made by the program.
Let S = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H)  L be the system’s distribution on low outputs, and
A = [[S]](_ L 
bH)L be the attacker’s distribution on low outputs. IA(o) quan-
tiﬁes the information contained in o about both unknowns, but IS(o) quanti-
ﬁes only the probabilistic choices made by the program.4 For programs that
make no probabilistic choices, A contains information about only the initial
high state, and S is a point mass at some state  such that L = o. So amount
of information IS(o) is 0. For probabilistic programs, IS(o) is generally not
4The technique used in x2.2.4 for modeling nontermination ensures that A and S are prob-
ability distributions. Thus, IA and IS are well-deﬁned.
31equal to 0; subtracting it removes all the information contained in IA(o) that is
solely about the results of probabilistic choices, leaving information only about
high inputs.
The following theorem states that Q quantiﬁes the information about high
input H contained in observation o:
Theorem 2.2. Q(E;b0
H) = IA(o)   IS(o):
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
As an example, consider the experiments involving PWC in x2.2.2. The ﬁrst
experiment E1 has the attacker correctly guess the password A, so
E1 = hPWC;bH;(p 7! A);(g 7! A;a 7! 0)i;
wheretable2.1deﬁnesbH (andtheotherbeliefsusedbelow). Onlyoneoutcome,
b0
H1, is possible from this experiment. We calculate the amount of ﬂow from this
outcome, letting H = (p 7! A):
Q(E1;b0
H1) = D(bH _ _ H)   D(b0
H1 _ _ H)
= (
P
0
H : _ H(0
H)  lg
_ H(0
H)
bH(0
H))   (
P
0
H : _ H(0
H)  lg
_ H(0
H)
b0
H1(0
H))
=  lgbH(H) + lgb0
H1(H)
= 0:0291
This small ﬂow makes sense because the outcome has only conﬁrmed some-
thing the attacker already believed to be almost certainly true. In experiment E2
the attacker guesses incorrectly:
E2 = hPWC;bH;(p 7! C);(g 7! A;a 7! 0)i:
Again, only one outcome is possible from this experiment, and calculating
Q(E2;b0
H2) yields an information ﬂow of 5:6439 bits. This higher information
32ﬂow makes sense, because the attacker’s postbelief is much closer to correctly
identifying the high state. The attacker’s prebelief bH ascribed a 0:02 probability
to the event p 6= A, and the information conveyed by an event with probability
0:02 is 5:6439. This suggests that Q is the right metric for the information about
high input contained in the observation.
Theinformationﬂowof5:6439 bitsinexperimentE2 mightseemsurprisingly
high. At most two bits are required to store password p in memory, so why
does the program leak more than ﬁve bits? Here, the greater leakage occurs
because the attacker’s belief is not uniform. A uniform prebelief (ascribing 1=3
probability to each password A, B, and C) would, in a series of experiments,
cause the attacker to learn a total of lg3  1:6 bits. However, belief bH is more
erroneous than the uniform belief, so a larger amount of information is required
to correct it.
An uncertainty-based deﬁnition for information ﬂow does not produce a
reasonable leakage for this experiment. The attacker’s initial uncertainty about
p is H(bH) = 0:1614 bits, where H is the information-theoretic metric of entropy,
or uncertainty, in a probability distribution :
H() ,  (
P
 : ()  lg()):
In the second experiment, the attacker’s ﬁnal uncertainty about p is H(bH2) = 1.
The reduction in uncertainty is 0:1614   1 =  0:8386, hence there is actually
an increase in uncertainty. So the uncertainty-based analysis that we have per-
formed is forced to conclude that information did not ﬂow to the attacker. But
this is clearly not the case—the attacker’s belief has been guided closer to reality
by the experiment. The uncertainty-based analysis ignores reality by comparing
bH and bH2 against themselves, instead of against the high state H.
332.3.2 Interpreting Metric Q
According to theorem 2.2, metric Q correctly quantiﬁes the amount of informa-
tion ﬂow, in bits. But what does it mean to leak one bit of information? The
next theorem states that k bits of leakage correspond to a k-fold doubling of the
probability that the attacker ascribes to reality.
Theorem 2.3. Let E = hS;bH;H;Li. Then:
Q(E;b
0
H) = k  b
0
H(H) = 2
k  bH(H):
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
Suppose an attacker were to guess what reality is by sampling from his belief
bH; the probability he guesses correctly is bH(H). Thus, by theorem 2.3, one bit
of leakage makes the attacker twice as likely to guess correctly. This reveals
an interesting analogy with the uncertainty-based deﬁnition. In it, one bit of
leakage corresponds to the attacker becoming twice as certain about the high
state, though he may, as the example in x2.3.1 shows, become certain about the
wrong high state. However, one bit of leakage in our accuracy-based deﬁnition
corresponds to the attacker becoming twice as certain about the correct high
state.
2.3.3 Accuracy, Uncertainty, and Misinformation
Accuracy and uncertainty are orthogonal properties of beliefs, as depicted in
ﬁgure 2.3. The ﬁgure shows the change in an attacker’s accuracy and uncer-
tainty when the program
FLIP : l := h 0:998 l := :h
34bH = h0:5;0:5i
o = (l 7! 1)
bH = h0:5;0:5i
o = (l 7! 0)
bH = h0:99;0:01i
o = (l 7! 1)
bH = h0:01;0:99i
o = (l 7! 0)
- 
6
?
Less accurate More accurate
More certain
Less certain
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Figure 2.3: Effect of FLIP on postbelief
Table 2.3: Analysis of FLIP
Quadrant
I II III IV
bH(h 7! 0) 0:5 0:5 0:99 0:01
bH(h 7! 1) 0:5 0:5 0:01 0:99
o (l 7! 0) (l 7! 1) (l 7! 1) (l 7! 0)
b0
H(h 7! 0) 0:99 0:01 0:5 0:5
b0
H(h 7! 1) 0:01 0:99 0:5 0:5
Increase in accuracy +0:9855  5:6439  0:9855 +5:6439
Reduction in uncertainty +0:9192 +0:9192  0:9192  0:9192
is analyzed with experiment E = hFLIP;bH;(h 7! 0);(l 7! 0)i and observation
o is generated by the experiment. The notation bH = hx;yi in ﬁgure 2.3 means
that bH(h 7! 0) = x and bH(h 7! 1) = y.
Usually, FLIP sets l to be h, so the attacker will expect this to be the case.
Executions in which this occurs will cause his postbelief to be more accurate,
but may cause his uncertainty to either increase or decrease, depending on his
prebelief; when uncertainty increases, an uncertainty metric would mistakenly
say that no ﬂow has occurred.
With probability 0:01, FLIP produces an execution that fools the attacker
and sets l to be :h, causing his belief to become less accurate. The decrease in
35accuracy results in misinformation, which is a negative information ﬂow. When
theattacker’sprebeliefisalmostcompletelyaccurate, suchexecutionswillmake
him more uncertain. But when the attacker’s prebelief is uniform, executions
that result in misinformation will make him less uncertain; when uncertainty
decreases, an uncertainty metric would mistakenly say that ﬂow has occurred.
Table 2.3 concretely demonstrates the orthogonality of accuracy and uncer-
tainty. The quadrant labels refer to ﬁgure 2.3. The attacker’s prebelief bH, ob-
servation o, and resulting postbelief b0
H are given in the top half of the table. In
the bottom half of the table, increase in accuracy is calculated using information
ﬂow metric Q, and reduction in uncertainty is calculated using the difference in
entropy H(bH)   H(b0
H). The symmetries in the bottom half of the table are a
result of the symmetries between prebeliefs and postbeliefs. Quadrants II and
IV, for example, have exchanged these beliefs, which for both metrics has the
effect of negating the amount of information ﬂow.
The probabilistic choice in FLIP is essential for producing misinformation,
as shown by the following theorem. Let Det be the set of syntactically deter-
ministic programs, i.e., programs that do not contain any probabilistic choice.
Because they lack a source of randomness, these programs cannot decrease the
accuracy of an attacker’s belief:
Theorem 2.4. S 2 Det =) 8E;b0
H 2 B(E) : Q(E;b0
H)  0:
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
2.3.4 Emulating Uncertainty
The accuracy metric of x2.3.1 generalizes uncertainty metrics. Informally, this is
because uncertainty metrics recognize only two distributions (belief before and
36after execution), whereas our framework recognizes these plus one additional
distribution (reality). By ignoring reality, our framework can produce the same
results as many uncertainty metrics. Here we show how to emulate the metric
of Clark et al. [25].
Let A, B, and C be random variables. The conditional mutual information
I(A;BjC) is the amount of uncertainty about the value of A that is resolved
by learning the value of B, given prior knowledge of the value of C [32]. Con-
ditional mutual information is deﬁned using a generalization of the entropy
function from x2.3.1 to conditional entropy [32]:
I(A;BjC) , H(AjC)   H(AjB;C)
=
X
a
X
b
X
c
Pr(a;b;c)lg
Pr(a;bjc)
Pr(ajc)  Pr(bjc)
:
In this deﬁnition, a abbreviates A = a, etc. The probability is taken with respect
to the joint distribution on A, B, and C.
The metric of Clark et al. states that the amount of information ﬂow L from
high input Hin into low output Lout, given low input Lin,5 is the mutual infor-
mation between Hin and Lout, given Lin:
L(Hin;Lin;Lout) , I(Hin;LoutjLin):
First, to instantiate our framework to that of Clark et al., we force our frame-
work to ignore reality by introducing an admissibility restriction (c.f. x2.1.4):
prebeliefs must be identical to the system’s chosen high input distribution. This
means that prebeliefs must be correct; there can be no error in the attacker’s
estimate of the probability distribution on high inputs.
Second, we adjust the deﬁnition of belief. The uncertainty model of Clark et
al. calculates information ﬂow as an expectation over a probability distribution
5Their metric more generally allows the quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow into any subset
of the output variables. The approach we give here can similarly be generalized.
37on both low and high inputs. We could model this using the techniques about
to be introduced in x2.3.5 and x2.3.6, but because of the admissibility restriction
just made, it is equivalent and simpler to allow beliefs to range over low state
as well as high state. As before, we assume that high state remains constant
using the copying technique of x2.2.4. Since beliefs now include low state, we
must also apply this technique to assure that the initial values of low variables
are preserved in the state. Let the low input component of the state be denoted
L0. Assume that the attacker’s prebelief b ranges over L0 [ H0, whereas his
postbelief b0 ranges over L0 [ H0 [ L [ H.
We want to establish that accuracy metric Q yields the same result as uncer-
tainty metric L for any outcome. Recall that Q is deﬁned in terms of distance
function D. Our previous instantiation of D as relative entropy yielded an ac-
curacy metric. Now we reinstantiate D using (non-relative) entropy:
D(b _ b
0) = H(b(L [ L
0 [ H
0))   H(b(L [ L
0)):
Observe that this instantiation ignores argument b0, the belief representing real-
ity. Let Hin = _ H, Lin = _ L, and Lout = 0L, where 0 is the output distribution
from the experiment protocol. This yields that amount of information ﬂow Q is
the same as uncertainty metric L:
Theorem 2.5. Q(E;b0) = L(Hin;Lin;Lout).
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
We discuss another relationship between accuracy and uncertainty in x2.3.6.
382.3.5 Expected Flow for an Experiment
Sinceanexperimentonaprobabilisticprogramcanproducemanyobservations,
and therefore many outcomes, it is desirable to characterize expected ﬂow over
those outcomes. So we deﬁne expected ﬂow QE over all observations from ex-
periment E:
QE(E) , Eo20L[Q(E;B(E;o))]
= (
P
o : (0L)(o)  Q(E;([[S]](_ L 
 bH)jo)H))
where 0  L = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H)  L is the distribution on observations; E2[X(y)]
is the expected value of expression X, which has free variable y, with respect to
distribution ; and B is the belief revision operator from x2.2.3.
Expected ﬂow is useful in analyzing probabilistic programs. Consider a
faulty password checker:
FPWC : if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0;
a := :a 0:18 skip
With probability 0:1, FPWC inverts the authentication ﬂag. Can this program
be expected to confound attackers—does FPWC leak less expected information
than PWC? This question can be answered by comparing the expected ﬂow
from FPWC to the ﬂow of PWC. Table 2.4 gives information ﬂows from FPWC
for experiments EF
1 and EF
2 , which are identical to E1 and E2 from x2.3.1, except
that they execute FPWC instead of PWC. Observations (a 7! 0) and (a 7! 1)
correspond to an execution where the value of a is inverted. The ﬂow for the
outcomes resulting from these observations is negative, indicating that the pro-
gram is giving the attacker misinformation. Note that, for both pairs of experi-
ments in table 2.4, the expected ﬂow of FPWC is less than the ﬂow of PWC. We
have conﬁrmed that the random corruption of a makes it more difﬁcult for the
attacker to increase the accuracy of his belief.
39Table 2.4: Leakage of PWC and FPWC
E o Q(E;B(E;o)) QE(E)
E1 (a 7! 1) 0:0291 0:0291
(a 7! 0) impossible
EF
1 (a 7! 1) 0:0258 0:0018
(a 7! 0)  0:2142
E2 (a 7! 1) impossible 5:6439
(a 7! 0) 5:6439
EF
2 (a 7! 1)  3:1844 2:3421
(a 7! 0) 2:9561
Expected ﬂow can be conservatively approximated by conditioning on a sin-
gle distribution rather than conditioning on many observations. Conditioning
 on L has the effect of making the low projection of  identical to L, while
leaving the high projection of jL unchanged for all L:
jL ,  :
()
(L)(L)
 L(L):
A bound on expected ﬂow is then calculated as follows. Given experiment
E = hS;bH;H;Li, let 0 be the distribution that results from the system ex-
ecuting S as in step 4 of the experiment protocol, i.e., 0 = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H). In
the experiment protocol, an attacker would observe the low projection of a
state from 0. But suppose that the attacker instead observed the low projec-
tion of 0 itself. (This projection is the distribution over observations that the
attacker would approach if he continued to repeat E.) Let eH be the postbelief
that results from conditioning on this distribution, as in step 5 of the protocol:
eH = (([[S]](_ L 
 bH))j(0  L))  H. Intuitively, eH is the attacker’s expected
postbelief with respect to 0L. The amount of information ﬂow from expected
postbelief eH then bounds the expected amount of information ﬂow:
40Theorem 2.6. Let:
E = hS;bH;H;Li;
0 = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H);
eH = (([[S]](_ L 
 bH))j(0L))H:
Then:
QE(E)  Q(E;eH):
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
As an example, consider experiment EF
2 . Calculating the attacker’s expected
postbelief eH in this experiment yields eH = h0:8601;0:0699;0:0699i, using the
postbelief notation from x2.3.3. Bound Q(E;eH) from theorem 2.6 is thus 6:4264
bits, which is indeed greater than expected ﬂow QE as calculated in table 2.4.
2.3.6 Expected Flow over All Experiments
Uncertainty-based metrics typically consider the expected information ﬂow
over all experiments, rather than the ﬂow in a single experiment. An analy-
sis, like ours, based on single experiments allows a more expressive language
of security properties in which particular inputs or experiments can be consid-
ered. Moreover, our analysis can be extended to calculate expected ﬂow over all
experiments.
Rather than choosing particular high input states H, the system may choose
distribution H over high states. A distribution over high inputs could be used,
for example, to determine the expected ﬂow of the password checker when
users’ choice of passwords can be described by a distribution. Distribution H
is sampled to produce the initial high input state. Taking the expectation in QE
41with respect to both H and o then yields the expected ﬂow over all experiments
for a given low input L.
The expected ﬂow over all experiments can be characterized using condi-
tional mutual information (c.f. x2.3.4). Let Hin denote the distribution over high
inputs, Lin over low inputs, and Lout over low outputs. For an experiment
E = hS;bH;H;Li, distribution Hin is H, distribution Lin is _ L, and distribution
Lout is 0L, where 0 is the output distribution from the experiment protocol. If
system distribution H is identical to attacker prebelief bH (i.e., there is no error
in the attacker’s estimate of the probability distribution on high inputs), the ex-
pectedﬂowoverallexperimentsforagivenlowinputisequaltotheconditional
mutual information between Hin and Lout given Lin:
Theorem 2.7. Let E = hS;bH;H;Li, where bH = H. Then:
QE(E) = I(Hin;LoutjLin):
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
This theorem means that our metric for expected information ﬂow agrees
with uncertainty metrics (such as Clark et al. [24]) if attackers have beliefs that
do not differ from reality—that is, if the attacker’s belief is equal to the system’s
distribution on high inputs. This requirement is unsurprising, because uncer-
tainty metrics do not distinguish between beliefs and reality.
The attacker may also choose distribution L over low states. This extension
increases the expressive power of the experiment model—for example, the at-
tacker can use L to express a randomized guessing strategy. His distribution
might also be a function of his belief; we do not address such attacker strategies
here.
422.3.7 Maximum Information Flow
System designers are likely to want to limit the maximum possible information
ﬂow. We characterize the maximum amount of information ﬂow that program
S can cause in a single outcome as the maximum amount of ﬂow from any
outcome of any experiment E = hS;bH;H;Li on S:
Qmax(S) , maxfQ(E;b
0
H) j E;b
0
H 2 B(E)g:
Consider applying Qmax to PWC. Assume that bH is a uniform distribution,
representing a lack of belief for any particular password, over k-bit passwords.
If the attacker guesses correctly, the maximum leakage is k bits according to
Qmax. But if the attacker guesses incorrectly, PWC can leak at most k lg(2k 1)
bits in an outcome; for k > 12 this is less than 0:0001 bits.
Uncertainty metrics typically declare that the maximum possible informa-
tion ﬂow is lgjStateHj; this is the number of bits necessary to store the high
state. This was true for the example of k-bit passwords above. However, as
experiment E2 from x2.3.1 shows, this declaration is valid only if the attacker’s
prebelief is no more inaccurate than the uniform distribution. Thus uncertainty
metrics make an implicit restriction on attacker beliefs that our accuracy metric
does not.
2.3.8 Repeated Experiments
Nothing precludes performing a series of experiments. The most interesting
case has the attacker return to step 2b of the experiment protocol in ﬁgure 2.2
after updating his belief in step 5—that is, the system keeps the high input to the
program constant, and the attacker is allowed to check new low inputs based
on the results of previous experiments.
43Table 2.5: Repeated experiments on PWC
Repetition
1 2
bH : A 0:98 0
B 0:01 0:5
C 0:01 0:5
L(g) A B
o(a) 0 0
b0
H : A 0 0
B 0:5 0
C 0:5 1
Q(E;b0
H) 5:6439 1:0
Suppose that experiment E2 from x2.3.1 is conducted and repeated with
L = (g 7! B). Then the attacker’s belief about the password evolves as shown
in table 2.5. Summing the information ﬂow for each experiment yields a total
information ﬂow of 6:6439. This total corresponds to what Q would calculate
for a single experiment, if that experiment changed prebelief bH to postbelief
b0
H2, where b0
H2 is the attacker’s ﬁnal postbelief in table 2.5:
D(bH _ _ H)   D(b0
H2 _ _ H) = 6:6439   0
= 6:6439
This example suggests that, given a series of experiments in which the post-
belief from one experiment becomes the prebelief to the next, the ﬁnal postbelief
contains all the information learned during the series. Let Ei = hS;bHi;H;Lii
be the ith experiment in the series, and let b0
Hi be the outcome from Ei. Let pre-
belief bHi in experiment Ei be chosen as postbelief b0
Hi 1 from experiment Ei 1.
Let bH1 be the attacker’s prebelief for the entire series. Let n be the length of the
series. The following theorem states that the ﬁnal postbelief does contain all the
information:
44Theorem 2.8. D(bH1 _ _ H)   D(b0
Hn _ _ H) = (
P
i : 1  i  n : Q(Ei;b0
Hi)):
Proof. Immediate by the deﬁnition of Q and arithmetic.
Consequently, our experiment model enables compositional reasoning about
series of attacks.
2.3.9 Number of Experiments
Attackers conduct experiments to reﬁne their beliefs. This suggests another
quantiﬁcation of the security of a program: the number of experiments required
for an attacker to reﬁne his belief to within some distance of reality. For sim-
plicity, assume that program S is deterministic,6 such that only one observation
is possible from an experiment. Then belief revision B (from x2.2.3) can be used
as a function from experiments to postbeliefs. Let A : Belief ! StateL be the
attacker’s strategy for choosing low inputs based on his beliefs. Deﬁne the ith
iteration of B as Bi:
Bi(S;bH;H;A) , B(S;b0
H;H;A(b0
H));
where b0
H = Bi 1(S;bH;H;A);
B1(S;bH;H;A) , B(S;bH;H;A(bH)):
Then the number of experiments N needed to achieve a postbelief within dis-
tance  of reality is:
N(S;bH;H;A) , minfi j D(Bi(S;bH;H;A) _ H)  g:
As discussed in x2.3.2, when an attacker’s belief is k bits distant from re-
ality, the probability he ascribes to the correct high state is 1=2k. If the attacker
6If program S is probabilistic, B(E) could instead be deﬁned as a random variable giving the
probability with which the attacker holds a postbelief. This would allow the deﬁnition of the
expected number of experiments to achieve a distance from reality.
45[[skip]] = _ 
[[v := E]] = _ [v 7! E]
[[S1;S2]] = [[S2]]([[S1]])
[[if B then S1 else S2]] = if [[B]] then [[S1]] else [[S2]]
[[while B do S]] = x(d : State ! Dist:
 :if [[B]] then d([[S]]) else _ )
[[S1 p8 S2]] = p  [[S1]] + (1   p)  [[S2]]
Figure 2.4: State semantics of programs
were to guess a high state by sampling from his belief, he would therefore guess
correctly with probability 1=2 after N experiments.
Sometimes an attacker needs only to reach a belief that is close to reality. For
example, if the high state is a Cartesian coordinate, the attacker might need only
to bound the coordinate within some Cartesian distance. Let ball(H) be all the
high states within distance  of H according to a distance metric M on StateH:
ball(H) , f0
H j M(0
H _ H)  g:
Then the number of experiments needed to achieve some distance  from some
ball  around reality is:
N(S;bH;H;A) , minfi j 
0
H 2 ball(H) ^ D(B
i(S;bH;H;A) _ 
0
H)  g:
2.4 Language Semantics
The last technical piece we require is a semantics [[S]] in which programs de-
note functions that map distributions to distributions. Here we build such a
semantics in two stages. First, we build a simpler semantics that maps states to
distributions. Second, we lift that semantics so that it operates on distributions.
Our ﬁrst task then is to deﬁne the semantics [[S]] : State ! Dist. That seman-
tics is given in ﬁgure 2.4. We assume a semantics [[E]] : State ! Val that gives
46meaning to expressions, and a semantics [[B]] : State ! Bool that gives meaning
to Boolean expressions.
The statements skip and if have essentially the same denotations as in the
standard deterministic case. State update [v 7! V ], where V 2 Val, changes
the value of v to V in . The distribution update [v 7! E] in the denotation of
assignment represents the result of substituting the meaning of E for v in all the
states of :
[v 7! E] ,  :((
P
0 : 0[v 7! [[E]]0] =  : (0))):
The semantics of while and sequential composition S1;S2 use lifting operator ,
which lifts function d : State ! Dist to function d : Dist ! Dist, as suggested
by x2.1.2:
d ,  :(
P
 : ()  d())
=  : :(
P
0 : (0)  d(0)());
where the equality follows from -reduction, and  and + are used as pointwise
operators:
p   ,  :p  ();
1 + 2 ,  :1() + 2():
Lifted d is thus the expected value (which is a distribution) of d with respect to
distribution .
To ensure that the ﬁxed point for while exists, we must verify that Dist is
a complete partial order with a bottom element and that [[]] is continuous. We
omit the proof here, as it is a consequence of a theorem proved by Kozen [66].
But we note that a key step is to strengthen the deﬁnition of Dist from x2.1.1 to
be f j  2 State ! [0;1] ^ kk  1g. This makes distributions correspond
to subprobability measures, and it is easy to check that the semantics produces
subprobability measures as output. The bottom element is then  :0, and the
47ordering relation on distributions is pointwise. Note that the deﬁnition of Belief
from x2.1.4 remains unchanged, since it did not depend on Dist. Thus beliefs
still correspond to probability measures. Anywhere that the result of the pro-
gram semantics must be upgraded to a belief (i.e., from a subprobability to a
probability), we rely on the technique of x2.2.4 to handle nontermination. The
most important occurrence of this is in step 5 of the experiment protocol in ﬁg-
ure 2.2.
The ﬁnal program construct is probabilistic choice, S1 p 8 S2, where 0 
p  1. The semantics multiplies the probability of choosing a side Si with the
frequency that Si produces a particular output state 0. Since the same state
0 might actually be produced by both sides of the choice, the frequency of its
occurrence is the sum of the frequency from either side: p([[S1]])(0)+(1 p)
([[S2]])(0), which can be simpliﬁed to the formula in ﬁgure 2.4.
To lift the semantics in ﬁgure 2.4 and deﬁne [[S]] : Dist ! Dist, we again
employ lifting operator :
[[S]] , [[S]]
=  :(
P
0 : (0)  ([[S]]0)()):
Interpreting this deﬁnition, note there are many states 0 in which S could begin
execution, and all of them could potentially terminate in state . So to compute
([[S]])(), we take a weighted average over all input states 0. The weights are
(0), which describes how likely 0 is to be used as the input state. With 0 as
input, S terminates in state  with frequency ([[S]]0)().
Applying this deﬁnition to the semantics in ﬁgure 2.4 yields [[S]], shown
in ﬁgure 2.5. This lifted semantics corresponds directly to a semantics given
by Kozen [66], which interprets programs as continuous linear operators on
probability measures. Our semantics uses an extension of the distribution con-
48[[skip]] = 
[[v := E]] = [v 7! E]
[[S1;S2]] = [[S2]]([[S1]])
[[if B then S1 else S2]] = [[S1]]( jB) + [[S2]]( j:B)
[[while B do S]] = x(d : Dist ! Dist: :d([[S]]( jB)) + ( j:B))
[[S1 p8 S2]] = [[S1]]p   + [[S2]](1   p)  
Figure 2.5: Distribution semantics of programs
ditioning operator j to Boolean expressions. Whereas distribution conditioning
produces a normalized distribution, Boolean expression conditioning produces
an unnormalized distribution:
jB ,  :if [[B]] then () else 0:
By producing unnormalized distributions as part of the meaning of if and while
statements, we track the frequency with which each branch of the statement is
chosen.
2.5 Insider Choice
The experiment protocol in x2.2 involved two agents, the attacker and the sys-
tem. Consider a third agent called the insider, whose goal is to help the attacker
learn secret information. The insider and attacker might initially communicate
to establish a strategy to achieve this goal. Once execution begins, the insider
cannot directly communicate with the attacker, but the insider can observe the
entire program state and can inﬂuence execution.
The insider’s ability to inﬂuence execution is modeled by a new program-
ming language construct, insider choice, denoted S1 8 S2:
S ::= ::: j S1 8 S2
49The insider, rather than the system, is the entity who executes this kind of
choice. The insider chooses either S1 or S2 and execution continues with the
chosen program.
As an example of insider choice, consider program L1:
L1 : h := h mod 2;
l := 0 8 l := 1
The second line of L1 allows the insider to choose between two values for vari-
able l. Since the insider is allowed to observe the high component of the state,
he can observe the parity of h and choose to set l equal to it, thus leaking the
parity of h.
The insider in this example made a deterministic choice. More generally,
insiders may also make probabilistic choices. For example, an insider could ﬂip
a fair coin then choose the left side on heads or the right side on tails. This
can be seen as an extension of probabilistic choice, in which the probability is
a function of the program state rather than just a constant. Thus insider choice
can model the behavior of probabilistic programs that are not inﬂuenced by an
insider.
2.5.1 Insider Functions
Formally, an insider is a function I 2 Insider, where
Insider , State ! [0::1]:
I() is the probability with which the left-hand side of the insider choice is
taken. For example, insider function IL1 leaks the value of h in program L1
with probability 0:99:
IL1() = if (h) = 0 then 0:99 else 0:01
50In a program with multiple syntactic occurrences of insider choice, a single in-
sider function can encode different probabilities for each occurrence if the pro-
gram state encodes the program counter.
Moreover, if the program state is sufﬁciently rich, insider functions can
model a range of insider capabilities. For example, suppose the operational
semantics guarantees that for every variable x, the previous value of x (i.e., the
value that was assigned to it before its current value was assigned) is preserved
in variable  x. Then insider functions can make decisions based on past state by
reading those previous values.7 In the following program, the insider leaks the
initial parity of h:
LP : h := h mod 2;
h := 0;
l := 0 8 l := 1
The insider function that accomplishes this is
ILP() = if ( h) = 0 then 1 else 0:
Note that without access to variable  h, the insider is unable to leak the initial
parity of h because this information is removed from the state when h is as-
signed the value 0.
Insiders with limited computational resources can be modeled by further
restricting Insider. For example, suppose that insiders are allowed only poly-
nomial time to make a choice. Then insider functions could be replaced by
polynomially time-bounded Turing machines, where the input to the machine
is the input  to the insider function, and the output of the machine is used as
the output of the insider function.
7This mechanism is similar to history variables [1]. Likewise, insiders who can predict the
future values of variables could be modeled by a mechanism similar to prophecy variables [1].
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[[v := E]]I = _ [v 7! E]
[[S1;S2]]I = ([[S2]]I)([[S1]]I)
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Figure 2.6: State semantics of programs with insider
[[skip]]I = 
[[v := E]]I = [v 7! E]
[[S1;S2]]I = [[S2]]I([[S1]]I)
[[if B then S1 else S2]]I = [[S1]]I( jB) + [[S2]]I( j:B)
[[while B do S]]I = x(d : Dist ! Dist:
 :d([[S]]I( jB)) + ( j:B))
[[S1 p8 S2]]I = [[S1]]I p   + [[S2]]I(1   p)  
[[S1 8 S2]]I = [[S1]]II() + [[S2]]II()
Figure 2.7: Distribution semantics of programs with insider
2.5.2 Semantics and Experiments
Formal semantics [[S]] : Insider ! State ! Dist is given in ﬁgure 2.6. The only
place in the semantics that the insider function is used is in the semantics of
S1 8 S2, and the semantics never modiﬁes the insider function. Because of this
second-class nature of insider functions, and for improved readability, we use
a subscript notation for the insider function I in semantics [[S]]I. We can lift the
semantics to operate on distributions as shown in ﬁgure 2.7. The lifted insider
function is deﬁned as follows:
I() ,  :I()  ();
I() ,  :(1   I())  ():
The experiment protocol in x2.2.1 can be extended to include insiders, as
shown in ﬁgure 2.8. Note that the attacker uses insider function I when con-
52An experiment E = hS;bH;H;L;Ii is conducted as follows.
1. The attacker chooses a prebelief bH about the high state.
2. (a) The system picks a high state H.
(b) The attacker picks a low state L.
3. The attacker predicts the output distribution: 0
A = [[S]]I(_ L 
 bH).
4. The system and insider execute the program S, which produces a state
0 2 0 as output, where 0 = [[S]]I(_ L 
 _ H). The attacker observes the low
projection of the output state: o = 0L.
5. The attacker infers a postbelief: b0
H = (0
Ajo)H.
Figure 2.8: Experiment protocol with insider
ducting the thought-experiment. This function thus encodes choices that the
insider and attacker have agreed upon in advance.
2.5.3 Security Conditions
Observational determinism [85,102,130] is a security condition for nondeterminis-
tic systems that generalizes noninterference [46]. We can state a probabilistic
generalization of observational determinism that is applicable to our insider
model: a program S satisﬁes observational determinism exactly when S be-
haves as a function from a low input state to a low output distribution, for any
insider and high input. Let the set of programs satisfying observational deter-
minism be denoted ObsDet, which is deﬁned as follows:
ObsDet , fS j 8I : 8L : 9L : 8H : [[S]]I(_ L 
 _ H)L = Lg:
Observational determinism is equivalent to zero information ﬂow in the in-
sider model—that is, a program S satisﬁes observational determinism exactly
when all experiments over S leak exactly 0 bits of information:
53Theorem 2.9. S 2 ObsDet  8E;b0
H 2 B(E) : Q(E;b0
H) = 0:
Proof. In appendix 2.A.
Theorem 2.9 suggests that observational determinism is the absolute security
condition for nondeterministic systems. On the other hand, the theorem also
shows that observational determinism is too strong to be useful with programs
that require information ﬂow, such as PWC.
Other nondeterministic security conditions, such as generalized noninterfer-
ence (GNI) [81], are already known to allow leakage of information [119]. Our
model of insider choice allows this leakage to be quantiﬁed: a program S sat-
isﬁes GNI when S behaves as a relation on a low input state and low output
distributions, for any insider and high input:
GNI , fS j 8L : 9L : 8H :
[
I
([[S]]I(_ L 
 _ H)L) = Lg:
Consider program LH, which can be shown to be in GNI:
LH : l := h 8 (l := 0 8 l := 1)
Using insider function ILH() = 1, this program always leaks the value of h.
Unless the attacker already has a perfectly accurate belief about h, this is a pos-
itive (and non-zero) amount of leakage. So even though the program is secure
according to GNI, an insider can reﬁne the program to be insecure. This weak-
ness is known as the reﬁnement paradox [102]. Insiders therefore introduce a kind
of nondeterminism that is not secure under reﬁnement.
542.6 Related Work
Quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow. The ﬁrst published connection between
information theory and information ﬂow is by Denning [35], who uses entropy
to calculate the leakage of a few assignment and conditional statements.
Backes, K¨ opf, and Rybalchenko [11] construct an automated static analysis
for computing the quantity of information ﬂow in simple imperative programs.
Their analysis assumes a uniform distribution on high inputs, computes a high
equivalence relation on low observable outputs, then counts the number of high
inputsineachequivalenceclass. Thiscountyieldsaprobabilitydistributionthat
can be used to compute several entropy-based metrics of information ﬂow.
Smith [108] argues that the function used to quantify uncertainty should de-
pend on the attack model. For some programs, the expectation taken as part of
the formula for mutual information masks the fact that certain executions leak
a large amount of information, thus making it easy for the attacker to guess the
remaining secret information. Our framework in part addresses this problem
by allowing quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow both for single experiments and
in expectation over all experiments.
McCamant and Ernst [80] implement an automated hybrid analysis for
quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow in Linux/x86 binaries. Their analysis com-
putes a conservative upper bound on the amount of information that can be
leaked by the particular execution the dynamic part of the analysis observes.
But the analysis cannot bound the quantity of ﬂow for executions it does not
observe. The quantity measured by the analysis is an upper bound on channel
capacity, which is the maximum amount, over any probability distribution on
inputs, of mutual information between secret inputs and public outputs.
55K¨ opf and Basin [65] quantify the resistance of a deterministic system against
sequences of attacks, where resistance is a function from the number of attacks
performed to the expected remaining uncertainty of the attacker. Their deﬁni-
tions can quantify uncertainty with several variants of entropy. They give an
automated, heuristic analysis that approximates resistance.
Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [24] develop a static analysis that bounds the
amount of information leaked by a while-program. Their metric for informa-
tion leakage is based on conditional entropy. The analysis comprises a dataﬂow
analysis, which computes a use-def graph, and syntax-directed inference rules,
which calculate leakage bounds. These authors also investigate other leakage
metrics, settling on conditional mutual information as an appropriate metric
for quantiﬁcation of ﬂow in probabilistic languages [23]; they do not consider
relative entropy. Mutual information is always at least 0, so unlike relative en-
tropy it cannot represent misinformation. As noted in x2.3.4, this uncertainty-
based deﬁnition requires a strong admissibility restriction: the attacker’s pre-
belief must be the same distribution from which the system generates the high
input. Malacaria [77] extends this line of work by classifying the rate of leak-
age of loops. His basic deﬁnition of amount of leakage is equivalent to [24], so
it is an instance of our own deﬁnition, as shown in x2.3.4. For the same rea-
son, Malacaria’s model is no more precise than our own model. Rate of leakage
could be deﬁned in our own model, like the other statistics in x2.3.
Backes [10] quantiﬁes information ﬂow for reactive systems, which exe-
cute cryptographic protocols, as the maximum distance between the low user’s
views of a protocol run for any two high behaviors, where a view is a probabil-
ity distribution on the traces observed by the user. The distance metric is left
abstract, hence not instantiated by any information-theoretic deﬁnition.
56Di Pierro, Hankin, and Wiklicky [38] relax noninterference to approximate
noninterference, where “approximate” denotes similarity of two processes in a
process algebra; similarity is quantiﬁed using the supremum norm of the differ-
ence between the probability distributions that the processes create on memory.
This quantity can be interpreted as a probability on an attacker’s ability to dis-
tinguish the two processes using a ﬁnite number of tests. This work also builds
an abstract interpretation that allows approximation of the conﬁnement of a
process. Subsequent work [39] generalizes from process algebras to probabilis-
tic transition systems.
Lowe [76] deﬁnes the information ﬂow quantity of a process with two users H
and L to be the number of behaviors of H that L can distinguish. When there
are n such distinguishable behaviors, H can use them to transmit lgn bits to L.
Weber [123] deﬁnes n-limited security, which allows declassiﬁcation at a rate
that depends, in part, on the size n of a buffer shared by the high and low pro-
jections of a state.
Millen [88], using deterministic state machines, proves that a system satis-
ﬁes noninterference exactly when the mutual information between certain in-
puts and outputs is zero. He also proposes mutual information as a metric for
information ﬂow, but he does not show how to compute the amount of ﬂow for
programs.
Database privacy. Evﬁmievski, Gehrke, and Srikant [42] quantify privacy
breaches in data mining. In their framework, randomized operators are applied
to conﬁdential data before the data is released. A privacy breach occurs when
release of the randomized data causes a large change in an attacker’s proba-
bility distribution on a property of the conﬁdential data. They use Bayesian
57reasoning, based on observation of randomized data, to update the attacker’s
distribution. Their distributions are similar to our beliefs, but have the same
strong admissibility restriction as Clark et al. [24] (c.f. x2.3.4). They also show
that relative entropy can be used to bound the maximum privacy breach for a
randomized operator.
Anonymity protocols. Chatzikokolakis et al. [21] analyze the degree of
anonymity provided by anonymity protocols. They model protocols as chan-
nels, and they quantify the loss of anonymity introduced by a protocol as the
information-theoretic capacity of the channel.
Noninterference. The ﬂow model (FM) is a security property proposed by
McLean [84] and later given a quantitative formalization by Gray [49], who
called it the Applied Flow Model. The FM stipulates that the probability of a
low output may depend on previous low outputs, but not on previous high
outputs. Gray formalizes this in the context of probabilistic state machines, and
he relates noninterference to the maximum rate of ﬂow between high and low.
Browne [19] develops a novel application of the Turing test: a system passes
Browne’s Turing test exactly when for all ﬁnite lengths of time, the information
ﬂow over that time is zero.
Volpano [118] gives a type system that can be used to establish the security
of password checking and one-way functions such as MD5 and SHA1. Nonin-
terference does not usually allow such functions to be typed, so this type system
is an improvement over previous type systems. However, the type system does
not allow a general analysis of quantitative information ﬂow.
58Volpano and Smith [120] give a type system that enforces relative secrecy,
which enforces that well-typed programs cannot leak conﬁdential data in poly-
nomial time.
Nondeterminism. Wittbold and Johnson [127] introduce nondeducibility on
strategies, an extension of Sutherland’s nondeducibility [113]. Wittbold and John-
son observe that if a program is run multiple times and feedback between runs
is allowed, information can be leaked by coding schemes across multiple runs.
A system that is nondeducible on strategies has no noiseless communication
channels between high input and low output, even in the presence of feedback.
Our insider framework can quantify the leakage due to strategies that are en-
codable as insider functions.
Halpern and Tuttle [53] introduce a framework for reasoning about knowl-
edgeandprobabilitybasedonthreekindsofadversaries: adversarieswhomake
nondeterministic choices, adversaries who represent the knowledge of the op-
ponent, and adversaries who control timing. Our insiders can be seen as an
instantiation of this framework. The insider choice and insider function consti-
tute an adversary who makes nondeterministic choices, and each of the models
of the insider’s power in x2.5.1 correspond to an adversary representing the
knowledge of the opponent. Gray and Syverson [50] apply the Halpern-Tuttle
framework to reason about qualitative security of probabilistic systems. They
relate their security condition to probabilistic noninterference [49] and informa-
tiontheory. HalpernandO’Neill[51]constructaframeworkforreasoningabout
secrecy that generalizes many previous results on qualitative and probabilistic,
but not quantitative, security. Their framework, like ours, uses subjective prob-
ability distributions.
59McIver and Morgan [82] calculate the channel capacity of a program using
conditional entropy. They add demonic nondeterminism as well as probabilis-
tic choice to the language of while-programs, and they show that whether a
program is perfectly secure (i.e., leaks 0 bits) is determined by the behavior of
its deterministic reﬁnements. They also consider restricting the observational
power of the demon making the nondeterministic choices.
2.7 Summary
This chapter presents a model for incorporating attacker beliefs into analysis of
quantitative information ﬂow. Our theory reveals that uncertainty, the tradi-
tional metric for information ﬂow, is inadequate. Information ﬂows when an
attacker’s belief becomes more accurate, but an uncertainty metric can mistak-
enly report a ﬂow of zero or less. Inversely, misinformation ﬂows when an at-
tacker’s belief becomes less accurate, but an uncertainty metric can mistakenly
report a positive information ﬂow. Hence, in the presence of beliefs, accuracy is
the correct metric for information ﬂow.
We have shown how to use an accuracy metric to calculate exact, expected,
and maximum information ﬂow; other statistics of information ﬂow, such as
variance, median, and rate, could be deﬁned in the same way. We have demon-
strated that our metric generalizes uncertainty metrics. Our formal model of
experiments enables precise, compositional reasoning about attackers’ actions
and beliefs. We have instantiated this model with a probabilistic semantics and
have shown that probabilistic choice is essential to producing misinformation.
We have also extended the model to enable analysis of information ﬂow caused
by insiders who collude with attackers.
602.A Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 2.1. B(E;o)(H) = BI(E;o):
Proof.
BI(E;o)
= h Deﬁnition of BI i
bH(H)  ([[S]](_ L 
 _ H)L)(o)
(
P
0
H : bH(0
H)  ([[S]](_ L 
 _ 0
H)L)(o))
= h Deﬁnition of L, apply distribution to o i
bH(H)  ((
P
 : L = o : ([[S]](_ L 
 _ H)()))
(
P
0
H : bH(0
H)  ((
P
 : L = o : ([[S]](_ L 
 _ 0
H)())))
= h Lemma 2.1 (below) i
bH(H)  ((
P
 : L = o : ([[S]](_ L 
 _ H)()))
(
P
0 : 0L = o : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(0))
= h Distributivity, one-point rule i
(
P
 : L = o ^ H = H : (
P
0
H : bH(H)  [[S]](_ L 
 _ H)()))
(
P
0 : 0L = o : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(0))
= h Lemma 2.1 (below) i
(
P
 : L = o ^ H = H : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)())
(
P
0 : 0L = o : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(0))
= h Distributivity i
(
P
 : L = o ^ H = H : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)()
(
P
0 : 0L = o : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(0)))
= h Deﬁnition of L i
(
P
 : H = H : (([[S]](_ L 
 bH))jo)())
= h Deﬁnition of H, applying distribution to H i
((([[S]](_ L 
 bH))jo)H)(H)
61= h Deﬁnition of B(E;o) i
B(E;o)(H)
Lemma 2.1. Let L = o. Then:
[[S]](_ L 
 bH)() = (
P
H : bH(H)  [[S]](_ L 
 _ H)()):
Proof.
[[S]](_ L 
 bH)()
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
(
P
0 : (_ L 
 bH)(0)  ([[S]]0)())
= h Deﬁnition of point mass i
(
P
0 : 0L = L : bH(0H)  ([[S]]0)())
= h Let  = L [ H, nesting, one-point rule i
(
P
H : bH(H)  [[S]](_ L 
 _ H)())
Theorem 2.2. Q(E;b0
H) = IA(o)   IS(o):
Proof.
Q(E;b0
H)
= h Deﬁnition of Q i
D(bH _ _ H)   D(b0
H _ _ H)
= h Deﬁnitions of D and point mass i
62 lgbH(H) + lgb0
H(H)
= h Lemma 2.2 (below), properties of lg i
 lgPrA(o) + lgPrS(o)
= h Deﬁnition of I i
IA(o)   IS(o)
Lemma 2.2. b0
H(H) = bH(H) 
S(o)
A(o):
Proof.
b0
H(H)
= h Deﬁnition of b0
H in experiment protocol i
(([[S]](_ L 
 bH)jo)H)(H)
= h Deﬁnition of H i
(
P
 : H = H : ([[S]](_ L 
 bH)jo)())
= h Deﬁnition of jo i
(
P
 : H = H ^ L = o : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)()
([[S]](_ L 
 bH)L)(o))
= h One-point rule:  = o [ H i
[[S]](_ L 
 bH)(o [ H)
([[S]](_ L 
 bH)L)(o)
= h Deﬁnition of A i
1
A(o)  [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(o [ H)
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
631
A(o)  (
P
0 : (_ L 
 bH)(0)  ([[S]]0)(o [ H))
= h Deﬁnition of 
, point mass i
1
A(o)  (
P
0 : 0L = L : bH(0H)  ([[S]](_ L 
 (_ 0H)))(o [ H))
= h High input is immutable i
1
A(o)  (
P
0 : 0L = L ^ 0H = H : bH(0H)
 ([[S]](_ L 
 (_ 0H)))(o [ H))
= h One-point rule: 0 = L [ H i
1
A(o)  bH(H)  ([[S]](_ L 
 _ 0
H))(o [ H)
= h High input is immutable, Deﬁnition of L i
1
A(o)  bH(H)  (([[S]](_ L 
 _ 0
H))L)(o)
= h Deﬁnition of S i
bH(H)  S(o)
A(o)
Theorem 2.3. Let E = hS;bH;H;Li. Then:
Q(E;b
0
H) = k  b
0
H(H) = 2
k  bH(H):
Proof.
Q(E;b0
H) = k
 h Deﬁnition of Q i
D(bH _ _ H)   D(b0
H _ _ H) = k
 h Deﬁnition of D i
64 (lgbh(H)   lgb0
H(H)) = k
 h Arithmetic, properties of log i
b0
H(H) = 2k  bH(H)
Theorem 2.4. S 2 Det =) 8E;b0
H 2 B(E) : Q(E;b0
H)  0:
Proof. Assume S 2 Det and let E, b0
H be arbitrary.
Q(E;b0
H)  0
 h Deﬁnition of Q, arithmetic i
D(bH _ _ H)  D(b0
H _ _ H)
 h Deﬁnition of D, arithmetic i
lgb(H)  lgb0(H)
 h Lemma 2.3 (below), lg is monotonic on (0;1], admissibility of b i
true
Lemma 2.3. Assume S 2 Det and let E, b0
H be arbitrary. Then:
b(H)  b
0(H):
Proof.
b0(H)
= h Deﬁnition of b0 i
([[S]](_ L 
 bH)joH)(H)
65= h Deﬁnition ofH, application to H, one-point rule i
(
P
0
L : ([[S]](_ L 
 bH)jo)(0
L [ H))
= h Deﬁnition of j, one-point rule i
[[S]](_ L 
 bH)(o [ H)
([[S]](_ L 
 bH)L)(o)
= h High input is immutable i
b(H)  [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(o [ H)
([[S]](_ L 
 bH)L)(o)
= h Output of S is a point mass (see below), let x be the denominator i
b(H)  1
x
 h Admissibility of b implies x 2 (0;1], arithmetic i
b(H)
To see that the output of S is a point mass, let o be the observation producing
b0. It is straightforward to check that if S 2 Det, then [[S]] is the point mass at 0,
where 0 is the state produced by the standard denotational semantics of while
programs, such as Winskel’s [125]. So the output of [[S]](L [ H) is the point
mass at o [ H.
Theorem 2.5. Q(E;b0) = L(Hin;Lin;Lout):
Proof.
Q(E;b0)
= h Deﬁnition of Q i
D(b _ _ H)   D(b0 _ _ H)
66= h Deﬁnition of D i
H(b(L [ L0 [ H0))   H(b(L [ L0))
  (H(b0(L [ L0 [ H0))   H(b0(L [ L0)))
= h Deﬁnition of domain of b i
H(b(L0 [ H0))   H(bL0)   (H(b0(L [ L0 [ H0))   H(b0(L [ L0)))
= h Deﬁnitions of Hin, Lin, Lout; b0 is an output distribution i
H(Hin;Lin)   H(Lin)   (H(Hin;Lin;Lout)   H(Lin;Lout))
= h Deﬁnition of conditional entropy i
H(HinjLin)   H(HinjLin;Lout)
= h Deﬁnition of L i
L(Hin;Lin;Lout)
Theorem 2.6 Let:
E = hS;bH;H;Li;
0 = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H);
eH = (([[S]](_ L 
 bH))j(0L))H:
Then:
QE(E)  Q(E;eH):
Proof.
QE(E)
= h Deﬁnition of QE i
67Eo20L[Q(E;B(E;o))]
= h Deﬁnition of Q, let b0
H = B(E;o) i
Eo20L[D(bH _ _ H)   D(b0
H _ _ H)]
= h Linearity of E i
D(bH _ _ H)   Eo20L[D(b0
H _ _ H)]
 h Jensen’s inequality and convexity of D [32] i
D(bH _ _ H)   D(Eo20L[b0
H] _ _ H)
= h Lemma 2.4 i
D(bH _ _ H)   D(eH _ _ H)
= h Deﬁnition of Q i
Q(E;eH)
Lemma 2.4. Let E, 0, eH be deﬁned as in theorem 2.6. Let b0
H = B(E;o), where
o 2 0L. Then:
Eo20L[b
0
H] = eH:
Proof. (by extensionality)
Eo20L[b0
H](H)
= h Deﬁnitions of E, b0
H i
((
P
o : (0L)(o)  B(E;o)))(H)
= h Deﬁnition of B(E;o) i
((
P
o : (0L)(o)  ((([[S]](_ L 
 bH))jo)H)))(H)
68= h Deﬁnition of H, applying distribution to H i
(
P
o : (0L)(o)  ((
P
0 : 0H = H : (([[S]](_ L 
 bH))jo)(0))))
= h Deﬁnition of jo, applying distribution to 0 i
(
P
o : (0L)(o)  (
P
0 : 0H = H ^ 0L = o :
([[S]](_ L
bH))(0)
([[S]](_ L
bH)L)(o)))
= h One-point rule i
(
P
o : (0L)(o)  ([[S]](_ L 
 bH))(o [ H)
([[S]](_ L 
 bH)L)(o) )
= h Deﬁnition of L, applied to o i
(
P
o : (0L)(o)  ([[S]](_ L 
 bH))(o [ H)
(
P
0 : 0L = o : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(0)))
= h Let  = o [ H, change of dummy: o := , deﬁnition of =L i
(
P
 : H = H : (0L)(o)  ([[S]](_ L 
 bH))()
(
P
0 : 0 =L  : [[S]](_ L 
 bH)(0)))
= h Deﬁnition of jL, applied to  i
(
P
 : H = H : ([[S]](_ L 
 bH)j(0L))())
= h Deﬁnition of H, applied to H i
(([[S]](_ L 
 bH)j(0L))H)(H)
= h Deﬁnition of eH i
eH(H)
Theorem 2.7. Let E = hS;bH;H;Li, where bH = H. Then:
QE(E) = I(Hin;LoutjLin):
Proof. Consider the amount of ﬂow resulting from a given high input H, obser-
vation o, and postbelief b0
H. We calculate:
69Q(hS;bH;H;Li;b0
H)
= h Deﬁnition of Q i
D(bH _ _ H)   D(b0
H _ _ H)
= h Deﬁnition of D i
 lg(bH(H)) + lg(b0
H(H))
= h Log identity i
lg b0
H(H)
bH(H)
= h Deﬁnition of b0
H and A i
lg ((Ajo)H)(H)
bH(H)
= h Lemma 2.5 i
lg ((Ajo)H)(H)
A(H)
It is now convenient to introduce notation for probability. Let Pr(E) denote
the probability of event E according to distribution , and let Pr(EjF) denote
PrjF(E). Let h denote the event that the high input sampled from Hin is h, let l
denote the event that the low input sampled from Lin (which is actually a point
mass) is L, and let o denote the event that the observation sampled from Lout
is o. Then ((Ajo)H)(H) can be rewritten as PrA(hjo); and A(H), as PrA(h).
We continue calculating:
lg ((Ajo)H)(H)
A(H)
= h Rewriting using probability notation i
lg PrA(hjo)
PrA(h)
70= h A = AjL i
lg
PrAjl(hjo)
PrAjl(h)
= h Rewriting using conditional probability notation i
lg PrA(hjo;l)
PrA(hjl)
= h Deﬁnition of conditional probability i
lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
Now take the expectation of the amount of ﬂow with respect to observation o,
which is distributed according to 0 = [[S]](_ L 
 _ H).
Eo[lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)]
= h Deﬁnition of E i
P
o Pr0(o)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h 0 = Ajh;l; conditional probability notation i
P
o PrA(ojh;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
Againtaketheexpectation, nowwithrespecttohighinputh, whosedistribution
is H:
Eh[
P
o PrA(ojh;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)]
= h Deﬁnition of E i
P
h PrH(h) 
P
o PrA(ojh;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h H = bH i
71P
h PrbH(h) 
P
o PrA(ojh;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h Lemma 2.5 i
P
h PrA(h) 
P
o PrA(ojh;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h Ajl = A; conditional probability notation i
P
h PrA(hjl) 
P
o PrA(ojh;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h Distributivity i
P
h
P
o PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojh;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h Deﬁnition of conditional probability i
P
h
P
o PrA(h;ojl)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h Deﬁnition of conditional probability i
P
h
P
o
PrA(h;o;l)
PrA(l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h A is a point mass at l, twice i
P
l
P
h
P
o PrA(h;o;l)  lg PrA(h;ojl)
PrA(hjl)  PrA(ojl)
= h Deﬁnition of mutual information i
I(Hin;LoutjLin)
72Lemma 2.5. bH = AH.
Proof. Let H be arbitrary, and let b = _ L 
 bH be the attacker’s belief about the
entire (low and high) state. We calculate:
(AH)(H)
= h Deﬁnition of A i
([[S]](_ L 
 bH)H)(H)
= h Deﬁnition of b i
(([[S]]b)H)(H)
= h Deﬁnition ofH i
(
P
 : H = H : ([[S]]b)())
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
(
P
 : H = H : (
P
0 : b(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h High input is immutable i
(
P
 : H = H : (
P
0 : 0H = H : b(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h Commutativity, distributivity i
(
P
0 : 0H = H : b(0)  (
P
 : H = H : ([[S]]0)()))
= h High input is immutable i
(
P
0 : 0H = H : b(0)  (
P
 : ([[S]]0)()))
= h S always terminates i
(
P
0 : 0H = H : b(0)  1)
73= h Deﬁnition ofH i
(bH)(H)
= h Deﬁnition of b i
bH(H)
Therefore bH = AH by extensionality.
Theorem 2.9. S 2 ObsDet  8E;b0
H 2 B(E) : Q(E;b0
H) = 0:
Proof. By mutual implication.
()) Assume S 2 ObsDet. Let E = hS;L;H;bH;Ii and b0
H 2 B(E) be arbi-
trary.
Q(E;b0
H) = 0
 h Deﬁnition of Q, arithmetic i
D(bH _ H) = D(b0
H _ H)
 h Deﬁnition of D, arithmetic i
bH(H) = b0
H(H)
 h Lemma 2.7 i
true
This concludes the forward direction ()) of the proof.
74(() By contrapositive. Assume S 62 ObsDet. We need to show:
9E = hS;L;H;bH;Ii;b
0
H 2 B(E) : Q(E;b
0
H 6= 0
We calculate:
S 62 ObsDet
 h Deﬁnition of ObsDet i
:8I;L9L8H : [[S]]I(_ L 
 _ H)L = L
 h Predicate calculus, change of dummy i
9~ I; ~ L8~ L9~ H : [[S]]~ I(_ ~ L 
 _ ~ H)L 6= ~ L ()
Make the following deﬁnitions:
I = ~ I
L = ~ L
0
H = arbitrary
0 = [[S]]I(_ L 
 _ 0
H)
0
L = 0L
H = the ~ H guaranteed by formula (*) above when ~ L = 0
L
 = [[S]]I(_ L 
 _ H)
L = L
And let bH be the belief mapping H to 1=2 and 0
H to 1=2.
WehavenowdeﬁnedallthevariablesinexperimentE, butweneedtodeﬁne
b0
H 2 B(E). To that end, we calculate attacker prediction A:
75A
= h Deﬁnition of prediction i
[[S]]I(_ L 
 bH)
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
1=2  [[S]](_ L 
 _ H) + 1=2  [[S]](_ L 
 _ 0
H)
= h Deﬁnition of ,0 i
1=2  ( + 0)
To deﬁne b0
H, we also need an observation o. Note that, by formula (2.6),
L 6= 0
L, so there is some low state 0
L such that L(0
L) 6= 0
L(0
L). Assume,
without loss of generality, that L(0
L) > 0
L(0
L). Let o be 0
L. But in order for
o to be an observation, it must be that o 2 [[S]](_ L 
 _ H), which implies that
[[S]](_ L 
 _ H)(o) > 0. This is guaranteed by the fact that L(o) > 0
L(o), and that
0
L(o)  0.
We can now calculate b0
H:
b0
H
= h Deﬁnition of b0
H experiment protocol i
AjoH
= h Deﬁnition of A i
1=2  ( + 0)joH
76With all these deﬁnitions, we can prove the desired result:
Q(E;b0
H) 6= 0
 h Deﬁnition of Q, arithmetic i
D(bH _ H) 6= D(b0
H _ H)
 h Deﬁnition of D, arithmetic i
bH(H) 6= b0
H(H)
 h Lemma 2.9 i
true
Lemma 2.6.
S 2 ObsDet =) 8I:8L:9L:8H :kHk = 1 =) [[S]]I(_ L
 _ H)L = L:
Proof. Assume S 2 ObsDet. Let I;L be arbitrary. Let L be the distribution
guaranteed to exist by the deﬁnition of ObsDet. Let H be arbitrary such that
kHk = 1.
[[S]]I(_ L 
 _ H)L
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
((
P
H : H(H)  [[S]]I(L [ H)))L
= hL distributes over +; i
(
P
H : H(H)  [[S]]I(L [ H)L)
= h S 2 ObsDet, deﬁnition of L i
77(
P
H : H(H)  L)
= h Distributivity, deﬁnition of kk i
L  kHk
= h Assumed kHk = 1 i
L
Lemma 2.7. Assume S 2 ObsDet. Let E = hS;L;H;bH;Ii and b0
H 2 B(E) be
arbitrary. Then:
bH = b
0
H:
Proof. Let A = [[S]]I(_ L 
 bH). Let o 2 [[S]]I(_ L 
 _ H)L.
b0
H
= h Deﬁnition of b0
H in experiment protocol i
(Ajo)H
= h Deﬁnition ofH i
H :(
P
0 : 0H = H : (Ajo)(0))
= h Deﬁnition of jo i
H :(
P
0 : 0H = H : if (0L) = o then
A(0)
(AL)(o) else 0)
= h Lemma 2.6 i
H :(
P
0 : 0H = H : if (0L) = o then
A(0)
L(o) else 0)
= h One-point rule i
78H :
A(o[H)
L(o)
= h Lemma 2.8 i
H :
bH(H)L(o)
L(o)
= h Arithmetic, -reduction i
bH
Lemma 2.8. Assume the deﬁnitions in lemma 2.7 and its proof. Then:
A(o [ H) = bH(H)  L(o):
Proof.
A(o [ H)
= h Deﬁnition of A i
[[S]]I(_ L 
 bH)(o [ H)
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
(
P
0 : (_ L 
 bH)(0)  ([[S]]I0)(o [ H))
= h Deﬁnition of 
, one-point rule i
(
P
0
H : bH(0
H)  ([[S]]I(L [ 0
H))(o [ H))
= h Immutable high input, one-point rule i
bH(H)  ([[S]]I(L [ H))(o [ H)
= h Immutable high input, deﬁnition ofL i
bH(H)  (([[S]]I(L [ H))L)(o)
79= h S 2 ObsDet, deﬁnition of L i
bH(H)  L(o)
Lemma 2.9. Assume the deﬁnitions in the contrapositive proof of theorem 2.9. Then:
bH(H) 6= b
0
H(H):
Proof. First we calculate b0
H(H):
b0
H(H)
= h Deﬁnition of b0
H i
(AjoH)(H)
= h Calculation of A in theorem 2.9 i
(1=2  ( + 0)joH)(H)
= h Deﬁnition of H, one-point rule, D deﬁned below i
(
P
L : (1=2  ( + 0)jo)(L [ H)=D)
= h Deﬁnition of jo, one-point rule i
1=2  ( + 0)(o [ H)=D
= h Deﬁnition of + for distributions i
1=2  ((o [ H) + 0(o [ 0
H))=D
= h Deﬁnition of 0, immutability of H input i
1=2  (o [ H)=D
80Quantity D is deﬁned to be 1=2  ((o [ H) + 0(o [ 0
H)). Similarly, we can
calculate b0
H(0
H) = 1=2  (o [ 0
H)=D.
We next calculate L(o):
L(o)
= h Deﬁnition of L and projection i
(
P
H : (o [ H))
= h Deﬁnition of , immutability of high input, one-point rule i
(o [ H)
Similarly, 0
L(o) = 0(o [ 0
H). By the deﬁnition of o we have L(o) 6= 0
L(o), so
(o [ H) 6= 0(o [ 0
H). Thus:
b0
H(0
H)
= h Calculated value of b0
H(0
H) i
1=2  (o [ 0
H)=D
6= h Above inequality i
1=2  (o [ H)=D
= h Calculated value of b0
H(H) i
b0
H(H)
81Finally, note that by the immutability of high input, the only high states with
non-zero mass in b0
H are H and 0
H. If b0
H(H) = 1=2, we would be forced to con-
clude b0
H(0
H) = 1=2 because the mass in a belief must sum to 1. But this would
contradict the previous calculation. So b0
H(H) 6= 1=2. Thus, since bH(H) = 1=2,
we conclude bH(H) 6= b0
H(H).
Theorem 3.2 D(b _ _ D) = Q(hA;b;D;qi;b0) + SP(hA;b;D;qi;b0)
Proof. The quantity of leakage is
Q(hA;b;D;qi;b
0) = D(b _ _ D)   D(b
0 _ _ D):
And the amount of program suppression is
SP(hA;b;D;qi;b
0) = D((b
0jq)TI _ _ D)
= D(b
0 _ _ D):
The equality follows because q is already contained in the attacker’s observa-
tion, so b0 has already been conditioned on q; and because restricting b0 to trusted
inputs is here equivalent to restricting to secret inputs (i.e., the actual database
contents), and this has already been done by the experiment protocol that pro-
duced b0.
Substituting and rewriting, we have
D(b _ _ D) = Q(hA;b;D;qi;b
0) + SP(hA;b;D;qi;b
0):
82CHAPTER 3
QUANTIFICATION OF INTEGRITY
Computer security policies often involve integrity requirements for infor-
mation and other system resources—for example, that electronic data must cor-
rectly represent what appears in paper sources [37, glossary entry “data in-
tegrity”], that information may be modiﬁed only by authorized programs and
authorized users [26], or that inputs to a program must be validated before be-
ing used to change system state external to the program, such as the ﬁlesys-
tem [122, p. 356]. This last example can be interpreted as an information-ﬂow
security policy in which information from (attacker-controlled) inputs can be
considered untrusted, whereas the system state should contain only trusted in-
formation: information ﬂow from untrusted to trusted is prohibited unless it
passes a validation procedure. Taint analysis [75,93,112,122,128] enforces a sim-
ilar information-ﬂow policy. Untrusted information is considered to be tainted;
and trusted information, untainted. If information ﬂows from tainted sources to
a sink that is supposed to be untainted, contamination of the sink has occurred.
In some scenarios, a qualitative integrity policy might be overly restrictive.
If the attacker can cause only a little contamination, a ﬂow from tainted to un-
tainted (i.e., untrusted to trusted) might be acceptable. Thus, quantitative in-
tegrity policies would be useful in characterizing security.
Since conﬁdentiality and integrity are information-ﬂow duals [15], previous
models for quantiﬁcation of information-ﬂow conﬁdentiality [11,24,35,49,76,
80,88] seem likely to apply to quantiﬁcation of integrity. In particular, the in-
tegrity policy “information is prohibited to ﬂow from untrusted to trusted” is
the dual of the conﬁdentiality policy “information is prohibited to ﬂow from se-
cret to public,” which is the kind of qualitative policy that previous work—and
83chapter 2—has made quantitative. Here, we adapt the results of chapter 2 to
quantify contamination with accuracy of belief.
Besides contamination, there is another, distinct aspect of quantitative in-
tegrity. In the information-theoretic model of communication channels [32],
a sender sends messages through a noisy channel to a receiver. The receiver
cannot observe the sender’s inputs or the noise but must attempt to determine
what message was sent. A standard question to ask is: “how much information
is transmitted over the channel?” When information is lost because of noise,
information has been suppressed; noise thus damages the integrity of the infor-
mation. Here, we show that suppression and transmission can be quantiﬁed by
usingaccuracyofbeliefs. Wealsoexamineerror-correctingcodesandshowthat,
as we would expect, they reduce suppression of information. Moreover, anal-
ysis of suppression is applicable with programs in general, not just programs
that model communication channels.
Contamination and suppression are not necessarily disjoint: A program that
takes t as trusted input and u as untrusted input, then outputs pair (t;u) as
trusted output, exhibits contamination—because output (t;u) is obviously af-
fected by an untrusted input u—but does not exhibit suppression. A program
that instead outputs tn, where  is exclusive-or and n is randomly generated
noise, exhibits suppression but not contamination. And a program that outputs
t  u exhibits both.
Quantifying conﬁdentiality and integrity simultaneously is useful for under-
standing the security of a statistical database, which contains information about
individuals and should respond to queries in a way that protects the privacy
of those individuals. The queries and responses might involve statistics (e.g.,
sums or averages) computed from individuals’ information. One mechanism
84that enforces this privacy policy is the addition of randomly generated noise to
the underlying data or to the response [35]; the database is responding with in-
formation that has been deliberately suppressed to improve conﬁdentiality. The
quantitative frameworks we have developed for conﬁdentiality and integrity
can be used to analyze this enforcement mechanism.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Models and metrics for quantiﬁcation of
contamination and suppression are given in x3.1 and x3.2. These metrics are
applied in x3.3 and x3.4 to error-correcting codes and statistical databases. The
duality between conﬁdentiality and integrity is explored in x3.5. Related work
is discussed in x3.6, and x3.7 concludes. Most proofs are delayed from the main
body to appendix 3.A.
3.1 Quantiﬁcation of Contamination
Three agents are involved in execution of a program: a system, a user, and an
attacker.1 The system executes a program, whose variables are categorized as
input, output, or internal. Input variables may only be read by the program,
output variables may only be written by the program, and internal variables
may be read and written but are never be observed by any agent except the
systemitself. Theuserandtheattackersupplyinputsbywritingtheinitialvalues
of input variables. These agents receive outputs by reading the ﬁnal values of
output variables. Since the attacker is untrusted, or low integrity, variables read
and written by the attacker are labeled U. Likewise, the user is trusted and the
user’s variables are labeled T. The channels between agents and the program
are depicted in ﬁgure 3.1.
1In chapter 2, we modeled only the system and the attacker. We further discuss the addition
of the user in x3.1.1 and x3.5.
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Figure 3.1: Channels in contamination experiment
Our goal is to quantify the amount of information about untrusted inputs
that the user learns by observing trusted outputs. This goal entails two restric-
tions on the user’s access to variables. First, the user should not be allowed to
read untrusted inputs—otherwise, the user could learn all the untrusted infor-
mation without observing any outputs. Second, the user should not be allowed
to read untrusted outputs, because we are interested only in the information the
user learns from trusted outputs. In addition to these restrictions, for simplic-
ity, we do not allow the user to write untrusted inputs (although this would be
possible to model). So the user may access only the trusted variables.
Similarly, the attacker may access only the untrusted variables. The attacker
may not write trusted inputs because he is untrusted. And for simplicity, we do
not allow the attacker to read trusted inputs or outputs. However, since ﬂow
from trusted to untrusted need not be prohibited, it would be possible to allow
and to model such reads.
Note that these access rules agree with the Biba integrity model [15] in that
they prohibit reading up (i.e., the user cannot read untrusted information) and
writing down (i.e., the attacker cannot write trusted information).
863.1.1 Contamination Experiment Protocol
Users cannot directly observe untrusted inputs, thus users are uncertain about
them. A user’s belief characterizes this uncertainty. Note that it is now the user
who holds beliefs—not the attacker, who held beliefs about secret inputs in the
model of chapter 2. Recall (from x2.1) that beliefs are held about program states,
which map variables to values. Previously, a state could be decomposed into
two parts: its high projection, containing just the secret variables, and its low pro-
jection, containing just the public variables. Now, since we are concerned with
integrity, we instead decompose a state into a trusted projection, containing just
the trusted variables, and an untrusted projection, containing just the untrusted
variables. The trusted projection of state  is denoted   T; and the untrusted
projection,   U. Probability distributions, hence beliefs, can likewise be pro-
jected. Previously, beliefswereprobabilitydistributionsoverthehighprojection
of states; now, beliefs are probability distributions over the untrusted projection
of states.
A contamination experiment describes how a user revises his beliefs about un-
trusted inputs. During an experiment, the user interacts with a system and
observes trusted outputs. The protocol for contamination experiments is given
in ﬁgure 3.2 and is explained below.2
Formally, a contamination experiment E is described by a tuple,
E = hS;bU;U;Ti;
where S is the program executed by the system, U is the untrusted projection of
the initial state, and T is the trusted projection of the initial state. For simplicity,
2This protocol is essentially identical to the protocol for conﬁdentiality experiments in ﬁg-
ure 2.2. The changes are (i) the introduction of the user as an agent, (ii) the reversal of the roles
of the user and attacker, and (iii) the substitution of “trusted” for “low” and “untrusted” for
“high.”
87A contamination experiment E = hS;bU;U;Ti is conducted as follows.
1. The user chooses a prebelief bU about the untrusted state.
2. (a) The attacker picks an untrusted state U.
(b) The user picks a trusted state T.
3. The user predicts the output distribution: 0
P = [[S]](_ T 
 bU).
4. The system executes program S, producing a state 0 2 0 as output, where
0 = [[S]](_ T 
 _ U). The user observes the trusted projection of the output
state: o = 0T.
5. The user infers a postbelief: b0
U = (0
Pjo)U.
Figure 3.2: Contamination experiment protocol
assume that S always terminates.3 Also assume that the attacker and user know
the code of program S.
The user’s prebelief bU, characterizing his uncertainty about untrusted inputs
at the beginning of the experiment, may be chosen arbitrarily.4 The attacker
chooses U, the untrusted projection of the initial state, and the user chooses T,
the trusted projection of the initial state. Using the semantics of S along with
prebelief bU as a distribution on untrusted input, the user conducts a “thought
experiment” to generate a prediction 0
P of the output distribution:

0
P = [[S]](_ T 
 bU):
Program S is executed by the system. The distribution on output states pro-
duced by that execution is 0:

0 = [[S]](_ T 
 _ U):
3This assumption can be eliminated by using the technique described in x2.2.4. Also, recall
that in conﬁdentiality experiments we assumed that S did not modify any of the secret (high)
projection of the state, because the initial secret values needed to be preserved in the ﬁnal state.
To remove this restriction, x2.2.4 described a technique for preserving a copy of the untrusted
component of the state. But here, we have already introduced an alternate solution—the im-
mutable inputs preserve such a copy. Thus copying is not needed here.
4As with conﬁdentiality, an admissibility restriction (c.f. x2.1.4) can rule out nonsensical prebe-
liefs.
88The user makes an observation, which is the trusted projection of an output state
sampled from 0. We write 0 2 0 to denote that 0 is in the support of (i.e., has
positive frequency according to) 0. The observation o resulting from 0 is
o = 
0T:
Finally, the user’s postbelief b0
U is the untrusted projection of the distribution
that results from conditioning prediction 0
P on observation o:
b
0
U = (
0
Pjo)U:
Postbelief b0
U characterizes the user’s uncertainty about the untrusted inputs at
the end of the experiment.
3.1.2 Contamination Metric
Deﬁne the amount of information ﬂow Qcon caused by outcome b0
U of experi-
ment E as the improvement in the accuracy of the user’s belief:
Qcon(E;b
0
U) , D(bU _ _ U)   D(b
0
U _ _ U):
Let D be instantiated with relative entropy as in chapter 2. Thus the unit of
measurement for Qcon is (information-theoretic) bits.
As an example of quantiﬁcation of contamination, consider the following
program:
t2 := t1 + u
Variables t1 and t2 are trusted, whereas variable u is untrusted. Suppose that t1
and u are one-bit variables—that is, they can store either 0 or 1—but that t2 can
store any integer. Let the user have a uniform prebelief bU about the value of
u. Based on his knowledge of t1, the user will correctly infer the value of u by
89observing t2. For example, if T(t1) = 0 and U(u) = 1, then observation o will
be that t2 = 1, and postbelief b0
U will assign state (u 7! 1) probability 1. Quantity
of ﬂow Qcon is thus 1. This amount is intuitively sensible: one bit of untrusted
information, the value of u, has contaminated the trusted output.
More generally, we can show that Qcon correctly quantiﬁes the infor-
mation contained in an observation o about untrusted input U. Let
Y = [[S]](_ T 
 _ U)T be the system’s distribution on trusted outputs, and let
U = [[S]](_ T 
 bU)T be the user’s distribution on trusted outputs. As in x2.3.1,
let I(F) denote the information conveyed by event F drawn from probability
distribution . Then IU(o) quantiﬁes the information contained in o about both
the untrusted inputs and the probabilistic choices made by the program, but
IY (o) quantiﬁes only the information about the probabilistic choices. And Qcon
quantiﬁes just the information about the untrusted inputs:
Corollary 3.1. Qcon(E;b0
U) = IU(o)   IY (o).
Proof. Identical to the proof of theorem 2.2, with the appropriate textual substi-
tutions for agents and security levels.
3.2 Quantiﬁcation of Suppression
We now model a sender and receiver, who communicate through a program.
The receiver, by observing the program’s outputs, attempts to determine the
sender’s inputs. For example, the sender might be a database, and the program
might construct a web page using queries to the database; the receiver attempts
to reconstruct information in the database from the (incomplete) information in
the web page. As another example, the program might model a noisy channel;
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Figure 3.3: Channels in suppression experiment
the sender’s inputs are messages, and the receiver attempts to determine what
messages were sent.
As with contamination, the program receives trusted inputs as the initial
values of variables and produces trusted outputs as the ﬁnal values of variables.
The sender writes the initial values of trusted inputs, and the receiver reads
the ﬁnal values of trusted outputs. These are the only ways that either agent
may access any variables. We continue to model an attacker, who can attempt
to interfere with the trusted outputs. The attacker writes the initial values of
untrusted inputs and may also read the ﬁnal values of untrusted outputs. The
channels between agents and the program are depicted in ﬁgure 3.3.
3.2.1 Suppression Experiment Protocol
Formally, a suppression experiment E is described by a tuple,
E = hS;b;U;Ti;
where S is the program, b is the receiver’s prebelief about trusted and untrusted
inputs, U is the untrusted projection of the initial state, and T is the trusted
projection of the initial state. Note that the receiver’s belief concerns the entire
initial state because he may not observe any inputs. The protocol for suppres-
sion experiments is given in ﬁgure 3.4. In the protocol, notation TO denotes
91A suppression experiment E = hS;b;U;Ti is conducted as follows.
1. The receiver chooses a prebelief b about the trusted and untrusted state.
2. (a) The attacker picks an untrusted state U.
(b) The sender picks a trusted state T.
3. The receiver predicts the output distribution: 0
R = [[S]]b.
4. The system executes program S, which produces a state 0 2 0 as output,
where 0 = [[S]](_ T 
 _ U). The receiver observes the trusted projection of
the output state: o = 0TO.
5. The receiver infers a postbelief: b0 = (0
Rjo).
Figure 3.4: Suppression experiment protocol
projection of state  to trusted outputs. The protocol is a straightforward adap-
tation of the contamination protocol from x3.1.1.
3.2.2 Suppression Metric
Deﬁne the amount of information ﬂow Qtrans—that is, the amount of
transmission—caused by outcome b0 of experiment E as the improvement in
the accuracy of the receiver’s belief about trusted inputs:
Qtrans(E;b
0) , D(bTI _ _ T)   D(b
0TI _ _ T);
where notation bTI denotes projection of belief b to trusted inputs.
Quantity D(b  TI _ _ T) is the maximum amount of information the re-
ceiver could learn about trusted inputs. Quantity Qtrans(E;b0) is the amount of
information the receiver actually learned about trusted inputs from outcome b0.
Thus, quantity D(b0TI _ _ T) is the amount of information the receiver failed
to learn about trusted inputs, meaning that it quantiﬁes suppression. Deﬁne
S(E;b0) to be that quantity:
S(E;b
0) , D(b
0TI _ _ T):
92As an example of quantiﬁcation of suppression, consider the following pro-
gram:
o := i  rnd()
Variables i and o are one-bit input and output variables, respectively. Both vari-
ables are trusted. Program expression rnd() returns a uniformly random bit. Let
the receiver have a uniform prebelief b about the value of i. As a result of the
suppression experiment protocol, the receiver infers a postbelief b0 about i that
is uniform, thus b = b0. So quantity of transmission Qtrans is 0 bits, and quantity
of suppression S is 1 bit. These quantities are intuitively sensible: the receiver
cannot learn anything about i by observing o because of the bit of random noise
added by the program.
We can show that Qtrans correctly quantiﬁes the information about trusted
input T contained in observation o. Let R = ([[S]]b)  TO be the receiver’s
distribution on trusted outputs. Suppose that the sender shares the receiver’s
belief about untrusted inputs, meaning that the sender’s distribution on un-
trusted inputs is bjT when the trusted input is T, and let Y = ([[S]](bjT))TO
be the sender’s distribution on trusted outputs.5 Then IR(o) quantiﬁes the in-
formation contained in o about the trusted inputs, untrusted inputs, and the
probabilistic choices made by the program. And IY (o) quantiﬁes only the in-
formation about the untrusted inputs and the probabilistic choices. Thus Qtrans
quantiﬁes just the information about the trusted inputs:
Theorem 3.1. Qtrans(E;b0) = IR(o)   IY (o):
Proof. In appendix 3.A.
5Another way to rationalize distribution Y is to recognize that it would be the receiver’s
distribution on trusted outputs if he were told the value of trusted input T.
93Furthermore, aresultsimilartotheorem2.7holdsforQtrans: ifthesenderand
receiver use the same distribution T on trusted inputs, then expected amount
of ﬂow E[Qtrans] is equal to the mutual information between trusted inputs Tin
and trusted outputs Tout, given the untrusted inputs Uin. The expectation is with
respect to observation o and distribution T.
Corollary 3.2. Let E = hS;(bjU);T;Ui, where bTI = T. Then:
E[Qtrans(E)] = I(Tin;ToutjUin):
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to the proof of theorem 2.7, substituting
“trusted” for “high” and “untrusted” for “low,” T for H and U for L, etc.
If program S does not mention any untrusted inputs, the conditioning on
untrusted input U can be eliminated from corollary 3.2. In this case, the ex-
pected amount of ﬂow is simply the mutual information between the trusted
inputs and the trusted outputs. This coincides with the standard information-
theoretic model of a communication channel [32], in which there are no un-
trusted inputs—suppression occurs only when random errors are introduced
by the channel itself.
Finally, as an example of quantifying both contamination and suppression,
consider this program:
o := i  u
Recall that i and o are one-bit, trusted input and output variables, and that u is a
one-bit, untrusted input variable. Suppose the receiver has a uniform prebelief
about inputs i and u. Then the quantity of suppression is 1 bit because the
receiver cannot learn anything about i. Likewise, if we treat the receiver as a
user—allowing him to observe i and o—then the quantity of contamination is 1
bit because he learns everything about u.
943.2.3 Attacker-controlled Suppression
Sometimes the attacker can control how much suppression occurs. For example,
consider the following program:
o := i + u
Assume that inputs i and u are integers in the interval [1;M] for some M > 1.
Output o is therefore an integer in [2;2M]. If the receiver observes that o is 2,
the receiver can infer that u = i = 1. Hence the attacker, by choosing u = 1,
can make it possible that no information about i is suppressed—though not
necessary, because i might be set to some integer other than 1. But if the attacker
sets u to M, no matter what value of o the receiver observes, all values of i are
still possible. Hence the attacker, by choosing u = M, can make it possible that
all information about i is suppressed. We now formalize this intuition.
Deﬁne the quantity of attacker-controlled suppression SA for a program S, re-
ceiver prebelief b, and trusted input T as follows:
SA(S;b;T) , max
U;b02B(hS;b;U;Ti)
S(hS;b;U;Ti;b
0)
  min
U;b02B(hS;b;U;Ti)
S(hS;b;U;Ti;b
0)
Thisquantityisthedifferencebetweenthemaximumandtheminimumamount
of suppression possible over any choice of inputs U made by the attacker. For
the program above with a uniform receiver prebelief, the quantity of attacker-
controlled suppression is lgM bits. This is intuitively sensible, because the at-
tacker can control whether it is possible for the receiver to learn everything or
nothing about i.
Consider this revision of the program we have been considering:
o := i1 + i2 + u
95Assume that i1 and i2 are integers in the interval [1;M]. If the receiver observes
that o = 3, the receiver can again infer the exact values of i1, i2, and u. So the
attacker can again make it possible that no information is suppressed. But if the
attacker sets u to M, then the receiver will observe that o is in [M +2;3M]. Note
that this allows the receiver to eliminate some possibilities for the input values,
since they cannot sum to less than M +2. Hence if the receiver’s prebelief on the
inputs is uniform, his postbelief will not be uniform, meaning that he learned
information about the inputs and that some information was not suppressed.
For example, suppose that the receiver observes that o = M + 2. There are
 M+1
2

=
M(M+1)
2 ways to choose input values that sum to M + 2. Each of these
will be equally likely, so the postbelief will assign each probability 2
M(M+1). (But
theremainingwaystochooseinputs—thosethatdonotsumtoM+2—willhave
probability 0, establishing that this distribution is not uniform.) The amount of
suppression is therefore lg
M(M+1)
2 , which is always less than the total amount of
information the receiver could have learned, lgM2. This is intuitively sensible,
because the attacker can no longer suppress all the information about trusted
inputs i1 and i2.
3.2.4 Program Suppression
Consider the following program:
if u then i2 := i1 else i2 := i1  rnd()
Assume that i1 is a 2-bit input variable and i2 is a 2-bit output variable. If the
attacker sets u to true, then i2 equals i1 and is no information is suppressed. But
if the attacker sets u to false, all information about i1 is suppressed. It would be
useful to quantify the amount of suppression that the attacker directly controls,
96versus the amount that is intrinsic in the program itself. The metric for attacker-
controlled suppression did not make this distinction.
Toward that goal, deﬁne the quantity of program suppression SP as follows:
SP(E;b
0) , D((b
0jU)TI _ _ T):
This deﬁnition differs from the deﬁnition of suppression S only by condition-
ing receiver postbelief b0 on untrusted input U. This conditioning yields the
receiver’s postbelief were he told the attacker’s untrusted inputs. Any remain-
ing suppression must come solely from the program.
Deﬁne the quantity of attacker-controlled program suppression SPA for a pro-
gram S, receiver prebelief b, and trusted input T as follows:
SPA(S;b;T) , max
U;b02B(hS;b;U;Ti)
SP(hS;b;U;Ti;b
0)
  min
U;b02B(hS;b;U;Ti)
SP(hS;b;U;Ti;b
0)
Thisquantityisthedifferencebetweenthemaximumandtheminimumamount
of program suppression possible over any choice of inputs U made by the at-
tacker. For the program above with a uniform receiver prebelief, the quantity
of attacker-controlled program suppression is 2 bits. This is intuitively sensible,
because the attacker controls whether i1 is completely suppressed.
3.3 Error-Correcting Codes
An error-correcting code adds redundant information to a message so that sup-
pression can be detected and corrected. One of the simplest error-correcting
codes is the repetition code Rn [4], which adds redundancy by repeating a mes-
sage n times to form a code-word. For example, R3 would encode message 1 as
97code-word 111. The code-word is sent over a noisy channel, which might cor-
rupt the code-word; the receiver receives this possibly corrupted word from the
channel. For example, the sender might send code-word 111 yet the receiver
could receive word 101. To decode the received word, the receiver can employ
nearest-neighbor decoding: the nearest neighbor of a word w is the6 code-word c
that is closest to w by the Hamming distance metric d. Treating words as vectors
of symbols, Hamming distance d(w;x) between words w and x is the number of
positions i at which wi 6= xi. For the repetition code, nearest-neighbor decoding
is a majority vote: a word is decoded to the symbol that occurs most frequently
in the word. For example, word 101 would be decoded to code-word 111, thus
to message 1, but 001 would be decoded to message 0.
Consider the following program, which models the binary symmetric channel
often studied in information theory:7
BSC : i := 1;
while i  n do
vi := ti p8 vi := not ti;
i := i + 1
BSC takes as trusted input an n-bit variable t, and outputs n-bit trusted variable
v. Each bit of the input has probability 1   p of being ﬂipped in the output.
If n = 1 and the receiver has a uniform prebelief on trusted input t, then
after executing BSC and observing v, the receiver’s postbelief b0 ascribes proba-
bility p to an input t such that t = v. The amount of program suppression SP is
thus  lgp. But suppose that the sender and receiver employ repetition code R3
with program BSC: the sender encodes a one-bit input s into three bits t1;t2;t3
6The nearest neighbor is not necessarily unique for some codes, in which case an arbitrary
nearest neighbor is chosen.
7Recall from chapter 2 that probabilistic choice S1 p8 S2, where 0  p  1, executes program
S1 with probability p or S2 with probability 1   p.
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Figure 3.5: Model of anonymizer
(so n = 3), inputs those bits to BSC, then the receiver gets three bits v1;v2;v3 as
output, and decodes them to one bit r. Let this composed program be R3(BSC).
Assuming for simplicity that the receiver has a uniform prebelief, postbelief b0
ascribes probability p3 + 3p2(1   p) to actual input s.8 The amount of program
suppression SP is thus  lg(p3+3p2(1 p)). So for any p > 1=2 (i.e., for any chan-
nel at least slightly biased toward correct transmission), the program suppres-
sion from R3(BSC) is less than the program suppression from BSC. Repetition
code R3 thus corrects program suppression.
3.4 Statistical Databases
The introduction to this chapter suggested that mechanisms used by statistical
databases to create anonymized responses to queries can be characterized as
sacriﬁcing integrity to improve conﬁdentiality. We can now make this charac-
terization precise by using our models.
As depicted in ﬁgure 3.5, we model the anonymizer with a program that
receives two inputs. The ﬁrst input is the user’s query, which contains pub-
8This probability can be derived either by evaluating the program semantics directly, or by
the following argument. Decoded output r equals input s if exactly zero or one bits in code
word t1t2t3 are ﬂipped during transmission. Each bit ti is transmitted correctly with probability
p and ﬂipped with probability 1   p. The probability that zero bits are ﬂipped is thus p3; the
probability that a particular bit ti is ﬂipped is p2(1   p); and there are three possible single bits
that could be ﬂipped. So the total probability of correct decoding is p3 + 3p2(1   p).
99lic information. The second input is a response containing secret informa-
tion from the database—perhaps even the entire contents of the database. The
anonymizer produces an anonymized response as public output.9 The user is an
attacker against conﬁdentiality, because he might be attempting to learn secret
information through his query. Since the model we have just described coin-
cides with our model for quantitative conﬁdentiality, it is straightforward to an-
alyze the amount of information leaked by the anonymizer using the techniques
in x2.3. In particular, metric Q is the quantity of leakage.
But the anonymizer also acts as a noisy communication channel, where the
database is the sender and the user is the receiver. The input to this chan-
nel is trusted input from the database, and the output from the channel is the
trusted, anonymized response to the user. The query input from the user could
be deemed untrusted, but the user is not an attacker against integrity because
he does not attempt to reduce the amount of information he learns through the
channel—indeed, he would prefer to increase the amount. So although there
is no attacker-controlled suppression, the anonymizer causes program suppres-
sion as quantiﬁed by SP.
We can relate the quantity of leakage to the amount of program suppression.
Let A be the anonymizer program, b be the user’s prebelief about the database,
d be the actual database contents, q be the user’s query, and b0 be the user’s post-
belief after observing the anonymized response. Then we obtain the following
theorem:
9The anonymizer might also produce some output about the anonymization it just per-
formed, and this output might be stored in the database and used during future anonymiza-
tions. This output would be secret; we do not model it here.
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Figure 3.6: Information ﬂows in a system. Dashed lines are uninteresting from
our security perspective.
Theorem 3.2. D(b _ _ d) = Q(hA;b;d;qi;b0) + SP(hA;b;d;qi;b0).
Proof. In appendix 3.A.
This theorem means that the quantity of leakage plus the quantity of pro-
gram suppression is constant for a given experiment and outcome. That con-
stant is inaccuracy D(b _ _ d) in the user’s prebelief b about the database con-
tents d. This is intuitively sensible, because D(b _ _ d) is the total amount of
information the user could possibly learn about the database contents. All of
that information is either communicated to the user (quantity Q(hA;b;d;qi;b0))
or suppressed (quantity SP(hA;b;d;qi;b0)).
3.5 Duality of Integrity and Conﬁdentiality
Consider a program that processes two levels of information, low and high,
denoted L and H. We take as the deﬁning characteristic of low information
that its use be unrestricted in the program. For conﬁdentiality, low is therefore
synonymous with public, and for integrity, low is synonymous with trusted.
Analogously, we take as the deﬁning characteristic of high information that its
useberestrictedintheprogram. Soforconﬁdentiality, highissynonymouswith
secret, and for integrity, high is synonymous with untrusted.
101Flow Attenuation
HI ! LO C: leakage C: hiding
I: contamination I: hygiene
LI ! LO C: — C: —
I: transmission I: suppression
Figure 3.7: Dualities between integrity (I) and conﬁdentiality (C)
Let HI denote the high inputs to the system; LO, the low outputs; etc. As de-
pictedinﬁgure3.6, therearefourinformationﬂowsbetweeninputsandoutputs
in this system: LI ! LO, HI ! LO, LI ! HO, and HI ! HO. The two ﬂows
to HO are uninteresting from our security perspective because high outputs do
not need to be protected—that is, for conﬁdentiality, it does not matter what
information ﬂows to secret outputs; and for integrity, it does not matter what
information ﬂows to untrusted outputs. However, the remaining two ﬂows to
LO are interesting and exhibit dualities, which are summarized in ﬁgure 3.7 and
discussed below.
Flow HI ! LO is the standard problem with which information-ﬂow se-
curity has been concerned. For conﬁdentiality, this is the ﬂow, or leakage, from
secret inputs to public outputs; x2.2 and x2.3 presented our framework for quan-
tiﬁcation of leakage. For integrity, this is the ﬂow from untrusted inputs to
trusted outputs; this ﬂow was named contamination in x3.1. Contamination of
trusted information is therefore the information-ﬂow dual of leakage of secret
information: both quantify how much information ﬂows between inputs and
outputs at different security levels. Indeed, our framework for quantiﬁcation
of contamination was nearly the same as our framework for quantiﬁcation of
leakage. We needed to introduce a new agent, the user, in the integrity model.
But the user could have been included in the conﬁdentiality model; the user’s
102role there would have been to choose secret inputs. Note that the user and at-
tacker reverse roles in the two models: for conﬁdentiality, the attacker holds
belief about high (secret) inputs, and for integrity, the user holds belief about
high (untrusted) inputs.
Deﬁne attenuation as the amount of information that does not ﬂow from an
input to an output. The amount of actual ﬂow of information is therefore the
amount of information that could possibly ﬂow less the amount of attenuation.
For conﬁdentiality, the attenuation of HI ! LO is the distance D(b0
H _ _ H)
from attacker’s postbelief b0
H to state H. This distance is the amount of secret
information that is not leaked to the attacker; we could call this attenuation
hiding of information. Dually, for integrity, distance D(b0
U _ _ U) is the amount
of untrusted information that does contaminate the trusted outputs; we could
call this attenuation hygiene because it preserves the “cleanliness” of the trusted
outputs.
Flow LI ! LO can be understood as one of the standard problems with
which classical information theory is concerned. For integrity, this is the ﬂow, or
transmission, from trusted inputs to trusted outputs; our framework for quan-
tifying the ﬂow and its attenuation, which we named suppression, was given in
x3.2. For conﬁdentiality, this ﬂow is uninteresting: the amount of information
that ﬂows from public inputs to public outputs does not characterize how the
program leaks or hides secret information. So there does not seem to be a dual
to this ﬂow.
1033.6 Related Work
Newsome, Song, and McCamant [94] quantify the amount of inﬂuence an at-
tacker can exert over the execution of a program as the logarithm of the size
of the set of possible outputs. Assuming that programs are deterministic and
that all inputs are either under the control of the attacker or are ﬁxed constants,
this quantity is the channel capacity of the program. Our deﬁnition of con-
tamination generalizes this deﬁnition by allowing probabilistic programs and
trusted inputs that are not under the control of the attacker. Also, their deﬁni-
tion conservatively assumes a uniform distribution over outputs, but the deﬁ-
nitions given here allow arbitrary distributions over inputs and outputs. How-
ever, they implement a dynamic analysis that automatically quantiﬁes inﬂuence
in real-world programs.
Kifer and Gehrke [63] quantify the utility of anonymized data with relative
entropy (there called Kullback-Leibler divergence). They use this metric to se-
lect among different anonymizations of a dataset.
Biba[15]ﬁrstidentiﬁedadualitybetweenconﬁdentialityandintegrity, mod-
eling integritywith adual of theBell–LaPadula modelof conﬁdentiality. Similar
dualities have been exploited in Flume [67] and recent versions of Jif [22].
Clark and Wilson [26] propose a different kind of integrity policy, suitable
for commercial organizations, based on well-formed transactions and veriﬁca-
tion procedures. We have not investigated quantitative generalizations of this
policy.
1043.7 Summary
This chapter presents an information-ﬂow model for quantiﬁcation of integrity.
We introduced two novel information-ﬂow integrity metrics, contamination
and suppression. Both metrics are deﬁned by adapting our belief-based model
(in chapter 2) for quantiﬁcation of conﬁdentiality. We have shown that our
metric for suppression agrees with the classical information-theoretic metric for
channel capacity. We have also applied our deﬁnition to the analysis of error-
correcting codes and statistical databases.
1053.A Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 3.1 Qtrans(E;b0) = IR(o)   IY (o):
Proof.
Qtrans(E;b0)
= h Deﬁnition of Qtrans i
D(bTI _ _ T)   D(b0TI _ _ T)
= h Deﬁnitions of D and point mass i
 lg(bTI)(T) + lg(b0TI)(T)
= h Lemma 3.1 (below), properties of lg i
 lgPrR(o) + lgPrY (o)
= h Deﬁnition of I i
IR(o)   IY (o)
Lemma 3.1. (b0TI)(T) = (bTI)(T) 
S(o)
R(o) :
Proof.
(b0TI)(T)
= h Deﬁnition of b0 in corruption experiment protocol i
((([[S]]b)jo)TI)(T)
= h Deﬁnition of TI i
(
P
 : TI = T : (([[S]]b)jo)())
106= h Deﬁnition of jo i
(
P
 : TI = T ^ TO = o : ([[S]]b)()
(([[S]]b)TO)(o))
= h Deﬁnition of T i
(
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]]b)()
(([[S]]b)TO)(o))
= h Distributivity i
1
(([[S]]b)TO)(o)  (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]]b)())
= h Deﬁnition of R i
1
R(o)  (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]]b)())
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
1
R(o)  (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : (
P
0 : b(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h Input is immutable, so  and 0 must agree on it i
1
R(o)  (
P
 : T = (T [ o) :
(
P
0 : 0TI = T : b(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h Associativity i
1
R(o)  (
P
0 : 0TI = T :
(
P
 : T = (T [ o) : b(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h Distributivity i
1
R(o)  (
P
0 : 0TI = T : b(0)
 (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]]0)()))
= h Unit of  i
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R(o)  (bTI)(T)
(bTI)(T)  (
P
0 : 0TI = T : b(0)
 (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]]0)()))
= h Distributivity i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (
P
0 : 0TI = T : b(0)
(bTI)(T)
 (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]]0)()))
= h Deﬁnition of bjU, using range of 0 i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (
P
0 : 0TI = T : (bjT)(0)
 (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]]0)()))
= h Distributivity i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (
P
0 : 0TI = T :
(
P
 : T = (T [ o) : (bjT)(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h Associativity i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (
P
 : T = (T [ o) :
(
P
0 : 0TI = T : (bjT)(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h Input is immutable, so  and 0 must agree on it i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (
P
 : T = (T [ o) :
(
P
0 : (bjT)(0)  ([[S]]0)()))
= h Deﬁnition of [[S]] i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (
P
 : T = (T [ o) : ([[S]](bjT))())
= h Deﬁnition of bjU i
1081
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (
P
 : TO = o : ([[S]](bjT))())
= h Deﬁnition of TO i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  (([[S]](bjT))TO)(o)
= h Deﬁnition of S i
1
R(o)  (bTI)(T)  S(o)
= h Commutativity i
(bTI)(T)  S(o)
R(o)
109CHAPTER 4
FORMALIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [37], also known
as the “Orange Book,” establishes veriﬁed design as the highest security certiﬁca-
tionthatacomputersystemcanobtain.1 Tomeet(inpart)thecriteriaforveriﬁed
design, a system must be accompanied by a formal security policy, a formal de-
sign, and a formal or informal proof that the design satisﬁes the policy. Some
lower levels of certiﬁcation also require the statement of a formal security pol-
icy.2 So formal techniques for speciﬁcation of security policies are necessary to
achieve high levels of certiﬁcation.
Recall from chapter 1 that the theory of trace properties seems appealing as
a formal technique for speciﬁcation of security policies, but that security poli-
cies such as noninterference and mean response time are not trace properties.
Sets of trace properties, however, are sufﬁcient to formalize security policies. In
chapter 1, we named these sets hyperproperties. A theory of hyperproperties is
developed in this chapter. We generalize safety and liveness, and their topo-
logical characterizations, from trace properties to hyperproperties. We identify
a subclass of hypersafety, called k-safety, for which we give a relatively com-
plete veriﬁcation methodology. And we show that every hyperproperty is the
intersection of a safety hyperproperty and a liveness hyperproperty.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Hyperproperties, hypersafety, k-safety,
and hyperliveness are deﬁned and explored in x4.1, x4.2, x4.3, and x4.4, respec-
tively. A topological account of hyperproperties is given in x4.5. The hyperpro-
This chapter contains material from a previously published paper [29], which is c  2008
IEEE and reprinted, with permission, from Proceedings of the 21st IEEE Computer Security Foun-
dations Symposium.
1Veriﬁed design is designated “Class A1” by the TCSEC.
2These certiﬁcations are structured protection and security domains, designated “Class B2” and
“Class B3” by the TCSEC.
110perty intersection theorem is presented in x4.6, and x4.7 concludes. Most proofs
are delayed from the main body to appendix 4.A.
4.1 Hyperproperties
We model system execution with traces, where a trace is a sequence of states; by
employing rich enough notions of state, this model can encode other represen-
tations of execution.3
The structure of a state is not important in the following deﬁnitions, so we
leave set  of states abstract. However, the structure of a state is important
for real examples, and we introduce predicates and functions, on states and on
traces, as needed to model events, timing, probability, etc.
Traces may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequences, which we categorize into sets:
	n , 
;
	inf , 
!;
	 , 	n [ 	inf;
where  denotes the set of all ﬁnite sequences over , and ! denotes the set
of all inﬁnite sequences over . For trace t = s0s1 ::: and index i 2 N, we deﬁne
the following indexing notation:
t[i] , si;
t[::i] , s0s1 :::si;
t[i::] , sisi+1 :::
3Chapter 5 shows how to model a labeled transition system as a set of traces by including
transition labels in states, thereby preserving information about the nondeterministic branching
structure of the system. This encoding is also used by chapter 5 to model state machines and
probabilistic systems.
111We denote concatenation of ﬁnite trace t and (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) trace t0 as tt0, and
we denote the empty trace as .
Asystemismodeledbyanon-emptysetofinﬁnitetraces, calleditsexecutions.
If an execution terminates (and thus could be represented by a ﬁnite trace), we
represent it as an inﬁnite trace by inﬁnitely stuttering the ﬁnal state in the ﬁnite
trace.
4.1.1 Trace Properties
A trace property is a set of inﬁnite traces [5,70]. The set of all trace properties is
Prop , P(	inf);
whereP denotespowerset. AsetT oftracessatisﬁesatracepropertyP, denoted
T j= P, iff all the traces of T are in P:
T j= P , T  P:
Some security policies are expressible as trace properties. For example, con-
sider the policy “The system may not write to the network after reading from a
ﬁle.” Formally, this is the set of traces
NRW , ft 2 	inf j :(9i;j 2 N : i < j ^ isFileRead(t[i])
^ isNetworkWrite(t[j]))g; (4.1.1)
where isFileRead and isNetworkWrite are state predicates.
Similarly, access control is a trace property requiring every operation to be
consistent with its requestor’s rights:
AC , ft 2 	inf j (8i 2 N : rightsReq(t[i])
 acm(t[i   1])[subj(t[i]);obj(t[i])])g: (4.1.2)
112Function acm(s) yields the access control matrix in state s. Function subj(s)
yields the subject who requested the operation that led to state s, function obj(s)
yields the object involved in that operation, and function rightsReq(s) yields the
rights required for the operation to be allowed.
As another example, guaranteed service is a trace property requiring that ev-
ery request for service is eventually satisﬁed:
GS , ft 2 	inf j (8i 2 N : isReq(t[i])
=) (9j > i : isRespToReq(t[j];t[i])))g: (4.1.3)
Predicate isReq(s) identiﬁes whether a request is initiated in state s, and predi-
cate isRespToReq(s0;s) identiﬁes whether state s0 completes the response to the
request initiated in state s.
4.1.2 Hyperproperties
A hyperproperty is a set of sets of inﬁnite traces, or equivalently a set of trace
properties. The set of all hyperproperties is
HP , P(P(	inf))
= P(Prop):
The interpretation of a hyperproperty as a security policy is that the hyperpro-
perty is the set of systems allowed by that policy.4 Each trace property in a
hyperproperty is an allowed system, specifying exactly which executions must
be possible for that system. Thus a set T of traces satisﬁes hyperproperty H,
denoted T j= H, iff T is in H:
T j= H , T 2 H:
4The hyperproperty might also contain the empty set of traces, although this set does not
correspond to a system.
113Note the use of bold face to denote hyperproperties (e.g., H) and sans serif
to denote sets of trace properties (e.g., Prop). Although a hyperproperty and a
set of trace properties are mathematically the same kind of object (a set of sets
of traces), they are used differently in formulas, hence the different typography.
Sets of hyperproperties are simultaneously bold face and sans serif (e.g., HP).
Given a trace property P, there is a unique hyperproperty denoted [P] that
expresses the same policy as P. We call this hyperproperty the lift of P. For P
and [P] to express the same policy, they must be satisﬁed by the same sets of
traces. Thus we can derive a deﬁnition of [P]:
(8T 2 Prop : T j= P () T j= [P])
= (8T 2 Prop : T  P () T 2 [P])
= [P] = fT 2 Prop j T  Pg
= [P] = P(P):
Consequently, the lift of P is the powerset of P:
[P] , P(P):
4.1.3 Hyperproperties in Action
Trace properties are satisﬁed by traces, whereas hyperproperties are satisﬁed
by sets of traces. This additional level of sets means that hyperproperties can be
more expressive than trace properties. We explore this added expressivity with
some examples.
Secure information ﬂow. Information-ﬂow security policies express restric-
tions on what information may be learned by users of a system. Users interact
114with systems by providing inputs and observing outputs. To model this interac-
tion, deﬁne ev(s) as the input or output event, if any, that occurs when a system
transitions to state s. Assume that at most one event, input or output, can occur
at each transition. For a trace t, extend this notation to ev(t), denoting the se-
quence of events resulting from application of ev() to each state in trace t.5 Fur-
ther assume that each user of a system is cleared either at conﬁdentiality level
L, representing low (public) information, or H, representing high (secret) infor-
mation, and that each event is labeled with one of these conﬁdentiality levels.
Deﬁne evL(t) to be the subsequence of low input and output events contained
within ev(t), and evHin(t) to be the subsequence of high input events contained
within ev(t).
Noninterference, as deﬁned by Goguen and Meseguer [46], requires that com-
mands issued by users holding high clearances be removable without affecting
observations of users holding low clearances. Treating commands as inputs
and observations as outputs, we model this security policy as a hyperproperty
requiring a system to contain, for any trace t, a corresponding trace t0 with no
high inputs yet with the same low events as t:
GMNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 SM
^ (8t 2 T : (9t
0 2 T : evHin(t
0) = 
^ evL(t) = evL(t
0)))g: (4.1.4)
Conjunct T 2 SM expresses the requirement, made by Goguen and Meseguer’s
formalization, that systems are deterministic state machines (x5.4 deﬁnes SM
formally). GMNI is not a trace property because trace t is allowed only if cor-
responding trace t0 is also allowed.
5Depending on the nature of events in the particular system that is being modeled, it might
be appropriate for ev(t) to eliminate stuttering of events.
115Generalized noninterference [81] extends Goguen and Meseguer’s deﬁnition
of noninterference to handle nondeterministic systems, which are the systems
modeled by Prop. McLean [86] reformulates generalized noninterference as a
policy requiring a system to contain, for any traces t1 and t2, an interleaved
trace t3 whose high inputs are the same as t1 and whose low events are the same
as t2. This is a hyperproperty:
GNI , fT 2 Prop j (8t1;t2 2 T : (9t3 2 T :
evHin(t3) = evHin(t1) ^ evL(t3) = evL(t2)))g: (4.1.5)
GNI is not a trace property because the presence of any two traces t1 and t2 in
a system necessitates the presence of a third trace t3.
Observational determinism [85,102] requires a system to appear deterministic
to a low user. Zdancewic and Myers’s [130] deﬁnition of observational deter-
minism can be formulated as a hyperproperty:
OD , fT 2 Prop j (8t;t
0 2 T : t[0] =L t
0[0] =) t L t
0)g: (4.1.6)
State equivalence relation s =L s0 holds whenever states s and s0 are indistin-
guishable to a low user, and trace equivalence relation t L t0 holds whenever
traces t and t0 are indistinguishable to a low user. Zdancewic and Myers deﬁne
trace equivalence in terms of state equivalence, requiring the sequence of states
in each trace to be equivalent up to both stuttering and preﬁx; equivalence up to
preﬁx makes their deﬁnition termination insensitive—that is, systems are allowed
to leak information via termination channels.6 OD is not a trace property be-
cause whether some trace is allowed in a system depends on all the other traces
of the system.
6Zdancewic and Myers also require systems to be race free, hence they weaken trace equiv-
alence to hold for each memory location in a state in isolation, not over all memory locations
simultaneously. We omit this requirement for simplicity.
116Bisimulation-based deﬁnitions of information-ﬂow security policies can also
be formulated as hyperproperties,7 which we demonstrate in chapter 5 with Fo-
cardi and Gorrieri’s [44] bisimulation nondeducibility on compositions (BNDC)
and with Boudol and Castellani’s [18] deﬁnition of noninterference.
All information-ﬂow security policies we investigated turned out to be hy-
perproperties, not trace properties. This is suggestive, but any stronger state-
ment about the connection between information ﬂow and hyperproperties
would require a formal deﬁnition of information-ﬂow policies, and none is uni-
versally accepted. Nonetheless, we believe that information ﬂow is intrinsically
tied to correlations between (not within) executions. And hyperproperties are
sufﬁciently expressive to formulate such correlations, whereas trace properties
are not.
Service level agreements. A service level agreement (SLA) speciﬁes acceptable
performance of a system. Such speciﬁcations commonly use statistics such as
 mean response time, the mean time that elapses between a request and a
response;
 time service factor, the percentage of requests that are serviced within a
speciﬁed time; and
 percentage uptime, the percentage of time during which the system is avail-
able to accept and service requests.
These statistics can be used to deﬁne policies with respect to individual exe-
cutions of a system or across all executions of a system. In the former case, the
7Since hyperproperties are trace-based, this might at ﬁrst seem to contradict results, such as
Focardi and Gorrieri’s [44], stating that bisimulation-based deﬁnitions are more expressive than
trace-based deﬁnitions. However, by employing a richer notion of state [105, x1.3] in traces than
Focardi and Gorrieri, hyperproperties are able to express bisimulations.
117SLA would be a trace property. For example, the policy “The mean response
time in each execution is less than 1 second” might not be satisﬁed by a system
if there are executions in which some response times are much greater than 1
second. Yet if these executions are rare, the system might still satisfy the policy
“The mean response time over all executions is less than 1 second.” This latter
SLA is not a trace property, but it is a hyperproperty:
RT , fT 2 Prop j mean
 
[
t2T
respTimes(t)
!
 1g: (4.1.7)
Function mean(X) denotes the mean8 of a set X of real numbers, and
respTimes(t) denotes the set of response times (in seconds) from request and
response events in trace t. Policies derived from the other SLA statistics above
can similarly be expressed as hyperproperties.
4.1.4 Beyond Hyperproperties?
Hyperproperties are able to express security policies that trace properties can-
not. So it is natural to ask whether there are security policies that hyperproper-
ties cannot express. We have equated security policies with system properties,
and we chose to model systems as trace sets. Every property of trace sets is a
hyperproperty, so by deﬁnition hyperproperties are expressively complete for
our formulations of “system” and “security policy.” To ﬁnd security policies
that hyperproperties cannot express (if any exist), we would need to examine
alternative notions of systems and security policies. Alternative formulations
of systems are discussed in chapter 5, but all the formulations considered there
turn out to have encodings as trace sets—thus hyperproperties are complete for
8Since X might have inﬁnite cardinality, RT requires a deﬁnition of the mean of an inﬁnite
set (and, for some sets, this mean does not exist). We omit formalizing such a deﬁnition here;
one possibility is to use Ces` aro means [54].
118those formulations. We do not know whether other formulations exist that do
not have such encodings.
One way to generalize the notion of a security policy is to consider policies
onsetsofsystems—forexample, diversity[100], whichrequiresthesystemsallto
implement the same functionality but to differ in their implementation details.
Any such policy, however, could be modeled as a hyperproperty on a single
system that is a product9 of all the systems in the set. So hyperproperties again
seem to be sufﬁcient.
4.1.5 Logic and Hyperproperties
We have not given a logic in which hyperproperties may be expressed. The ex-
amples in this chapter require only second-order logic. Although higher-order
logic might also be useful to express hyperproperties, higher-order logic is re-
ducible to second-order logic [107, x6.2]. So we believe that second-order logic
is sufﬁcient to express all hyperproperties. But we do not know whether the full
power of second-order logic is necessary to express hyperproperties of interest.
This has ramiﬁcations for veriﬁcation of hyperproperties, because although full
second-order logic cannot be effectively and completely axiomatized, fragments
of it can be [14, x2.3].10
9The product of systems T1 and T2 can be deﬁned as system f(t1[0];t2[0])(t1[1];t1[2])::: j t1 2
T1 ^ t2 2 T2g, comprising traces over pairs of states. Generalizing, the product of a set of n
systems comprises traces over n-tuples of states.
10It is natural to ask whether we could further reduce second-order logic to ﬁrst-order. Such a
reduction is possible, but only with the Henkin, rather than standard, semantics of second-order
logic [14, x4.2]. We do not know which of these semantics should be preferred for hyperproper-
ties. However, there are trace properties, and thus hyperproperties, that we conjecture cannot
be expressed in ﬁrst-order logic—for example, the trace property containing the single trace
pqppqqpppqqq :::, where p and q are states. This suggests that the standard semantics is appro-
priate.
1194.1.6 Reﬁnement and Hyperproperties
Programmers use stepwise reﬁnement [1,9,33,40,71,126] to develop, in a series of
steps, a program that implements a speciﬁcation. The programmer starts from
the speciﬁcation. Each successive step creates a more concrete speciﬁcation, ul-
timately culminating in a speciﬁcation sufﬁciently concrete that a computer can
execute it. To prove that the ﬁnal concrete speciﬁcation correctly implements the
original speciﬁcation, the programmer argues at each step that the new concrete
speciﬁcation reﬁnes the previous speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcation S1 reﬁnes speciﬁca-
tion S2, denoted S1 REF S2, iff every behavior permitted by S1 is also permitted
by S2—that is, the set of behaviors of S1 is a subset of the set of behaviors of S2.
Speciﬁcations might describe behaviors at different levels of abstraction. For
example, a speciﬁcation might describe behaviors of a queue, but a reﬁnement
of that speciﬁcation might use an array to implement this behavior. Or a speci-
ﬁcation might describe behaviors using critical sections, but a reﬁnement might
implement critical sections with semaphores. So programmers need techniques
to relate the behaviors described by speciﬁcations. Abstraction functions [55,56]
and reﬁnement mappings [1] have been developed for this purpose; both interpret
concrete behaviors as abstract behaviors.
Generalizing from these two techniques, let an interpretation function be a
function of type 	 ! 	. Let IF be any class of interpretation functions that (like
abstraction functions and reﬁnement mappings) is closed under composition
and contains the identity function id.11
11Abstraction functions must also preserve data type operations, and reﬁnement mappings
must preserve externally visible components up to stuttering. But these restrictions are not
relevant to our discussion.
120An interpretation function  can be lifted to Prop ! Prop by applying  to
each trace in a set:
(T) , f(t) j t 2 Tg:
System S -satisﬁes trace property P, denoted S j= P, iff (S) j= P. Notation
S j= P, as we have used it so far, thus means that S j=id P.
Trace property P1 reﬁnes P2 under interpretation , denoted P1 REF P2,
iff (P1)  P2. So for trace properties, satisfaction is the same relation as reﬁne-
ment, and subset implies reﬁnement—that is, if C is a subset of A, then C reﬁnes
A (under interpretation id). This implication is desirable, because it permits re-
ﬁnements that resolve nondeterminism by removing traces from a system.
It is well-known that this kind of reﬁnement does not generally work for se-
curity policies.12 For example, recall system  (chapter 1), which nondetermin-
istically chooses to output 0, 1, or the value of a secret bit h. System  satisﬁes
the speciﬁcation “The possible output values are independent of the values of
secrets,” which can be formulated as a hyperproperty. But consider a system 0
that always outputs h. System 0 does not satisfy the speciﬁcation and therefore
cannot reﬁne , yet 0  . So subset does not imply reﬁnement for hyperprop-
erties as it does for trace properties.
Hyperproperty H1 reﬁnes H2 under interpretation , denoted H1 HREF
H2, iff (H1)  H2, where (H) is deﬁned as f(T) j T 2 Hg. A natural
relationship that we would expect to hold is
(8S 2 Prop;H 2 HP : S j= H () [S] HREFid H); (4.1.8)
12Previous work has identiﬁed reﬁnement techniques that are valid for use with certain
information-ﬂow security policies [17,79,86].
121because satisfaction and reﬁnement intuitively should agree (as they did for
trace properties). Straightforward application of deﬁnitions shows that (4.1.8)
holds iff H is subset closed.
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, the set of hyperproperties with which reﬁne-
ment works is the set SSC of subset-closed hyperproperties:
SSC , fH 2 HP j (8T 2 Prop : T 2 H
=) (8T
0 2 Prop : T
0  T =) T
0 2 H))g:
The lifted trace properties are, of course, members of SSC. But SSC contains
more than just the lifted trace properties. For example, observational determin-
ism OD (4.1.6) is subset closed and therefore a member of SSC, but OD is not a
lifted trace property.
4.2 Hypersafety
According to Alpern and Schneider [5], the “bad thing” in a safety property
must be both
 ﬁnitely observable, meaning its occurrence can be detected in ﬁnite time,
and
 irremediable, so its occurrence can never be remediated by future events.
No-read-then-write NRW (4.1.1) and access control AC (4.1.2) are both safety.
The bad thing for NRW is a ﬁnite trace in which a network write occurs after a
ﬁle read. This bad thing is ﬁnitely observable, because the write can be detected
in some ﬁnite preﬁx of the trace, and irremediable, because the network write
can never be undone. For AC, the bad thing is similarly a ﬁnite trace in which
an operation is performed without appropriate rights.
122For trace properties, a bad thing is a ﬁnite trace that cannot be a preﬁx of any
execution satisfying the safety property. A ﬁnite trace t is a preﬁx of a (ﬁnite or
inﬁnite) trace t0, denoted t  t0, iff t0 = tt00 for some t00 2 	.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A trace property S is a safety property [5] iff
(8t 2 	inf : t = 2 S =) (9m 2 	n : m  t ^
(8t
0 2 	inf : m  t
0 =) t
0 = 2 S))):
Deﬁne SP to be the set of all safety properties; note that SP is itself a hyperpro-
perty.
We generalize safety to hypersafety by generalizing the bad thing from a
ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite13 set of ﬁnite traces. Deﬁne Obs to be the set of such obser-
vations:
Obs , P
n(	n);
where Pn(X) denotes the set of all ﬁnite subsets of set X. Preﬁx  on sets of
traces is deﬁned as follows:14
T  T
0 , (8t 2 T : (9t
0 2 T
0 : t  t
0)):
Note that this deﬁnition allows T 0 to contain traces that have no preﬁx in T.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A hyperproperty S is a safety hyperproperty (is hypersafety) iff
(8T 2 Prop : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs : M  T
^ (8T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 =) T
0 = 2 S))):
13Inﬁnite sets might seem to be an attractive alternative, and many of the results in the rest of
this chapter would still hold. However, the topological characterization given in x4.5 (speciﬁ-
cally, propositions 4.4 and 4.5) would be sacriﬁced.
14Other deﬁnitions of trace set preﬁx are possible, but inconsistent with our notion of obser-
vation. We discuss this in x4.5.
123The deﬁnition of hypersafety parallels the deﬁnition of safety, but the domains
involved now include an extra level of sets. Deﬁne SHP to be the set of all safety
hyperproperties.
Observational determinism OD (4.1.6) is hypersafety. The bad thing is a pair
oftracesthatarenotlow-equivalentdespitehavinglow-equivalentinitialstates.
But set SP of all safety properties is not hypersafety: there is no bad thing that
prevents an arbitrary trace property from being extended to a safety property.
Safety properties lift to safety hyperproperties:
Proposition 4.1. (8S 2 Prop : S 2 SP () [S] 2 SHP):
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Reﬁnement of hypersafety. Stepwise reﬁnement works with all safety hy-
perproperties, because safety hyperproperties are subset closed (c.f. x4.1.6), as
stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. SHP  SSC.
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
A consequence of theorem 4.1 is that any hyperproperty that is not sub-
set closed cannot be hypersafety. For example, generalized noninterference
GNI (4.1.5) is not subset closed: a system containing traces t1 and t2 and in-
terleaved trace t3 might satisfy GNI, but the subset containing only t1 and t2
would not satisfy GNI. Thus GNI cannot be hypersafety.
1244.3 Beyond 2-Safety
Safety properties enjoy a relatively complete veriﬁcation methodology based on
invariance arguments [6]. Although we have not obtained such a methodology
for hypersafety, we can use invariance arguments to verify a class of safety hy-
perproperties by generalizing recent work on veriﬁcation of secure information
ﬂow.
Recall that secure information ﬂow is a hyperproperty but not a trace prop-
erty. Recent work gives system transformations that reduce verifying secure
information ﬂow15 to verifying a safety property of some transformed system:
Pottier and Simonet [99] develop a type system for verifying secure informa-
tion ﬂow based on simultaneous reasoning about two executions of a program.
Darvas et al. [34] show that secure information ﬂow can be expressed in dy-
namic logic. Barthe et al. [12] give an equivalent formulation for Hoare logic
and temporal logic, based on a self-composition construction.
Deﬁne the sequential self-composition of P as the program P;P 0, where P 0 de-
notes program P, but with every variable renamed to a fresh, primed variable—
for example, variable x is renamed to x0. One way to verify that P exhibits se-
cure information ﬂow is to establish the following trace property of transformed
program P;P 0:
If for every low variable l, before execution l = l0 holds, then when
execution terminates l = l0 still holds, no matter what the values of
high variables were.
15These reductions are possible because the particular formulations of secure information
ﬂow used in each work are actually hypersafety. A formulation that is hyperliveness—which
would include all possibilistic information-ﬂow policies, as discussed in x4.4—would not be
amenable to these reductions.
125Barthe et al. generalize the self-composition operator from sequential composi-
tion to any operator that satisﬁes certain conditions, and they note that parallel
composition satisﬁes these conditions. They also relax the equality constraints
in the above trace property to partial equivalence relations. Terauchi and
Aiken [115] further generalize the applicability of self-composition by showing
that it can be used to verify any 2-safety property, which they deﬁne informally
as a “property that can be refuted by observing two ﬁnite traces.”
Using hyperproperties, we can show that the above results are special cases
of a more general theorem. Deﬁne a k-safety hyperproperty as a safety hyper-
property in which the bad thing never involves more than k traces:
Deﬁnition 4.3. A hyperproperty S is a k-safety hyperproperty (is k-safety) iff
(8T 2 Prop : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ jMj  k
^ (8T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 =) T
0 = 2 S))):
This is just the deﬁnition of hypersafety with an added conjunct “jMj  k”. For
a given k, deﬁne KSHP(k) to be the set of all k-safety hyperproperties.
As an example of a k-safety hyperproperty for any k, consider a system that
stores a secret by splitting it into k shares. Suppose that an action of the system
is to output a share. Then a hyperproperty of interest might be that the system
cannot, across all of its executions, output all k shares (thereby outputting suf-
ﬁcient information for the secret to be reconstructed). We denote this k-safety
hyperproperty as SecSk.
The 1-safety hyperproperties are the lifted safety properties—that is,
KSHP(1) = f[S] j S 2 SPg
—since the bad thing for a safety property is a single trace. Thus “1-safety” and
“safety” are synonymous.
126The Terauchi and Aiken deﬁnition of 2-safety properties is limited to deter-
ministic programs that are expressed in a relational model of execution (which
we address further in x5.2), and it ignores nonterminating traces. So their 2-
safety properties are a strict subset of the 2-safety hyperproperties, KSHP(2).
For example, observational determinism OD (4.1.6) is not a 2-safety property,
but it is a 2-safety hyperproperty.
Deﬁne the parallel self-composition of system S as the product system S  S
consisting of traces over   :
S  S , f(t[0];t
0[0])(t[1];t
0[1]) j t 2 S ^ t
0 2 Sg:
Deﬁne the k-product of S, denoted Sk, to be the k-fold parallel self-composition
of S, comprising traces over k. Self-composition S  S is equivalent to 2-
product S2.
Previous work has shown how to reduce a particular formulation of nonin-
terference of system S to a related safety property of S2 [12], and how to reduce
any 2-safety hyperproperty of S to a related safety property of S;S0 [115]. The
following theorem generalizes those results. Let Sys be the set of all systems.
For any system S, any k-safety hyperproperty K of S can be reduced to a safety
property K of Sk, and the proof of the following theorem (in appendix 4.A)
shows how to construct K from K:
Theorem 4.2. (8S 2 Sys;K 2 KSHP(k) : (9K 2 SP : S j= K () Sk j= K)).
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Theorem 4.2 provides a veriﬁcation technique for k-safety: reduce a k-safety
hyperproperty to a safety property, then verify that the safety property is satis-
ﬁed by Sk using an invariance argument. Since invariance arguments are rela-
127tively complete for safety properties [6], this methodology is relatively complete
for k-safety.
However, theorem 4.2 does not provide the relatively complete veriﬁcation
procedureweseekforhypersafety, becausetherearesafetyhyperpropertiesthat
are not k-safety for any k. For example, consider the hyperproperty “for any k,
a system cannot output all k shares of a secret from a k-secret sharing”:
SecS ,
[
k
SecSk: (4.3.1)
SecS is not k-safety for any k. Yet it is hypersafety, since any trace property not
contained in it violates some SecSk.
4.4 Hyperliveness
Alpern and Schneider [5] characterize the “good thing” in a liveness property as
 always possible, no matter what has occurred so far, and
 possibly inﬁnite, so it need not be a discrete event.
For example, guaranteed service GS (4.1.3) is a liveness property in which the
good thing is the eventual response to a request. This good thing is always pos-
sible, because a state in which a response is produced can always be appended
to any ﬁnite trace containing a request. And this good thing is not inﬁnite be-
cause the response is a discrete event, but starvation freedom, which stipulates
that a system makes progress inﬁnitely often, is an example of a liveness prop-
erty with an inﬁnite good thing.
128Formally, a good thing is an inﬁnite sufﬁx of a ﬁnite trace:
Deﬁnition 4.4. Trace property L is a liveness property [5] iff
(8t 2 	n : (9t
0 2 	inf : t  t
0 ^ t
0 2 L)):
Deﬁne LP to be the set of all liveness properties. Not surprisingly, LP is a hyper-
property.
Just as with hypersafety, we generalize liveness to hyperliveness by general-
izing a ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces. The deﬁnition of hyperliveness
is essentially the same as the deﬁnition of liveness, except for an additional level
of sets:
Deﬁnition 4.5. Hyperproperty L is a liveness hyperproperty (is hyperliveness) iff
(8T 2 Obs : (9T
0 2 Prop : T  T
0 ^ T
0 2 L)):
Deﬁne LHP to be the set of all liveness hyperproperties.
Mean response time RT (4.1.7) is not liveness but it is hyperliveness: the
good thing is that the mean response time is low enough. Given any observa-
tion T with any mean response time, it is always possible to extend T, such that
the resulting system has a low enough mean response time, by adding a trace
that has many quick responses. Note that if this policy were approximated by
limiting the maximum response time in each execution, the resulting hyperpro-
perty would be a lifted safety property.
Set LP of all liveness properties is a liveness hyperproperty: every obser-
vation can be extended to any liveness property. Similarly, set SP of all safety
properties is a liveness hyperproperty: every observation can be extended to a
safety property (whose bad thing is “not beginning execution with one of the
ﬁnite traces in the observation”).
129The only hyperproperty that is both hypersafety and hyperliveness is true,
deﬁned as Prop. The hyperproperty false, deﬁned as f;g, is hypersafety but not
hyperliveness.16
Liveness properties lift to liveness hyperproperties:
Proposition 4.2. (8L 2 Prop : L 2 LP () [L] 2 LHP).
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Possibilistic information ﬂow. Some information-ﬂow security policies, such
as observational determinism OD (4.1.6), restrict nondeterminism of a system
from being publicly observable. However, observable nondeterminism might
be useful, for a couple of reasons. First, systems might exhibit nondeterminism
due to scheduling. If the scheduler cannot be inﬂuenced by secret information
(i.e., the scheduler does not serve as a covert timing channel), it is reasonable
to allow the scheduler to behave nondeterministically. Second, nondetermin-
ism is a useful modeling abstraction when dealing with probabilistic systems
(which we consider in more detail in x5.5). When the exact probabilities for a
system are unknown, they can be abstracted by nondeterminism. For at least
these reasons, there is a history of research on possibilistic information-ﬂow se-
curity policies, beginning with nondeducibility [113] and generalized noninter-
ference [81]. Such policies are founded on the intuition that low observers of
a system should gain little from their observations. Typically, these policies re-
quire that every low observation is consistent with some large set of possible
high behaviors.
16The false property is the empty set of traces, so it might seem reasonable to deﬁne false as
the empty set of trace sets. But then the lift of the false property would not equal false. Note
that false is not satisﬁed by any system because, by deﬁnition, ; is not a system.
130McLean [86] shows that possibilistic information-ﬂow policies can be ex-
pressed as trace sets that are closed with respect to selective interleaving func-
tions. Such functions, given two executions of a system, specify another trace
that must also be an execution of the system—as did the deﬁnition of general-
ized noninterference GNI (4.1.5). Mantel [78] generalizes from these functions
toclosureoperators, whichextendasetS ofexecutionstoasetS0 suchthatS  S0.
Mantel argues that every possibilistic information-ﬂow policy can be expressed
as a closure operator.
Given a closure operator Cl that expresses a possibilistic information-ﬂow
policy, the hyperproperty PCl induced by Cl is
PCl , fCl(T) j T 2 Propg:
Deﬁne the set PIF of all such hyperproperties to be
S
Cl PCl. It is now easy to see
that these are liveness hyperproperties: any observation T can be extended to
its closure.
Theorem 4.3. PIF  LHP.
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Possibilistic information-ﬂow policies are therefore never hypersafety.17
Temporal logics. Consider the hyperproperty “For every initial state, there is
some terminating trace, but not all traces must terminate,” denoted as NNT. In
branching-time temporal logic, NNT could be expressed as
 terminates; (4.4.1)
17Another way to reach this conclusion is to observe that closure operators need not yield hy-
perproperties that are subset closed—yet, by theorem 4.1, every safety hyperproperty is subset
closed.
131where terminates is a state predicate and  is the “not never” operator.18 There
is no linear-time temporal predicate that expresses NNT, nor is there a live-
ness property equivalent to NNT [69]; an approximation would be a linear-time
predicate, or a liveness property, that requires every trace to terminate. How-
ever, NNT is hyperliveness because any ﬁnite trace can be extended to a set of
executions such that at least one execution terminates.
This example suggests a relationship between hyperproperties and
branching-time temporal predicates, and between trace properties and linear-
time temporal predicates. We can make this relationship precise by examin-
ing the semantics of temporal logic. In both branching time and linear time,
a semantic model contains a set of states and a valuation function assign-
ing a Boolean value to each atomic proposition in each state. Additionally, a
branching-time model requires a current state and a set of traces, whereas a
linear-time model requires a single trace [41]. These requirements differ because
a linear-time predicate is a property of a trace, whereas a branching-time predi-
cate is a property of a state and all the future traces that could proceed from that
state. Thus, trace properties model linear-time predicates, and hyperproperties
model branching-time predicates for a given state.
Moreover, hyperproperties can express policies that branching-time predi-
cates cannot. Consider the trace property “Every trace must end with an inﬁ-
nite number of good states,” denoted SAG, where good is a state predicate. In
linear-time temporal logic, SAG could be expressed as
   good; (4.4.2)
18Temporal logics CTL [27] would express this formula as E F terminates.
132where   is the “sometime” operator and  is the “always” operator. SAG is
liveness and thus hyperliveness, but there is no branching-time predicate that
expresses it [69].
4.5 Topology
Topology enables an elegant characterization of the structure of hyperproper-
ties, just as it did for trace properties. We begin by summarizing the topology
of trace properties [110].
Consider an observer of an execution of a system, who is permitted to see
each new state as it is produced by the system; otherwise, the system is a black
box to the observer. The observer attempts to determine whether trace property
P holds of the system. At any point in time, the observer has seen only a ﬁnite
preﬁx of the (inﬁnite) execution. Thus, the observer should declare that the
system satisﬁes P, after observing ﬁnite trace t, only if all possible extensions of
t will also satisfy P. Abramsky names such properties observable [3].
Like the bad thing for a safety property, a observable property must be de-
tectable in ﬁnite time; and once detected, hold thereafter. Formally, O is a ob-
servable property iff
(8t 2 	inf : t 2 O =) (9m 2 	n : m  t
^ (8t
0 2 	inf : m  t
0 =) t
0 2 O))):
Deﬁne O to be the set of observable properties. This set satisﬁes two closure
conditions. First, if O1;:::;On are observable, then
Tn
i=1 Oi is also observable.
Second, if O is a (potentially inﬁnite) set of observable properties, then
S
O2O O
is also observable. Thus O is closed under ﬁnite intersections and inﬁnite unions.
133A topology on a set S is a set T  P(S) such that T is closed under ﬁnite inter-
sections and inﬁnite unions. Because O is so closed, it is a topology on 	inf. We
name O the Plotkin topology, because Plotkin proposed its use in characterizing
safety and liveness [5].19
The elements of a topology T are called its open sets. A convenient way to
characterize the open sets of a topology is in terms of a base or a subbase. A base
of topology T is a set B  T such that every open set is a (potentially inﬁnite)
union of elements of B. A subbase is a set A  T such that the collection of ﬁnite
intersections of A is a base for T . The set
O
B , f"t j t 2 	ng
is a base (and a subbase) of the Plotkin topology, where
"t , ft
0 2 	inf j t  t
0g
is the completion of a ﬁnite trace t. When t  t0 we say that t0 extends t. The
completion of t is thus the set of all inﬁnite extensions of t.
Alpern and Schneider [5] noted that, in the Plotkin topology, safety proper-
ties correspond to closed sets and liveness properties correspond to dense sets.
A closed set is the complement (with respect to S) of an open set. If a trace t is
not a member of a closed set C, there is some bad thing (speciﬁcally, the preﬁx
m of t in the deﬁnition of observable as instantiated on open set C, the comple-
ment of C) that is to blame; the existence of such bad things makes C a safety
property. Likewise, a set that is dense intersects every non-empty open set in T .
So for any ﬁnite trace t and dense set D, the intersection of " t (which is open
because it is a member of OB) and D is nonempty. Since any ﬁnite trace can be
extended to be in D, it holds that D is a liveness property.
19Topology O is also the Scott topology on the !-algebraic CPO of traces ordered by  [110].
134We want to construct a topology on sets of traces that extends this correspon-
dence to hyperproperties. The most important step is generalizing the notion of
ﬁnite observability from trace properties to hyperproperties. In fact, this gener-
alization was already accomplished in x4.2, where a bad thing was generalized
from a ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces—that is, an observation. The
observer, as before, sees the system produce each new state in the execution.
However, the observer may now reset the system at any time, causing it to be-
gin a new execution. At any ﬁnite point in time, the observer has now collected
a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite (thus partial) executions. An observation is thus an element
of Obs, as deﬁned in x4.2.
An extension of an observation should allow the observer to perform addi-
tional resets of the system, yielding a larger set of traces. An extension should
also allow each execution to proceed longer, yielding longer traces. So extension
corresponds to trace set preﬁx  (c.f. x4.2). The completion of observation M is
"M , fT 2 Prop j M  Tg:
We can now deﬁne our topology on sets of traces in terms of its subbase:
O
SB , f"M j M 2 Obsg:
The base O
B of our topology is then O
SB closed under ﬁnite intersections. The
base and subbase turn out to be the same sets:
Proposition 4.3. O
B = O
SB.
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Finally, our topology O is O
B closed under inﬁnite unions.
Deﬁne C to be the closed sets in our topology and D to be the dense sets.
Just as safety and liveness correspond to closed and dense sets in the Plotkin
135topology, hypersafety and hyperliveness correspond to closed and dense sets in
our generalization of that topology:
Proposition 4.4. SHP = C.
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Proposition 4.5. LHP = D.
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Our topology O is actually equivalent to well-known topology. The Vietoris
(or ﬁnite or convex Vietoris) topology is a standard construction of a topology on
sets out of an underlying topology [87,116]. Our underlying topology was on
traces, andweconstructedatopologyonsetsoftraces. TheVietorisconstruction
can be decomposed into the lower Vietoris and upper Vietoris constructions [109],
which also yield topologies. Let VL(T ) denote the lower Vietoris construction,
which given underlying topology T on space X produces the topology on P(X)
induced by subbase VSB
L (T ):
V
SB
L (T ) , fhOi j O 2 T g;
where hTi is deﬁned20 as
hTi , fU 2 P(X) j U \ T 6= ;g:
20Operators [] (from x4.1) and hi are similar to modal logic operators  (necessity) and 
(possibility): For trace property T, lift [T] denotes the set of all reﬁnements of T—that is, the
hyperproperty in which T is necessary. Similarly, hTi denotes the set of all trace properties that
share a trace with T—that is, the hyperproperty in which T is always possible.
136The following theorem states that our topology is equivalent to the lower
Vietoris construction applied to the Plotkin topology:
Theorem 4.4. O = VL(O).
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Smyth [109] established that the lower Vietoris topology is equivalent to the
lower (or Hoare) powerdomain, which is a construction used to model the seman-
tics of nondeterminism [98]. So our topology embodies the same intuition about
nondeterminism as the lower powerdomain does.
Theproofoftheorem4.4yieldsanothertopologicalcharacterizationofsafety
hyperproperties: the set of lifted safety properties, closed under inﬁnite inter-
sections and ﬁnite unions (denoted as closure operator ClC, because these clo-
sure conditions characterize a topology of Closed sets), is the set of safety hyper-
properties.
Proposition 4.6. SHP = ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg).
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
Deﬁning trace set preﬁx. Recall that trace set preﬁx  is deﬁned as follows:
T  T
0 , (8t 2 T : (9t
0 2 T
0 : t  t
0)):
For clarity, we use L instead of  to refer to that deﬁnition throughout the rest
of this section (L stands for Lower Vietoris).
Two natural alternatives to L are
T U T
0 , (8t
0 2 T
0 : (9t 2 T : t  t
0));
T C T
0 , T L T
0 ^ T U T
0:
137(U and C stand for Upper and Convex Vietoris. These preﬁx relations corre-
spond to the eponymous topologies.) However, both alternatives turn out to be
unsuitable for our purposes, because they do not correspond to our intuition
about ﬁnite observability—as we now explain.
Hyperproperty O is observable iff
(8T 2 Prop : T 2 O =) (9M 2 Obs : M  T
^ (8T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 =) T
0 2 O))):
Consider using U for trace set preﬁx . For a concrete example, suppose that
 = fa;b;cg, O is observable, T 2 O, and M = fa;bg. Any T 0 such that MUT 0
must be a member of O. Every trace t0 in T 0 must begin with either a or b and
cannot begin with c. In particular, T 0 might contain traces beginning only with
b, never with a. Observation M therefore characterizes a system in which a non-
deterministic choice to produce c as the ﬁrst state is not possible. So with U, an
observation records what nondeterminism is denied, and all future extensions
of that observation are also required to deny that nondeterminism.
In contrast, with L (i.e., our topology), an observation records what non-
determinism has so far been permitted, and all future extensions of that obser-
vation are required also to permit that nondeterminism. Our intuition is that
observers of a black-box system can observe permitted nondeterminism (by ob-
serving states produced by the system) but not denied nondeterminism. The
deﬁnition of U does not correspond to that intuition, but the deﬁnition of L
does. Similarly, using C for trace set preﬁx leads to observations that record
both permitted and denied nondeterminism (because C is the conjunction of
L and U), and therefore C does not correspond to our intuition, either.
138So neither the upper nor the convex Vietoris topology enjoys open sets that
are the observable hyperproperties; consequently, the equivalence of closed sets
and hypersafety is lost. Nonetheless, these topologies might be useful for other
purposes—for example, in refusal semantics for CSP [57].
4.6 Beyond Hypersafety and Hyperliveness
Security policies can exhibit features of both safety and liveness. For example,
consider a policy on a medical information system that must maintain the conﬁ-
dentiality of patient records and must also eventually notify patients whenever
their records are accessed [8]. If the conﬁdentiality requirement is interpreted
as observational determinism OD (4.1.6), this system must both prevent bad
things (OD, which is hypersafety) as well as guarantee good things (eventual
notiﬁcation, which can be formulated as liveness). As another example, con-
sider an asynchronous proactive secret-sharing system [132] that must main-
tain and periodically refresh a secret. Each share refresh must complete dur-
ing a given time interval with high probability. Maintaining the conﬁdential-
ity of the secret can be formulated as SecS (4.3.1), which is hypersafety. The
eventual refresh of the secret shares can be formulated as liveness: every execu-
tion eventually completes the refresh if enough servers remain uncompromised.
And the high probability that the refresh succeeds within a given time inter-
val is hyperliveness—similar to mean response time RT (4.1.7). Both of these
examples illustrate hyperproperties that are intersections of (hyper)safety and
(hyper)liveness.
In fact, as stated by the following theorem, every hyperproperty is the inter-
section of a safety hyperproperty with a liveness hyperproperty. This theorem
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Figure 4.1: Classiﬁcation of security policies
generalizes the result of Alpern and Schneider [5] that every trace property is
the intersection of a safety property and a liveness property:
Theorem 4.5. (8P 2 HP : (9S 2 SHP;L 2 LHP : P = S \ L)).
Proof. In appendix 4.A.
4.7 Summary
This chapter has classiﬁed several security policies with hypersafety and hyper-
liveness. Figure 4.1 summarizes this classiﬁcation.
We have introduced hyperproperties, which are sets of trace properties and
can express security policies that trace properties cannot, such as secure infor-
mation ﬂow and service level agreements. We have generalized safety and live-
ness to hyperproperties, showing that every hyperproperty is the intersection of
a safety hyperproperty and a liveness hyperproperty. We have also generalized
140the topological characterization of safety and liveness from trace properties to
hyperproperties. We have shown that reﬁnement is applicable with safety hy-
perproperties.
We have given a relatively complete veriﬁcation methodology for k-safety
hyperproperties that generalizes prior techniques for verifying secure informa-
tion ﬂow. But we do not know whether there is a relatively complete method-
ology for all hyperproperties, or even all safety hyperproperties.21 If such a
methodology could be found, security might take its place as “just another”
functional requirement to be veriﬁed.
21If the full power of second-order logic is necessary to express hyperproperties (as discussed
at the end of x4.1), such methods could not exist. Nonetheless, methods for verifying fragments
of the logic might sufﬁce for verifying hyperproperties that correspond to security policies.
1414.A Appendix: Proofs
Bueno and Clarkson [20] have formally veriﬁed propositions 4.1 and 4.2, theo-
rems 4.2, 4.3, and 4.5, and an analogue of theorem 4.1 using the Isabelle/HOL
proof assistant [95]. We believe that the remaining proofs could also be formally
veriﬁed.
Proposition 4.1. (8S 2 Prop : S 2 SP () [S] 2 SHP).
Proof. By mutual implication.
()) Let S be an arbitrary safety property. We want to show that [S] is a safety
hyperproperty—that is, any trace property T not in [S] contains some bad
thing.
First, weﬁnd abadthing M for T. By thedeﬁnitionoflifting, [S] = P(S) =
fP 2 Prop j P  Sg. Since T is not in this set, T 6 S. So some trace t is
in T but not in S. By the deﬁnition of safety, if t = 2 S, there is some ﬁnite
trace m that is a bad thing for S. So no extension of m is in S. Deﬁne M to
be fmg.
Second, we show that M is irremediable. Note that M  T because m  t
and t 2 T. Let T 0 be an arbitrary trace property that extends M—that is,
M  T 0. By the deﬁnition of , there exists a t0 2 T 0 such that m  t0. We
established above that no extension of m is in S, so t0 = 2 S. But, again by
the deﬁnition of lifting, T 0 = 2 [S], since T 0 contains a trace not in S.
Thus, by deﬁnition, [S] is hypersafety.
(() Let S be an arbitrary trace property such that [S] is hypersafety. We want
to show that S is safety. Our strategy is as above—we ﬁnd a bad thing and
then show that it is irremediable.
142Consider any t such that t = 2 S. By the deﬁnition of lifting, we have that
ftg = 2 [S]. By the deﬁnition of hypersafety applied to [S], there exists an
M  ftg such that for all T 0  M, we have T 0 = 2 [S].
We claim that M must be non-empty. To show this, suppose for sake of
contradiction that M is empty. Then M is a preﬁx of every trace property
T 0, so no T 0 can be a member of S, which implies that [S] itself must be
empty. But [S] = P(S), so [S] must at least contain S as a member. This is
a contradiction, thus M is non-empty and contains at least one trace.
All traces in M must be preﬁxes of t, by the deﬁnition of . Choose the
longest such preﬁx in M and denote it as m. This m serves as a bad thing
for t, as we show next.
Let t0 be arbitrary such that m  t0, and let T 0 = ft0g. By the transitivity of
, we have M  T 0, so T 0 = 2 [S] by the above application of the deﬁnition
of hypersafety. But this implies that t0 = 2 S, by the deﬁnition of lifting.
We have shown that, for any t = 2 S, there exists an m  t, such that for any
t0  m, we have t0 = 2 S. Therefore, S is safety, by deﬁnition.
Theorem 4.1. SHP  SSC.
Proof. Assume that S is hypersafety. For sake of contradiction, also assume that
S is not subset closed. This latter assumption implies that there exist two trace
properties T and T 0 such that T 2 S, and T 0 = 2 S, yet T 0  T. By the deﬁnition
of hypersafety, since T 0 = 2 S, there exists an observation M that is a bad thing
for T 0—that is, M  T 0 and for all T 00 such that M  T 00, it holds that T 00 = 2 S.
Consider this M. By the deﬁnition of , since T 0  T and M  T 0, we have
M  T. Then T is an instance of T 00 above, which means T = 2 S. But this
contradicts T 2 S. Therefore, S must be subset closed.
143To see that the subset relation is strict, deﬁne the trace property true as 	inf.
Consider any liveness property L other than true—for example, guaranteed ser-
vice GS (4.1.3). When lifted to hyperproperty [L], the result is subset closed by
deﬁnition of []. By proposition 4.2 below (whose proof does not depend on this
theorem), [L] is hyperliveness. Since L is not true, we have that [L] is not true,
which is the only hyperproperty that is both hypersafety and hyperliveness. So
[L] cannot be hypersafety. Thus [L] is a hyperproperty that is not hypersafety
but is subset closed.
Theorem 4.2. (8S 2 Sys;K 2 KSHP(k) : (9K 2 SP : S j= K () Sk j= K)).
Proof. Let K be an arbitrary k-safety hyperproperty of system S. Our strategy is
to construct a safety property K that holds of system Sk exactly when K holds
of S.
Since K is k-safety, every trace property not contained in it has some bad
thing of size at most k—that is, for all T = 2 K, there exists an observation M
where jMj  k and M  T, such that for all T 0 where M  T 0, it holds that
T 0 = 2 K. Construct the set M of all such bad things:
M , fM 2 Obs j jMj  k ^ (9T 2 Prop : T = 2 K ^ M  T)
^ (8T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 =) T
0 = 2 K)g:
Next we deﬁne some notation to encode a set of traces as a single trace.
Consider a trace property T such that jTj  k. Construct a ﬁnite list of traces
t1;t2;:::;tk such that ti 2 T for all i. Further, we require that no ti is equal to
any tl, for any i and l, unless jTj < k. We construct a trace t such that t[j] is the
tuple (t1[j];t2[j];:::;tk[j]); note that t is a trace over state space k. Let trace t so
constructed from T be denoted zipk(T), and let the inverse of this construction
144be denoted unzipk(t); note that zipk() and unzipk() are partial functions. We can
also apply this notation to observations, which are ﬁnite sets of ﬁnite traces.22
Now we can construct safety property K. Let K be the set of traces over k
such that no trace in K encodes an extension of any bad thing M 2 M:
K , ft
k j :(9M 2 Obs : M 2 M ^ zipk(M)  t
k)g;
where tk denotes a trace t over space k.
To see that K is safety, suppose that tk = 2 K. Then by the deﬁnition of K,
there must exist some M 2 M such that zipk(M)  tk. Consider any trace
uk  zipk(M). By the deﬁnition of K, we have that uk = 2 K. Thus, for any trace
tk not in K, there is some ﬁnite bad thing zipk(M), such that no extension uk of
the bad thing is in K. By deﬁnition, K is therefore safety.
Finally, we need to show that S satisﬁes K exactly when Sk satisﬁes K. We
do so by mutual implication.
()) Suppose S j= K. Then, by deﬁnition, S 2 K. For sake of contradiction,
suppose that Sk 6 K. Then, by the deﬁnition of subset, there exists some
tk 2 Sk such that tk = 2 K. Let T be unzipk(tk). By the deﬁnition of K, there
must exist some M 2 M such that zipk(M)  tk. Applying unzipk() to
this predicate, and noting that unzip is monotonic with respect to , we
obtain M  unzipk(tk). By the deﬁnition of T, we then have that M  T.
By the construction of M, T therefore cannot be in K. By the construction
of Sk and the deﬁnition of T, each trace in T must also be a trace of S.
So by deﬁnition, T  S. By transitivity, we have that M  S. By the
22In this case, the ti have ﬁnite and potentially differing length. So if j > jtij, let ti[j] = ?
for some new state ? = 2 . Thus, zipk(T) is a trace over state space ( [ ?)k. We redeﬁne trace
preﬁx  over this space to ignore ?: let t  t0 iff, for some t00 that is a trace over , dte = dt0et00,
where dte is the truncation of t that removes any ? states. For notational simplicity, we omit this
technicality in the remainder of the proof.
145construction of M, S then cannot be in K. But this contradicts the fact that
S 2 K. Therefore, Sk  K, so by deﬁnition Sk j= K.
(() Suppose Sk j= K. Then, by deﬁnition, Sk  K. Suppose, for sake of
contradiction, that S does not satisfy K. Then, by deﬁnition, S = 2 K. Since
K is k-safety, this means that there exists an M  S, where jMj  k,
such that for all T 0  M, T 0 = 2 K. Let mk be zipk(M), and let sk be a
trace of Sk such that mk  sk (such a trace must exist since M  S). By
the construction of K, for any tk  mk, we have that tk = 2 K. Therefore,
sk = 2 K, and it follows that Sk 6 K. But this contradicts the fact that
Sk  K. Therefore, S 2 K, so by deﬁnition S j= K.
Proposition 4.2. (8L 2 Prop : L 2 LP () [L] 2 LHP).
Proof. By mutual implication.
()) Let L be an arbitrary liveness property. We want to show that [L] is a live-
ness hyperproperty—that is, any observation M can be extended to a trace
property T that is contained in [L]. So let M be an arbitrary observation.
By the deﬁnition of liveness, for each m 2 M, there exists some t  m such
that t 2 L. For a given m, let that trace t be denoted tm. Construct the set
T =
S
m2Mftmg. Since all the tm are elements of L, we have T  L. By the
deﬁnition of lifting, it follows that T is contained in [L]. Further, T extends
M by the construction of T. Thus, T satisﬁes the requirements of the trace
property we needed to construct. By deﬁnition, [L] is hyperliveness.
(() Let L be an arbitrary property such that [L] is hyperliveness. We want to
show that L is liveness. So consider an arbitrary trace t, and let T = ftg.
Since [L] is hyperliveness, we have that there exists a T 0 such that T  T 0
146and T 0 2 [L]. Since T  T 0 and T = ftg, there exists a t0 such that t  t0 and
t0 2 T 0, by the deﬁnition of . By the deﬁnition of lifting, if t0 2 T 0 2 [L], it
must be the case that t0 2 L. Thus, for any t, there exists a t0 such that t  t0
and t0 2 L. Therefore, L is liveness, by deﬁnition.
Theorem 4.3. PIF  LHP.
Proof. Let P be an arbitrary possibilistic information-ﬂow hyperproperty, and
let ClP be the closure operator that Mantel [78] would associate with P.23 Then,
by Mantel’s Deﬁnition 10, it must be the case that P = fClP(T) j T 2 Propg.
Closure operators must satisfy the axiom (8X : X  Cl(X)), which we use
below.
To show that P is hyperliveness, let T 2 Obs be arbitrary. By the deﬁnition
of hyperliveness, we need to show that there exists a T 0 2 Prop such that T  T 0
and T 0 2 P. Let T 0 be ClP(^ T), where ^ T denotes the embedding of T into Prop by
inﬁnitely stuttering the ﬁnal state of each trace in T, as discussed in x4.1. By the
closure axiom above, we have that ^ T  ClP(^ T). So by the deﬁnition of , we can
conclude T  ClP(^ T) = T 0. Further, T 0 must be an element of P since it is the
ClP-closure of trace property ^ T. Therefore, T 0 satisﬁes the required conditions,
and P is hyperliveness.
To see that the subset relation is strict, consider liveness property GS (guar-
anteed service) from x4.1. It corresponds to liveness hyperproperty [GS], but
has no corresponding closure operator. For suppose that such a closure opera-
tor did exist, and consider an inﬁnite trace t in which service fails to occur. The
closure of any set containing t must still contain t, by the axiom above. But then
23More precisely, Mantel argues that every “possibilistic information-ﬂow property [sic]” can
be expressed as a basic security predicate, and that each basic security predicate induces a set of
closure operators. Any element of this set sufﬁces to instantiate ClP. Also, Mantel’s closure
operators were over ﬁnite traces, and we have generalized to inﬁnite traces.
147the closure does not satisfy GS, and so the closure operator cannot correspond
to [GS].
Proposition 4.3. O
B = O
SB.
Proof. By mutual containment.
() By deﬁnition, the elements of O
B are ﬁnite intersections of elements of
O
SB. Thus, every element of O
SB is already trivially an element of O
B.
() Let N be an arbitrary element of O
B. By the deﬁnition of a base, we can
write N as
T
i " Mi, where i ranges over a ﬁnite index set and each Mi
is an observation. We want to show that there exists an element " N of
O
SB such that N ="N. So consider N. Every trace property T in it must
extend every Mi. Thus, by the deﬁnition of , every such trace property
T extends
S
i Mi. Therefore N ="
S
i Mi. Our desired observation N is
thus
S
i Mi. Note that, for N to be a valid observation, it must be a ﬁnite
set. The union over Mi must therefore result in a ﬁnite set—which it does,
since i ranges over a ﬁnite index set.
Proposition 4.4. SHP = C.
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Let S be an arbitrary safety hyperproperty. We need to show that it is also
a closed set. By the deﬁnition of closed, this is equivalent to showing that
S is the complement of an open set. Our strategy is to construct hyperpro-
perty O, show that O and S are equal, and show that O is open.
By the deﬁnition of hypersafety, we have that any trace property T that is
not a member of S—and thus is a member of S—must contain some bad
148thing. Consider the set M 2 P(Obs) of all bad things for S. M contains
one or more elements for every trace property in S:
M , fM 2 Obs j (9T 2 S : M  T
^ (8T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 =) T
0 2 S))g:
Next, deﬁne O as the completion of M—that is, the set of all trace proper-
ties that extend a bad thing for S:
O ,
[
M2M
"M
= fT j (9M 2 M : M  T)g; (4.A.1)
where the equality follows by the deﬁnition of "M. Since each such trace
property T violates S, we would suspect that O is the complement of S.
This is indeed the case:
Claim. O = S
Proof. (By mutual containment.)
() Suppose T 2 O. Then by equation 4.A.1, there is some M 2
M such that M  T. By the deﬁnition of M, any extension
of M is an element of S. Since T is such an extension, T 2 S.
() Suppose T 2 S. Then T = 2 S, so by the deﬁnition of hy-
persafety, (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ (8T 0 2 Prop : M 
T 0 =) T 0 = 2 S)). Consider that M. It must be a member
of M, by deﬁnition. Since M  T, we have that T 2 O by
equation 4.A.1.
All that remains is to show that O is open. First, note that " M, for any
M 2 Obs, is by deﬁnition an element of O
SB. Thus each of the sets "M in
149the deﬁnition of O is open. Second, by the deﬁnition of open sets, a union
of open sets is open. O is such a union, and is therefore open.
() Let C be an arbitrary closed set. We need to show that it is also hyper-
safety. Our strategy is to identify, for any trace property T not in C, a bad
thing for T. If such a bad thing exists for all T, then C is by deﬁnition
hypersafety.
Since C is closed, it is by deﬁnition the complement of an open set. By
proposition 4.3, we can therefore write C as follows:
C =
[
i
"Mi; (4.A.2)
where each Mi is an observation.
Let T be an arbitrary trace property such that T = 2 C, or equivalently,
such that T 2 C. Then T must be in at least one of the inﬁnite unions in
equation 4.A.2. Thus, there must exist an i such that
T 2 "Mi and Mi = fU 2 Prop j Mi  Ug; (4.A.3)
where the equality follows from the deﬁnition of ".
We construct the bad thing M for T by deﬁning:
M , Mi:
We have that M  T, because of equation 4.A.3.
To show that M is a bad thing for T, consider any T 0  M. By the def-
inition of M, T 0  Mi. By equation 4.A.3, it follows that T 0, like T, is a
member of "Mi. By equation 4.A.2, T 0 2 C. Therefore, T 0 = 2 C.
We have now shown that for any T = 2 C, there exists an M  T, such that
for all T 0  M, T 0 = 2 C. Thus C is hypersafety, by deﬁnition.
150Proposition 4.5. LHP = D.
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Let L be an arbitrary liveness hyperproperty. We need to show that L is
dense. By the deﬁnition of dense, we must therefore show that L intersects
every non-empty open set. So let O be an arbitrary non-empty open set.
We need to show that L \ O is non-empty. By proposition 4.3 and the
deﬁnition of open, we can write O as
S
i "Mi. Consider an arbitrary Mi.
Since L is hyperliveness, there exists a T  Mi such that T 2 L. Further,
by the deﬁnition of ", we have that T 2 O. Therefore, T 2 L \ O, and it
follows that L is dense, by deﬁnition.
() Let D be an arbitrary dense set. To show that D is hyperliveness, we
must show that any observation T can be extended to a trace property T 0
contained in D—that is, (8T 2 Obs : (9T 0 2 Prop : T  T 0 ^ T 0 2 D)).
So let T be an arbitrary observation. Let OT be the completion of T:
OT , "T
= fT
0 2 Prop j T  T
0g (4.A.4)
OT is an element of O
SB, the subbase of our topology, by deﬁnition. Thus,
by the deﬁnition of a subbase, OT is an open set. By the deﬁnition of a
dense set (which is that a dense set intersects every open set), we therefore
have that OT \ D 6= ;. Let T 0 be any element in the set OT \ D. By
equation 4.A.4, we have T  T 0.
We have now shown that, for an arbitrary observation T, there exists a
trace property T 0 such that T  T 0 and T 0 2 D. Therefore, D is hyperlive-
ness, by deﬁnition.
151Theorem 4.4. O = VL(O).
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Suppose O 2 O. By the deﬁnitions of a base and of O, we can write O
as
S1
i " Mi, where each Mi is an element of Obs.24 Now we calculate:
S1
i "Mi
= h deﬁnition of "i
S1
i fT j T  Mig
= h deﬁnition of  i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi : (9t 2 T : mij  t))g
= h deﬁnition of "i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi :"mij \ T 6= ;)g
= h deﬁnition of hi i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi : T 2 h"miji)g
= h deﬁnition of \ i
S1
i
T
jh"miji
Since "mij 2 OB by deﬁnition, and OB  O by the deﬁnition of base, we
have that h"miji 2 VSB
L (O). Thus, by the deﬁnition of subbase,
S1
i
T
jh"
miji 2 VL(O). Therefore, by the calculation above, we can conclude O 2
VL(O).
24We decorate quantiﬁers with 1 and  to denote an inﬁnite and ﬁnite range, respectively.
152() Suppose O 2 VL(O). By the deﬁnition of subbase and VL, we can write
O as
S1
i
T
jhOiji, where each Oij is an element of O. Now we calculate:
S1
i
T
jhOiji
= h deﬁnition of hi i
S1
i
T
jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g
Since Oij is open in the base topology O, it can be rewritten a union of base
open sets "tijk, where each tijk is a ﬁnite trace:
Oij =
1 [
k
"tijk:
We continue calculating:
= h rewriting Oij i
S1
i
T
jfT j T \ (
S1
k "tijk) 6= ;g
= h set theory i
S1
i fT j (8 j : (91 k : T \ "tijk 6= ;))g
= h deﬁnition of  i
S1
i fT j (8 j : (91 k : ftijkg  T))g
= h set theory; let k0 be the k guaranteed to exist for i and j i
S1
i fT j
S
j tijk0  Tg
= h let Mi =
S
j tijk0; deﬁnition of "i
S1
i "Mi
Finally, since Mi is a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces, it is an element of Obs. So
by deﬁnition, "Mi 2 O
SB. Thus by the deﬁnition of base,
S1
i "Mi 2 O.
Therefore, by the calculation above, we can conclude O 2 O.
153Proposition 4.6. SHP = ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg).
Proof. Let S be an arbitrary safety hyperproperty. By proposition 4.4, S is a
closed set in topology O. By theorem 4.4, S is thus also a closed set in topol-
ogy VL(O). By the deﬁnition of closed, S is the complement of an open set in
topology VL(O). By the deﬁnition of a base, we can thus write S as unions of
intersections of base elements. Letting  denote set complement, we calculate:
S
= h deﬁnition of base i
S1
i
T
jhOiji
= h deﬁnition of hi i
S1
i
T
jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g
= h double negation i

S1
i
T
jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g
= h set theory i

T1
i
S
jfT j T \ Oij = ;g
= h set theory i

T1
i
S
jfT j T  Oijg
= h deﬁnition of [] i

T1
i
S
j [Oij]
Removing a complement from each side of the above equation, we obtain
S =
1 \
i
 [
j
[Oij]:
154Since each Oij is open in topology O, we have that Oij is closed in O. By the fact
that closed sets in O correspond to safety properties [5], Oij is a safety property.
Therefore, S is the inﬁnite intersection of ﬁnite unions of safety properties, and
by deﬁnition of ClC must be an element of ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg).
Similarly, given an arbitrary element of ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg), the same rea-
soning used above establishes that it is also an element of SHP. Therefore, by
mutual containment, the two sets are equal.
Theorem 4.5. (8P 2 HP : (9S 2 SHP;L 2 LHP : P = S \ L)).
Proof. This theorem can be easily proved by adapting either the logical [105]
or topological [5] proof of the intersection theorem for trace properties. The
domains involved are merely upgraded to include an additional level of sets.
Here we take the former approach and rehearse the logical proof.
Our strategy is as follows. Given hyperproperty P, we construct safety hy-
perproperty S that contains P as a subset. We also construct liveness hyperpro-
perty L that contains P. The intersection of S and L then necessarily contains
P, and we shall show that the intersection is, in fact, exactly P.
To construct S, we deﬁne the safety hyperproperty Safe(P), which stipulates
that the hyperliveness of P is never violated. A bad thing for this safety hyper-
property is any set of traces that cannot be extended to satisfy P. So we require
that Safe(P) contains only sets T of traces such that any observation of T can be
extended to satisfy P. Formally,
Safe(P) , fT 2 Prop j (8M 2 Obs : M  T
=) (9T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 ^ T
0 2 P))g:
155It is straightforward to establish that Safe(P) is hypersafety: Any set T not con-
tained in Safe(P) must satisfy the negation of the predicate in the above deﬁni-
tion of Safe(P)—that is, (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ (8T 0 2 Prop : M  T 0 =)
T 0 = 2 P)). If no extension of M can be in P, then no extension T 0 of M can be in
Safe(P) because the hyperliveness of P would be violated in T 0 at observation
M. So
(8T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 =) T
0 = 2 P)
=) (8T
0 2 Prop : M  T
0 =) T
0 = 2 Safe(P)): (4.A.5)
Thus, by monotonicity, (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ (8T 0 2 Prop : M  T 0 =)
T 0 = 2 Safe(P))). Therefore Safe(P) is hypersafety.
Similarly, to construct L, we deﬁne the liveness hyperproperty Live(P),
which stipulates that it is always possible either to satisfy P or to become im-
possible, due to some bad thing, to satisfy P. In the latter case, a safety hyper-
property has been violated—namely, Safe(P). Formally,
Live(P) , P [ Safe(P);
where H denotes the complement of hyperproperty H with respect to Prop. To
show that Live(P) is hyperliveness, consider any observation T. Suppose that
T can be extended to some trace property T 0 such that T 0 2 P. Then T 0 is also
in Live(P), so Live(P) is hyperliveness for T. On the other hand, if T cannot
be extended to satisfy P, then T is a bad thing for Safe(P)—that is, (8T 0 2
Prop : T  T 0 =) T 0 = 2 P). Let T 0 be an arbitrary extension of T. By the
same reasoning as equation (4.A.5), T 0 is not in Safe(P). Therefore T 0 must be in
Safe(P). Thus, Live(P) is again hyperliveness for T. We conclude that Live(P)
is hyperliveness.
156Next, note that P  Safe(P), because any element T of P satisﬁes the def-
inition of Safe(P). In particular, for any M  T, there is a T 0  M such that
T 0 2 P—namely, T 0 = T. Thus, Safe(P) = P [ Safe(P).
Finally, let S = Safe(P) and L = Live(P), and we prove the theorem by
simple set manipulation:
S \ L = Safe(P) \ Live(P)
= (P [ Safe(P)) \ (P [ Safe(P))
= P \ (Safe(P) [ Safe(P))
= P \ Prop
= P
157CHAPTER 5
FORMALIZATION OF SYSTEM REPRESENTATIONS
Security policies are properties of systems, meaning that a system either does
or does not satisfy a security policy. Chapter 4 models systems (and their
executions) with trace sets. Some models of system execution are expressed
with other mathematical formalisms—for example, relational semantics, la-
beled transition systems, and state machines. And probability can be used with
each of these formalisms to model random behaviors of systems. Chapter 4
mentions some of these formalisms but does not make them precise.
For example, recall noninterference stipulates that commands executed on be-
half of users holding high clearances have no effect on system behavior ob-
served by users holding low clearances. Goguen and Meseguer’s deﬁnition
of noninterference [46] models system behavior with state machines, whereas
our deﬁnition GMNI (4.1.4), repeated below, assumes an encoding of state ma-
chines as trace sets and requires a trace set T to contain, for any trace t, a cor-
responding trace t0 with no high input events yet with the same low input and
output events as t:
GMNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 SM
^ (8t 2 T : (9t
0 2 T : evHin(t
0) = 
^ evL(t) = evL(t
0)))g:
Conjunct T 2 SM expresses the requirement that trace set T encodes a state
machine, but we have not yet deﬁned set SM (we shall in x5.4). Nor have we
classiﬁed GMNI as hypersafety or hyperliveness.
It is reasonable to expect that GMNI is hypersafety; the bad thing should
be a set ft;t0g of ﬁnite traces where t0 contains no high inputs and contains the
158same low inputs as t, yet t and t0 have different low outputs. But GMNI fails
to be hypersafety because of a technicality. Goguen and Meseguer’s state ma-
chines must be deterministic, so SM must exclude all trace sets that exhibit
nondeterminism. Thus a system T might fail to satisfy GMNI only because
T is nondeterministic, in which case a deterministic, non-interfering observa-
tion of T would be remediable—hence GMNI would not be hypersafety.1 The
problem is that the deﬁnition of hypersafety, by quantifying over Prop, assumed
that systems are allowed to be nondeterministic. Now that we are interested in
state machines, our deﬁnitions of hypersafety and hyperliveness should quan-
tify over only those trace sets that encode state machines. And in general, those
deﬁnitions should be parameterized on a system representation.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The deﬁnitions of hypersafety and hy-
perliveness are generalized in x5.1 to account for system representations. Hy-
perproperties for relational systems, labeled transition systems, state machines,
and probabilistic systems are presented in x5.2, x5.3, x5.4, and x5.5. The technical
results of chapter 4 are generalized in x5.6 to account for system representations,
and x5.7 concludes.
5.1 Generalized Hypersafety and Hyperliveness
Chapter 4 assumed a particular system representation—namely, Prop, the set of
all trace sets. Now, let Rep be a set of trace sets that encodes a system represen-
tation. For example, each set in Rep might encode a state machine. Note that
Rep is a subset of Prop.
1A similar problem would occur even if we used implication instead of conjunction in the
deﬁnitionofGMNI toformalizetherequirementthatsystemsbe(deterministic)statemachines:
any observation could be remediated by adding traces that represent nondeterministic transi-
tions of the state machine.
159Recall that Obs is the set of observations of Prop, and that an observation is a
ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces. We now need to deﬁne the set of observations of Rep.
Let Obs(Rep) denote the subset of Obs containing observations of Rep, where
Obs(Rep) , fM 2 Obs j (9T 2 Rep : M  T)g:
Note that Obs(Rep) is simply Obs if Rep equals Prop.
Now we can deﬁne hypersafety and hyperliveness for a given system repre-
sentation.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A hyperproperty S is a safety hyperproperty for system representa-
tion Rep (is hypersafety for Rep) iff
(8T 2 Rep : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs(Rep) : M  T
^ (8T
0 2 Rep : M  T
0 =) T
0 = 2 S))):
Deﬁnition 5.2. Hyperproperty L is a liveness hyperproperty for system representa-
tion Rep (is hyperliveness for Rep) iff
(8T 2 Obs(Rep) : (9T
0 2 Rep : T  T
0 ^ T
0 2 L)):
Note that both deﬁnitions simplify to the original deﬁnitions of hypersafety and
hyperliveness in chapter 4 if Rep equals Prop. We now demonstrate the use of
these generalized deﬁnitions with several system representations.
5.2 Relational Systems
In language-based information-ﬂow security [104], a program P is sometimes
modeled (e.g., with large-step operational semantics) as a relation + such that
160hP;si + s0 if P begun in initial state s terminates in ﬁnal state s0. Using this
relation, noninterference can be stated as
s1 =L s2 ^ hP;s1i + s
0
1 ^ hP;s2i + s
0
2 =) s
0
1 =L s
0
2;
whererelation=L (c.f.observationaldeterminismOD (4.1.6))determineswhich
states are low-equivalent. This statement of noninterference is termination insen-
sitive because it allows information to leak through termination channels.
To model a program P as set T of traces, intuitively, imagine that an observer
of the program periodically checks to see in what state the program is. If P be-
gun in initial state s never terminates, the observer will see an inﬁnite sequence
containing only s. If P does terminate in ﬁnal state s0, the observer will see a
ﬁnite sequence of s followed by an inﬁnite sequence of s0. Let T be the set of all
such traces. Formally, T is deﬁned as follows:
T = ft 2 	inf j hP;si + s
0 ^ t 2 s
+(s
0)
!g
[ ft 2 	inf j :(9s
0 : hP;si + s
0) ^ t = s
!g:
Let Rel, the set of all relational systems, be the set of all trace sets so constructed
for any P.
Deﬁne termination-insensitive relational noninterference as a hyperproperty:
TIRNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 Rel
^ (8t1;t2 2 T : t1[0] =L t2[0]
=) diverges(t1) _ diverges(t2)
_ (9s1;s2 2  : terminates(t1;s1)
^ terminates(t2;s2) ^ s1 =L s2))g: (5.2.1)
Predicate diverges(t) holds whenever t is a trace of a program P such that P does
not terminate when begun in initial state t[0], so t = (t[0])!. Similarly, predicate
161terminates(t;s) holds whenever P terminates in ﬁnal state s when begun in ini-
tial state t[0], so t = (t[0])+s!. We assume without loss of generality that ﬁnal
states are distinguishable from initial states (e.g., by having a special ﬂag set),
so that diverges and terminates can distinguish between nontermination and ter-
mination in a ﬁnal state that otherwise is identical to an initial state. TIRNI is
hypersafety for Rel: the bad thing is a pair of traces that begin in low-equivalent
initial states but terminate in ﬁnal states that are not low-equivalent.
Termination-sensitive noninterference is the same as termination insensitive,
except that it forbids one trace to diverge and the other to terminate. So deﬁne
termination-sensitive relational noninterference as follows:
TSRNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 Rel
^ (8t1;t2 2 T : t1[0] =L t2[0]
=) (diverges(t1) ^ diverges(t2))
_ (9s1;s2 2  : terminates(t1;s1)
^ terminates(t2;s2) ^ s1 =L s2))g: (5.2.2)
Note that the only change is that a disjunction became a conjunction. TSRNI is
neither hypersafety nor hyperliveness for Rel. To see that it is not hypersafety
for Rel, consider a system containing a pair ft;t0g of traces, where t diverges
and t0 does not, yet where t and t0 contain low-equivalent initial states, does
not satisfy TSRNI. But any ﬁnite preﬁx of this pair could be remediated by
extending the preﬁx of t to terminate in the same ﬁnal state as t0. Likewise,
to see that TSRNI is not hyperliveness for Rel,2 consider a ﬁnite observation
2Terauchi and Aiken [115] characterized termination-sensitive noninterference as “2-
liveness,” where they deﬁned “2-liveness” as a “property which may observe up to two possibly
inﬁnite traces to refute the property.” Although they are correct that TSRNI could be refuted
by observing two inﬁnite traces, refutation is really about safety, not liveness—there is no good
thing for TSRNI, but there is an inﬁnitely-observable bad thing. So “2-inﬁnite-safety” would
be a better term than “2-liveness.”
162containing a pair of terminating traces that have low-equivalent initial states
but not low-equivalent ﬁnal states. This observation cannot be extended to be
in TSRNI.
5.3 Labeled Transition Systems
Deﬁnitions of noninterference are sometimes based on bisimulation, which is a
relation that speciﬁes whether two systems are equivalent to an observer. Bisim-
ulations are often expressed over labeled transition systems, which are triples
(S;L;!) where S is a set of LTS-states,3 L is a set of labels, and ! is a rela-
tion on S  L  S [90]. Elements of relation ! are usually notated s1
` ! s2 and
are interpreted to mean that the system has a transition labeled ` from LTS-state
s1 to LTS-state s2.
Alabeledtransitionsystem(S;L;!)canbeencodedasasetoftraces. Deﬁne
the state space  for the traces to be SL.4 Given state s 2 , let st(s) denote the
LTS-state from s, and let lab(s) denote the label from s. Deﬁne traces(S;L;!) to
be
ft j (8i 2 N : st(t[i])
lab(t[i])
! st(t[i + 1]))g:5
Let LTS be the set of all trace sets so constructed for any LTS.
Bismulation nondeducibility on compositions. We now demonstrate how to
use this encoding by formalizing Focardi and Gorrieri’s [44] deﬁnition of bisim-
ulation nondeducibility on compositions (BNDC), which is a noninterference pol-
3We use the term LTS-state to distinguish these from the states deﬁned in x4.1.
4This construction would not work with an impoverished notion of state, as observed by
Focardi and Gorrieri [44] for states that are elements only of L.
5We could replace lab(t[i]) with lab(t[i+1]) in this deﬁnition; the choice of where to store the
label is arbitrary.
163icy for nondeterministic LTSs. The intuition behind this policy is that a system
should appear the same to a low observer no matter with what other system
it is composed (i.e., run in parallel). Assume that set L of labels can be par-
titioned into three sets of actions (i.e., events): a set of low security actions, a
set H of high security actions, and fg, where  is an unobservable internal ac-
tion. An LTS E = (S;L;!) satisﬁes BNDC, denoted BNDC(E), iff for all LTSs
F = (S;H [ fg;!F) that take only high and internal actions,
E=H  (EjF) n H;
with notations =, j, n, and  informally deﬁned as follows:6
 Hiding operator E=H relabels as  all actions from H that occur during
execution of E. System E=H thus represents the view of system E by a
low observer, since all the high actions are hidden.
 Parallel composition operator EjF denotes the interleaving of systems E
and F. The systems can synchronize on actions, causing the composed
system to emit internal action .
 Restriction operator E n H prohibits the occurrence of any actions from H
during execution of E, meaning that no transition with a label from H is
allowed. System (EjF) n H thus represents a low observer’s view of E
when all the high actions that E takes are synchronized with F.
 Weak bisimulation relation E  F intuitively means that E and F can
simulate each other: if E can take a transition with label `, then there must
exist a transition of F that is also labeled `, and after taking those transi-
tions E and F must remain bisimilar. F is allowed to take any number
6The formal deﬁnitions (over LTSs) are standard and given by Focardi and Gorrieri [44]. It is
straightforward to deﬁne them directly over trace sets.
164of internal transitions (labeled ) before or after the `-labeled transition.
Further, the relation must be symmetric, such that if E  F then F  E.
Thus, ifE=H  (EjF)nH, alowobserver’sviewofE doesnotchangewhenE is
composed with any high security system F. The hyperproperty corresponding
to Focardi and Gorrieri’s BNDC is
BNDC , fT 2 Prop j T 2 LTS
^ (9E 2 LTS : T = traces(E)
^ BNDC(E))g: (5.3.1)
BNDC is hyperliveness for LTS because of the existential in deﬁnition of :
any observation can be remedied by adding additional transitions. This remedi-
ation corresponds to a closure operator because it only adds traces, thus BNDC
is a possibilistic-information ﬂow policy.
Boudol and Castellani’s noninterference. Boudol and Castellani [18] deﬁne a
bisimulation-based noninterference policy for concurrent programs. To model
this policy as a hyperproperty, we ﬁrst formalize their model of program ex-
ecution. They model execution as a binary relation ! on program terms and
memories; a program term P and a memory  step to a new program term P 0
and memory 0. Deﬁne the set P of states for program P to be the set of pairs
of a program term and a memory, prog(s) to be the program term from state s,
and mem(s) to be the memory from state s. Deﬁne traces(P) to be the set of all
traces t such that prog(t[0]) is P, and for all i, t[i] ! t[i + 1]. This construction
encodes P as a set of traces and is an instance of our general construction for
encoding LTSs (c.f. x5.3); here there are only LTS-states and no labels.
165Second, we formalize Boudol and Castellani’s security policy. Let =L be
an equivalence relation on memories such that 1 =L 2 means 1 and 2 are
indistinguishable to a low observer. State s can step to state s0 in program P,
denoted stepsP(s;s0), if
(9t 2 	inf;i 2 N : t 2 traces(P) ^ t[i] = s ^ t[i + 1] = s
0):
Deﬁne P
L (read “bisimilar”) to be a binary relation on P such that if s1 is bisim-
ilar to s2, then s1 and s2 must have indistinguishable memories to a low ob-
server; further, if s1 can step to state s0
1, then either s0
1 is bisimilar to s2, or s2 can
step to s0
2 where s0
1 and s0
2 are bisimilar. Formally, P
L is the largest symmetric
binary relation on P such that
s1 
P
L s2 =) mem(s1) =L mem(s2)
^(9s
0
1 2  : stepsP(s1;s
0
1) =) s
0
1 
P
L s2
_ (9s
0
2 2  : stepsP(s2;s
0
2) ^ s
0
1 
P
L s
0
2)):
Relation P
L formalizes Deﬁnition 3.5 (( ;L)-Bisimulation) from [18].
Boudol and Castellani deﬁne program P to be secure, which we denote
BCNI(P), iff P is bisimilar to itself in all initially low-equivalent memories:
BCNI(P) , (81;2 : 1 =L 2 =) (P;1) 
P
L (P;2)):
BCNI(P) formalizes Deﬁnition 3.8 (Secure Programs) from [18]. The hyper-
property containing all secure programs according to Boudol and Castellani’s
deﬁnition is
BCNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 LTS =) (9P : T = traces(P) ^ BCNI(P))g:
BCNI is hyperliveness because of the existential quantiﬁer on s0
2 in the deﬁ-
nition of P
L: any observation that contains traces leading to non-bisimilar states
166can be remedied by adding additional traces leading to bisimilar states. This re-
mediation corresponds to a closure operator because it only adds traces, thus
BCNI is a possibilistic information-ﬂow policy.
5.4 State Machines
Goguen and Meseguer [46] deﬁne a state machine as a tuple (S;C;O;out;do;s0),
where S is a set of machine states, C is a set of commands, O is a set of outputs,
out is a function from S to O yielding what output the user of the machine
observes when the machine is in a given state, do is a function from S  C
to S describing how the machine transitions between states as a function of
commands, and s0 is the initial state of the machine.7 Such state machines are
deterministic because do is a function rather than a relation.
A state machine M = (S;C;O;out;do;s0) can be encoded as a set of traces.
The construction proceeds in two steps. First, M is encoded as a labeled transi-
tion system (c.f. x5.3) by treating the machine commands and outputs as labels:
Let the set ^ S of LTS-states be set S of machine states. Let the set ^ L of labels be
product set C  O of commands and outputs. Let the transition relation ! in-
clude (s;(c;o);s0) whenever do(s;c) = s0 and out(s0) = o. We now have a labeled
transition system L = (^ S; ^ L;!). Second, the traces of M are the traces of L that
start with s0: let traces(M) be traces(^ S;L;!) \ ft 2 	inf j t[0] = s0g.
The set SM of all state machines is a hyperproperty:
SM , fT 2 Prop j (9M : T = traces(M))g: (5.4.1)
7Our deﬁnition of state machines simpliﬁes Goguen and Meseguer’s by omitting user clear-
ances, though the clearances still appear in the deﬁnition of GMNI.
167Finally, we can declare that GMNI is hypersafety for SM, fulﬁlling our expec-
tation from the beginning of this chapter.
5.5 Probabilistic Systems
A probabilistic system is equipped with a function p such that the system tran-
sitions from a state s to state s0 with probability p(s;s0).8 This probability is
Markovian because it does not depend upon past or future states in an execution;
nonetheless, dependence upon the past or future can be modeled by allowing
states to contain history or prophecy variables [1]. Function p can itself even be
encoded into the state in various ways. For example, state s could record p(s;s0)
for all states s0. Or in a trace t, state t[i] could record p(t[i];t[i + 1]). This lat-
ter encoding is an instantiation of the construction in x5.3 for encoding labeled
transition systems as sets of traces; here, the labels are probabilities. Either way,
probabilistic systems can be modeled as sets of traces. Deﬁne PR to be the set
of all trace sets that encode probabilistic systems—that is, trace set T is in PR if
T encodes a valid probability function p(;).
Toobtainaprobabilitymeasureonsetsoftraces, letPrs;S(T)denotetheprob-
ability with which set T of ﬁnite traces is produced by probabilistic system S
beginning in initial state s.9 O’Neill et al. [96] show how to construct this prob-
ability measure from p. We now demonstrate how the measure can be used in
the deﬁnitions of hyperproperties.
8To be a valid probability, p(s;s0) must be in the real interval [0,1] for all s and s0; and for all
s, it most hold that
P
s0 p(s;s0) = 1.
9The initial state can be eliminated if we also assume a prior probability on initial states [52,
x6.5]. The requirement that the traces in T be ﬁnite is, however, essential to ensure that Prs;S(T)
is a valid probability measure.
168Probabilistic noninterference. In information-ﬂow security, the original mo-
tivation for adding probability to system models was to address covert chan-
nels and to establish connections between information theory and information
ﬂow [48,49,88]. Probabilistic noninterference [49] emerged from this line of re-
search. Intuitively, this policy requires that the probability of every low trace be
the same for every low-equivalent initial state. To formulate probabilistic non-
interference as a hyperproperty, we need some notation. Let the low equivalence
class of a ﬁnite trace t be denoted [t]L, where
[t]L , ft
0 2 	n j evL(t) = evL(t
0)g:
The probability that system S, starting in state s, produces a trace that is low-
equivalent to t is therefore Prs;S([t]L). Let the set of initial states of trace property
T be denoted Init(T), where
Init(T) , fs j fsg  Tg:
Probabilistic noninterference can now be expressed as follows:
PNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 PR
^ (8s1;s2 2 Init(T) : evL(s1) = evL(s2)
=) (8t 2 	n : Prs1;T([t]L) = Prs2;T([t]L)))g: (5.5.1)
PNI is not hyperliveness for PR, because a system that deterministically
produces two non-low-equivalent traces from two initial low-equivalent states
cannot be extended to satisfy PNI. Whether PNI is hypersafety for PR depends
on whether state space  is ﬁnite. To see why, consider a system T such that
T = 2 PNI and T 2 PR. We can attempt to construct a bad thing M for T as
follows. Since T = 2 PNI, there exists a trace tL of low events that is produced by
169initial states s1 and s2 with differing probabilities. Let M be the preﬁx of T that
completely determines the probability of tL for those initial states:
M = ft 2 	n j t[0] 2 fs1;s2g ^ t  T ^ evL(t) = tLg:
Recall that bad things must be ﬁnitely observable and irremediable. M is irre-
mediable because no extension of it can change the probability of tL for initial
states s1 and s2. But is M ﬁnitely observable—that is, is M 2 Obs? Recall that an
element of Obs must be a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces. Each trace in M is ﬁnite, but
M might not be a ﬁnite set:
 If state space  is countably inﬁnite,10 there could be inﬁnitely many states
to which s1 (and s2) transition. Hence there could need to be inﬁnitely
many traces in M to completely determine the probability of tL, so M
could not be in Obs. Moreover, any ﬁnite subset N of M would necessarily
omit some states from . So it might be possible to extend N to a system T 0
that satisﬁes PNI by adding traces containing those omitted states. Thus
T would have no bad thing, and PNI would not be hypersafety for PR.
 If  is ﬁnite, only ﬁnitely many ﬁnite traces are low-equivalent to tL. Thus
M is ﬁnite, and no extension of T 0 of M can change the probability of tL.
So T 0 cannot be in PNI. Therefore PNI is hypersafety for PR.
Gray’s deﬁnition of probabilistic noninterference [49] is hypersafety for PR, be-
cause Gray required the state (and input and output) space to be ﬁnite. But the
deﬁnition of O’Neill et al. [96] is neither hypersafety nor hyperliveness, because
it allowed a countably inﬁnite state space.
10Statespacecannotbeuncountablyinﬁnitewithoutgeneralizingprobabilityfunctionp(;)
to a probability measure.
170Secure encryption. A private-key encryption scheme is a tuple (M, K, C, Gen,
Enc, Dec), where M is the message space, K is the key space, and C is the ciphertext
space such that the following hold:
 Gen is the key-generation algorithm, a randomized algorithm that produces
a key k 2 K. We write k   Gen to denote the sampling of k from the
probability distribution induced by Gen.
 Enc is the encryption algorithm, an algorithm (either randomized or deter-
ministic) that accepts a key k 2 K, a plaintext message m 2 M, and yields
a ciphertext c 2 C that is the encryption of m using k. We denote this as
c = Enc(m;k).
 Dec is the decryption algorithm, a deterministic algorithm that accepts a key
k 2 K, a ciphertext c 2 C, and yields a plaintext m that is the decryption of
c using k. We denote this as m = Dec(c;k).
 Decryption is the inverse of encryption. Formally, for all m 2 M and
k 2 K, it holds that Pr(Dec(Enc(m;k);k) = m) = 1.
A private-key encryption scheme satisﬁes perfect indistinguishability [61] if the
probability distribution on ciphertexts is the same for all plaintexts. Formally,
for all m1, m2, and c,
Pr(k   Gen : Enc(m1;k) = c) = Pr(k   Gen : Enc(m2;k) = c):
Perfect indistinguishability can be formulated as a hyperproperty on prob-
abilistic systems. To encode encryption scheme (M, K, C, Gen, Enc, Dec) as a
probabilistic system, let the set of states of the system be
M [ K [ C [ fGeng [ fEnc(m;k) j k 2 K;m 2 Mg
[ fDec(c;k) j k 2 K;c 2 Cg:
171Let probability function p(;) be deﬁned such that
 p(Gen;k) = Pr(k = Gen),
 p(Enc(m;k);c) = Pr(c = Enc(m;k)), and
 p(Dec(c;k);m) = 1 iff Dec(c;k) = m.
Let the system so constructed from (M, K, C, Gen, Enc, Dec) be denoted
encSys(M;K;C;Gen;Enc;Dec);
and let the set of all such systems be ES. The following hyperproperty expresses
perfect indistinguishability:
PI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 ES
^ (9M;K;C;Gen;Enc;Dec :
T = encSys(M;K;C;Gen;Enc;Dec)
^ (8m1;m2 2 M;c 2 C :
Pr(Enc(m1) = c)
= Pr(Enc(m2) = c)))g; (5.5.2)
where Pr(Enc(m) = c) denotes
X
k2K
PrGen;T(fGen;kg)  PrEnc(m;k);T(fEnc(m;k);cg):
PI is hypersafety for ES because any encryption scheme that is not in PI
has a ciphertext c and two messages m1, m2 such that the probability that m1
encrypts to c is not equal to the probability that m2 encrypts to c. Trace set
fEnc(m;k);c j k 2 K;m 2 fm1;m2gg thus is irremediable, and it is ﬁnite assum-
ing that key space K is ﬁnite. So the trace set is a bad thing. But note that PI is
not subset closed for Prop, so stepwise reﬁnement is not applicable with PI.
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guishability in various attacker models (including IND-CPA and IND-CCA),
can similarly be formulated as hyperproperties.
Quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow. Probability can also be used to reason
about the amount of information that a system can leak. For example, chan-
nel capacity is the maximum rate at which information can be reliably sent over
a channel [106]; Gray [49] formulates as a channel the leakage of secret infor-
mation from a system, and he quantiﬁes the capacity of that channel. The hy-
perproperty “The channel capacity is k bits” (denoted CCk) is hyperliveness for
PR, since no matter what the rate is for some ﬁnite preﬁx of the system, the rate
can changed to any arbitrary amount by an appropriate extension that conveys
more or less information.
Chapter 2 gives a model and metric for quantifying the leakage over a series
of experiments on a program S. The policy specifying that the leakage is less
than k bits for all experiments, denoted QLk, is hypersafety for a variant of PR,
as we now show.
Recall that a state of a probabilistic program has an immutable high pro-
jection and a mutable low projection, that a repeated experiment on probabilistic
program S is a ﬁnite sequence of executions of S, and that each individual ex-
ecution is an experiment. An experiment can be represented with two states: an
initial state, in which inputs are provided to the program, and a ﬁnal state, in
which outputs are given by the program. All initial states (across all executions)
in a repeated experiment must have the same high projection but may have dif-
ferent low projections. Recall that the probabilistic behavior of S is modeled by
a semantics [[S]] that maps inputs states to output distributions, where ([[S]]s)(s0)
173is the probability that S begun in state s terminates in state s0. An attacker be-
gins an experiment with a prebelief about the high projection of the initial state.
After observing the output of the execution, the attacker updates his prebelief
to produce a postbelief about the high projection of the initial state.
We here use traces and events to represent repeated experiments, where each
state in a trace produces an event. The events alternate between input and out-
put, and the ﬁrst event in a trace must be an input. Each output must have the
correct probability of occurring according to [[S]] and the most recent input.11
Each low input projection may vary, but the high projection must be the same
in each input. Let Syst(S) denote the system of such traces resulting from pro-
gram S:
Syst(S) , ft 2 	n j (8i : 0  2i + 1  jtj
=) evHin(t[2i]) = evHin(t[0])
^ p(t[2i];t[2i + 1]) = ([[S]]t[2i])(t[2i + 1]))g;
where jtj denotes the length of ﬁnite trace t, and p(;) is the probability function
used in x5.5. From Syst(S) we can construct probability measure Prs;Syst(S), also
used in x5.5.12
Each pair of states t[i] and t[i+1], for even i, in repeated experiment t yields
anexperiment. Anexperimentisdescribedformallybyaprebelief, ahighinput,
a low input, a low output, and a postbelief.
11A representation in which each ﬁnite trace contains two states (initial and ﬁnal) might at
ﬁrst seem suitable for repeated experiments. That representation would fail to preserve the
order in which inputs are provided (in initial states) across the sequence of executions in the
repeated experiment. However, a single trace with many states does capture this order.
12Note that p(s;s0) is deﬁned only at every other state in each trace of Syst(S), so to construct
the measure we treat each pair of states in the trace a single state. Also note that the set of
program states must be ﬁnite for the probability measure to be well-deﬁned.
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diction A of the low output is calculated from prebelief bH and low input l:
A(bH;l) , s:bH(evHin(s))  Prr;Syst(S)(frsg);
where r is the state that has evHin(s) as its high projection and l as its low projec-
tion. Denote the ith experiment in trace t, with initial prebelief bH, as E(t;i;bH).
We deﬁne E(t;i;bH) using OCaml-style record syntax:
E(t;i;bH) , f preBelief = if i > 0 then E(t;i   1):postBelief else bH;
highIn = evHin(t[2i]);
lowIn = evL(t[2i]);
lowOut = evL(t[2i + 1]);
postBelief = (A(bH;l)jlowOut)H g;
where j is the distribution conditioning operator, and is the distribution pro-
jection operator, deﬁned in x2.1.
The quantity of ﬂow in experiment E(t;i;bH) is denoted Q(E(t;i;bH)) and
deﬁned in x2.3.1. The quantity of ﬂow over repeated experiment t with initial
prebelief bH, denoted Q(t;bH), is the sum of the ﬂow for each experiment in t:
Q(t;bH) ,
(jtj 1)=2 X
i=0
Q(E(t;i;bH)):
Hyperproperty QLk is the set of all systems that exhibit at most k bits of ﬂow
over any experiment:
QLk , fT 2 Prop j (9S : T = Syst(S) =) (8t 2 T;bH : Q(bH;t)  k))g:
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The results proved in chapter 4 about hypersafety and hyperliveness generalize
naturally to speciﬁc system representations.13 Informally, the generalizations
are as follows:
 If P is safety (liveness) for Rep, then [P] is hypersafety (hyperliveness) for
Rep (generalizing propositions 4.1 and 4.2).
 If P is hypersafety for Rep, then P is subset closed for Rep, but not nec-
essarily subset closed for Prop (generalizing theorem 4.1). Consequently,
stepwise reﬁnement does not necessarily work with hyperproperties that
are hypersafety for Rep.
 If P is a possibilistic information-ﬂow policy for Rep, then P is hyperlive-
ness for Rep (generalizing theorem 4.3).
 k-hypersafety for Rep can be reduced to safety for Rep
k (generalizing the-
orem 4.2).
 Every hyperproperty for Rep is the intersection of a safety hyperproperty
for Rep with a liveness hyperproperty for Rep (generalizing theorem 4.5).
We give the formal statements of these generalized results below. The proofs of
these results are all straightforward corollaries of the original results, although
some proofs require additional assumptions about Rep.
First, we must deﬁne safety and liveness for system representations. Let
Tr(Rep) denote the set of all traces that are contained in any system in Rep—that
is, Tr(Rep) =
S
T2Rep T. Let Obs(Tr(Rep)) denote the set of all ﬁnite traces that
are preﬁxes of some trace in Tr(Rep)—that is, Obs(Tr(Rep)) = ft 2 	n j (9t0 2
13We do not generalize the topological results here. However, since the intersection theorem
generalizes, we believe that the topological results could also be generalized.
176Tr(Rep) : t  t0)g. Let the lift [P]Rep of property P in Rep be P(P) \ Rep. A trace
property S is a safety property for system representation Rep iff
(8t 2 Tr(Rep) : t = 2 S =) (9m 2 Obs(Tr(Rep)) : m  t ^
(8t
0 2 Tr(Rep) : m  t
0 =) t
0 = 2 S))):
A trace property L is a liveness property for system representation Rep iff
(8t 2 Obs(Tr(Rep)) : (9t
0 2 Tr(Rep) : t  t
0 ^ t
0 2 L)):
Note that, compared to the original deﬁnitions of safety and liveness in chap-
ter 4, we have simply replaced 	inf with Tr(Rep), and 	n with Obs(Tr(Rep)).
Let SP(Rep) be the set of all safety properties for Rep, and let LP(Rep) be the set
of all liveness properties for Rep. Likewise, let SHP(Rep) be the set of all safety
hyperproperties for Rep, and let LHP(Rep) be the set of all liveness hyperprop-
erties for Rep.
Generalization of proposition 4.1. If (8t 2 Tr(Rep) : ftg 2 Rep), then
(8S 2 P(Rep) : S 2 SP(Rep) () [S]Rep 2 SHP(Rep)):
The forward direction of this generalization always holds, but the backward
direction ((=) might not hold if Rep does not allow individual traces from
Tr(Rep) to be representations: the bad thing for a safety hyperproperty could
never be an individual trace, hence the safety hyperproperty could not be the
lift of a safety property. So the backward direction requires the assumption that
any individual trace in Tr(Rep) is itself a system representation in Rep—that is,
(8t 2 Tr(Rep) : ftg 2 Rep). Note that Prop satisﬁes this assumption.
Generalization of proposition 4.2. If (8T  Tr(Rep) : T 2 Rep), then
(8L 2 P(Rep) : L 2 LP(Rep) () [L]Rep 2 LHP(Rep)):
177The backward direction of this generalization always holds, but the forward
direction (=)) might not hold if Rep does not allow arbitrary unions of indi-
vidual traces from Tr(Rep) to be representations: the union of the individual
good things for a liveness property would not necessarily be good for the lift
of that liveness property. So the forward direction requires the assumption that
arbitrary unions of individual traces in Tr(Rep) are themselves system repre-
sentations in Rep—that is, (8T  Tr(Rep) : T 2 Rep). Note that Prop satisﬁes
this assumption.
Generalization of theorem 4.1. If (9L 2 LP(Rep) : L 6= Tr(Rep)), then
SHP(Rep)  SSC(Rep):
SSC(Rep) is the set of all hyperproperties for Rep that are subset closed on Rep:
P 2 SSC(Rep) () (8T 2 P : (8T
0 2 Rep : T
0  T =) T
0 2 P)):
The strictness of the subset in the theorem generalization requires the assump-
tion that there exist subset-closed hyperproperties that are not safety. But it
sufﬁces to instead assume that hyperliveness is not trivial for Rep—that is,
(9L 2 LP(Rep) : L 6= Tr(Rep)). Note that Prop satisﬁes both assumptions.
Generalization of theorem 4.2.
(8S 2 Rep;K 2 KSHP(k)(Rep) : (9K 2 SP(Rep) : S j= K () S
k j= K)):
KSHP(k)(Rep) is the subset of SHP(Rep) where the size of bad thing M is
bounded by k.
178Generalization of theorem 4.3. If there exists some liveness hyperproperty for
Rep that is not a possibilistic information-ﬂow policy for Rep, then
PIF(Rep)  LHP(Rep):
PIF(Rep) is the set of all possibilistic information-ﬂow policies expressed by clo-
sure operators Cl of type Rep ! Rep. The strictness of the subset requires the
assumption of the existence of a liveness hyperproperty for Rep that is not a
possibilistic information-ﬂow policy for Rep. Note that Prop satisﬁes this as-
sumption.
Generalization of theorem 4.5.
(8P 2 P(Rep) : (9S 2 SHP(Rep);L 2 LHP(Rep) : P = S \ L)):
The proof of this generalization requires the following generalized deﬁnition:
Safe(P) , fT 2 Rep j (8M 2 Obs(Rep) : M  T
=) (9T
0 2 Rep : M  T
0 ^ T
0 2 P))g:
Also, in the deﬁnition of Live(P), notation H must now denote the complement
of hyperproperty H with respect to Rep.
5.7 Summary
This chapter has classiﬁed several security policies with hypersafety and hy-
perliveness for particular system representations. Figure 5.1 summarizes this
classiﬁcation.
We have shown that the theory of hyperproperties can be generalized to ap-
ply to system representations such as relational semantics, labeled transition
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SHP LHP
PIF
[LP]
[SP] = KSHP(1)
KSHP(2)
GMNI 
TIRNI
TSRNI 
PNI
QLk
PI 
BNDC
BCNI
CCk
Figure 5.1: Classiﬁcation of security policies for system representations
systems, state machines, and probabilistic systems. In each case, we encode the
system representation into trace sets, thus into hyperproperties. All of our theo-
remsabouthyperpropertiescontinuetoholdforsystemrepresentations, though
some additional assumptions about the system representation are needed.
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CONCLUSION
In practice, computer security policies are often expressed as informal re-
quirements in natural languages (e.g., English), which are inherently ambigu-
ous. But security policies can also be expressed precisely with mathematical
models and notations, and this precision makes policies amenable to analysis
both by humans and computers.
This dissertation has developed such mathematical foundations. Informa-
tion theory was used in chapters 2 and 3 to quantify information-ﬂow security.
This quantiﬁcation is useful for analyzing the security of systems whose proper
operation requires leakage of information, such as password checkers and sta-
tistical databases. We showed that accuracy of belief can be used to quantify
information ﬂow for both conﬁdentiality and integrity, and that accuracy gen-
eralizes previous metrics based on uncertainty. Hyperproperties were used in
chapters 4 and 5 to formalize security policies. This formalization is the ﬁrst to
enable expression of all kinds of security requirements in a uniform framework.
We showed that the theory of trace properties generalizes to hyperproperties.
The historical background in x1.1 began with the taxonomy of conﬁdential-
ity, integrity, and availability. More research is needed on the relationship be-
tween this taxonomy and the formalisms we have studied. For quantitative
ﬂow, we have given deﬁnitions for conﬁdentiality and integrity, but availability
remains unexplored. For hyperproperties, the relationship with the taxonomy
is an open question, but we can offer some observations:
 Information-ﬂow conﬁdentiality is not a trace property, but it is a hyper-
property, and it can be hypersafety (e.g., observational determinism) or
hyperliveness (e.g., generalized noninterference).
181 Integrity, as the information-ﬂow dual of conﬁdentiality, includes exam-
ples from both hypersafety and hyperliveness. And when stipulating ac-
cess control on changes to data and other resources, integrity is safety.
 Availability is sometimes hypersafety (maximum response time in any
execution, which is also safety) and sometimes hyperliveness (mean re-
sponse time over all executions).
The classiﬁcation of security requirements as conﬁdentiality, integrity, and
availability therefore would seem to be orthogonal to hypersafety and hyper-
liveness.
More research is also needed on how to obtain assurance that real systems
meet the security deﬁnitions we have given. For quantitative ﬂow, one impor-
tant open question is how to make our theoretical policies practical in real sys-
tems, either by enforcing a limit on information ﬂow or by measuring the actual
amount of information ﬂow. For hyperproperties, we gave a relatively complete
veriﬁcation methodology for k-hypersafety properties, but whether there is a
relatively complete veriﬁcation methodology for all hyperproperties remains
an important open question.
The immediate goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to im-
prove our understanding of the foundations of computer security so that we
can specify system security requirements and gain assurance that systems meet
those requirements. But the ultimate goal is to ameliorate the real-world con-
sequences of security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were a motivation
for the 1991 report by the System Security Study Committee of the National
Research Council:
“Computer systems are coming of age. As [they] become more
prevalent, sophisticated, ...and interconnected, society becomes
182more vulnerable to poor system design, accidents..., and attacks.
Without more responsible design and use, system disruptions will
increase, with harmful consequences for society.” [92, Executive
Summary]
Now, almost two decades later, it seems clear not only that the Committee
was right, but that the potential for disruptions and the severity of their con-
sequences continues to increase. It is my hope that the research presented in
this dissertation will in some way help to reduce the economic, defense, and
social consequences of security vulnerabilities.
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